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THE MARYLAND "JEW BILL": A FOOTNOTE TO THOMAS JEFFERSON'S WORK FOR FREEDOM OF RELIGION*

JOSEPH L. BLAU

TO THE END OF HIS LIFE, in 1826, Thomas Jefferson was proud of the great *Act for Establishing Religious Freedom* which he wrote, and which was passed by the Assembly of Virginia in 1786. Inspired, in this instance, by John Locke's view that men's religious professions should in no wise affect their civil status, Jefferson wrote these words, vital today as when they were first composed:

> Well aware . . . that our civil rights have no dependence on our religious professions, more than our opinions in physics and geometry; that, therefore, the proscribing any citizen as unworthy the public confidence by laying upon him an incapacity of being called to the offices of trust and emolument, unless he profess or renounce this or that religious opinion, is depriving him injuriously of those privileges and advantages to which in common with his fellow citizens he has a natural right. . . . Be it therefore enacted by the General Assembly . . . that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinions in matters of religion, and that the same shall in nowise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities. . . .[1]

The principle presented by Jefferson was enshrined in the Constitution of the United States of America.[2] It was still further extended by the specific statement of the first amendment to the Constitution, adopted two years later, in 1791.[3] No state which entered the Union after the adoption of the Constitution could violate, in its state constitution, this fundamental tenet of our democracy.

The influence of Jefferson in the acceptance of these principles makes it clear why, although Jefferson knew very little about the Jewish religion and was, in fact, unsympathetic towards it, he steadfastly maintained the right of the individual Jew to practise his religion free from

* Read at the annual meeting of the American Jewish Historical Society, February 12, 1944.

1. Thomas Jefferson: *An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom.*

2. Article VI, "Miscellaneous Provisions," section 3: ". . . no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States."

3. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."

the economic, social, and political handicaps imposed by bigotry.[4] The influence of Jefferson was such that more and more opportunities arose for the Jew to take his place in the development of America.

While the newly formed states started with religious tolerance, in some of the older states, whose constitutions preceded that of the United States, old barriers, traditional obstacles, were permitted to linger on beyond their time. Such was the case with the state of Maryland, whose constitution and bill of rights, adopted as early as November, 1776, retained a religious test clause which effectively disqualified any sincere Jewish religionist from holding state office.[5] This was especially unfortunate in the light of the fact that the constitution of this state was, in many respects, an extremely liberal document, so that to many it seemed that the "religious restriction was an alien and disjointed member of that compact."[6]

Not only was politics a closed career for those who could not subscribe to this religious test; non-subscribers could not even practise law, and an important professional path was thus closed to them. Among the Jews of Baltimore, there were some to whom such a situation was intolerable and demanded remedial action. Such a public-spirited Jewish citizen, Solomon Etting (1764-1847), with the help of his father-in-law, Bernard Gratz, formerly of Philadelphia, began, in 1797, a thirty year fight to eliminate the religious test from Maryland law.[7] The first step in the long struggle was a Memorial or petition to the House of Delegates, composed by Etting, setting forth the grievances of his co-religionists, that "they are a set of people called Jews and that they are thereby deprived of many of the invaluable rights of citizenship."[8] Al-

4. Lee M. Friedman: *Jewish Pioneers and Patriots* (Philadelphia, 1942), pp. 34-35.

5. Cf. J. H. Hollander, "The Civil Status of the Jews of Maryland" in *Publications* of The American Jewish Historical Society, II, p. 44, for the substance of article 35 of the bill of rights and article 55 of the constitution, in both of which a religious test is prescribed.

6. Col. W. G. D. Worthington, in a speech before the Maryland House of Delegates in 1824. cf. *Speeches on the Jew Bill, in the House of Delegates of Maryland by H. M. Brackenridge, Col. W. G. D. Worthington, and John S. Tyson, Esquire . . .* (Philadelphia, 1829), p. 103.

7. Cf. Matthew Page Andrews: *History of Maryland, Province and State* (New York, 1929), p. 450. For further details on the life of Solomon Etting, cf. Aaron Baroway, "Solomon Etting, 1764-1847," in *Maryland Historical Magazine*, XV (1920), 1-20.

8. Excerpts from Etting's Memorial are set forth in E. Milton Altfeld: *The Jew's Struggle for Religious and Civil Liberty in Maryland* (Baltimore, 1924), p. 10. cf. also B. H. Hartogensis, "Unequal Religious Rights in Maryland since 1776," in *Publications* of The American Jewish Historical Society, XXV, p. 95.

though this memorial was finally shelved in 1801, Etting presented subsequent petitions in 1802, 1803, and 1804. Each of these received the same scant attention; in 1804, however, the early supporters of full civil rights for the Jews of Maryland, who seem to have included William Pinkney and, possibly, Jeremiah Sullivan of Baltimore,[9] demanded a vote on the disposition of the petition. So decisively were the proponents of Jewish rights defeated that no further action was taken for twelve years.

Meanwhile, Thomas Jefferson had become President of the United States, and, in this capacity, had appointed Reuben Etting, brother of Solomon, as U. S. Marshal for Maryland.[10] Thus Marylanders faced an anomalous situation in which federal jurisdiction in their state was exercised by one who could not even have entered the legal profession under their own constitution. Meanwhile, too, the western, mountainous counties of Maryland, whose conditions were similar to those of the western, mountainous section of Virginia from which Jefferson had come, were sending legislators of Jeffersonian views to the Maryland House of Delegates. As these western counties grew in strength, the possibility of a tolerant, Jeffersonian solution drew nearer.

One such Maryland Jeffersonian, whose whole political career was tied to the Jewish question, was Thomas Kennedy. Kennedy was born in Paisley, Scotland, in 1776, the year of American independence, and the year in which the religious test was incorporated in the Maryland constitution. He came to this country in 1796; according to one account, written by himself late in his life, his journey from Scotland began on April 18, 1796, the twenty-first anniversary of Paul Revere's famous ride.[11] After a romantic meeting with his brother, who had preceded him to this country, Kennedy settled in Washington County, Maryland, where he took an active interest in politics and wrote some abominable poetry, which he published at his own expense.

To this poetry we may now turn to discover the extent to which Jef-

9. Cf. Hartogensis, *op. cit.*, p. 95, for Pinkney. For Sullivan, cf. Altfeld, *op. cit.*, p. 205, n., quoting *Niles Register* for January 16, 1826. Among the many other inaccuracies of his book, Altfeld seems not to have considered the inclusion of Sullivan's name in this early account worthy of comment.

10. Cf. *Speeches on the Jew Bill*, p. 115.

11. Cf. T. J. C. Williams, "Washington County, Maryland," in *Maryland Historical Magazine*, II (1907), 350. The date of Kennedy's departure from Scotland is given as 1795 by his granddaughter, Anna Howell Kennedy Findlay, "Where 'the Captain' was Found," *ibid.*, XXXIII (1938), 116.

ferson's influence had worked on Kennedy in a few short years. For in 1800, this amateur poet referred to Jefferson and to the Act to Establish Religious Liberty in Virginia in these limpingly laudatory lines of his "Song of Liberty":

> Acting in a noble cause
> He abolished cruel laws;
> Set the mind and body free,
> He's the son of Liberty.
>
> Few like Jefferson we find
> Among the sons of human kind.
> Friend of peace and honesty
> Is the son of Liberty.[12]

Kennedy was elected to the Maryland House of Delegates in 1818 and, on December 9th of that year, offered a resolution calling for the appointment of a committee to consider the justice and expediency of "placing the Jewish inhabitants on an equal footing with the Christian."[13] The committee, of which Kennedy was made Chairman, presented about two weeks later a bill entitled, "An act to extend to the sect of people professing the Jewish religion, the same right and privileges that are enjoyed by Christians." The bill was given its first reading immediately; the second reading, originally scheduled for January 13, 1819, took place exactly a week after the scheduled date. At this time, the bill was defeated, 50 to 24.[14]

Speeches in favor of the bill were made by Kennedy, by E. S. Thomas, and by Judge H. M. Brackenridge; the opponents were represented by one speaker only. Kennedy's speech reveals the nature of the man. Although he was a politician, he was not of the pork-barrel variety, but, rather, was devoted to the abstract principles of democratic government, such as he might have learned from Jefferson. For, despite his

12. Quoted by Altfeld, *op. cit.*, p. 17. It would be interesting to discover whether this poem was an occasional piece arising out of the stormy campaign of 1800, or whether it was of earlier origin. Inasmuch as the election of Jefferson did not become a matter of record until early in 1801, it could not have been an attempt to curry favor with a winner. Cf. Thomas Kennedy, *Poems*. Printed by D. Rapine for the Author, Washington City (Md.), 1816.

13. Altfeld, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

sponsorship of this bill, which from this time was called by proponents and antagonists alike the "Jew bill," he noted that there were no Jews in the county from which he was elected. Further, he stated that there were few Jews in the United States, very few in Maryland, but that, even if there were only one Jew, that one would be entitled to justice. If, he continued, any test at all were to be considered necessary under a republican government, that test should be political rather than religious.[15]

The speech of Judge Brackenridge, who seems to have been an accomplished lawyer and orator, also betrays a strong Jeffersonian bent.[16] So, for example, Brackenridge insisted that temporal power can restrain action, not opinion; that religion, as such, is a matter entirely between man and his God; that there should be no coercion in matters of religion; that on these

> self-evident truths . . . are built the *rights of conscience*, so little understood, or at least respected, in most countries, not so well, I confess it with regret, in Maryland, as they ought to be, but perfectly so in the constitution of the United States; an instrument for which we are indebted as a nation, to the high estimation of enlightened men, and which has conferred on our country, the reputation of being the land of freedom and toleration.[17]

Jeffersonian, too, was Brackenridge's insistence that "*Every* citizen is entitled to *all* the privileges of citizenship;"[18] this assertion was made in answer to those who maintained that the privileges of citizenship should be restricted to those who conformed to the prevailing religious tenets of their communities.

The legal training of the speaker makes his constitutional argument interesting. Brackenridge maintained the primacy of the federal over the state constitution in matters of difference; he therefore insisted that the principle of "no religious test"[19] had been secured to the citizens of

15. The full text of Kennedy's speech is available in *A Sketch of the Proceedings in the Legislature of Maryland December, 1818* (Baltimore, 1819).

16. The full text can be found in *Speeches on the Jew Bill*, pp. 60-82. The contemporaneous publication in Berlin of a German translation *(Breckenridge's Rede über gleiche Rechte der Juden mit den Christen)* indicates how widespread was the interest in this issue.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 63.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

19. Constitution of the United States, Article VI, section 3.

Maryland by their ratification of the federal constitution.[20] Brackenridge also pointed out that the intent of the religious test in England was not primarily religious, but political, that it arose out of the contest between Catholic and Protestant groups for political supremacy. From this historical argument, he derived the conclusion that a religious test was unsuited to conditions in the United States, where religion and politics had been completely separated.[21]

Finally, Brackenridge considered the general "racist" type of argument, that the Jews are in some respect inferior in character. This he denied categorically, and insisted that the Jewish people are perhaps entitled to first rank among the nations, because they were "the chosen people," and because Jesus and the apostles were Jewish. Whatever the Jews of his day were, he asserted, their enemies had made them; in the United States, freed from enemies, they were "estimable," at least in the same proportion as other people. Finally, he stated that there was nothing in the Jewish religion which disqualified the Jew from discharging the duties and fulfilling the obligations of a citizen of Maryland.[22]

Intense interest was stirred up in many parts of the country by the fight that was being waged for the bill. In Naphtali Phillips' Tammany-sponsored *National Advocate,* at this time edited by Mordecai Manuel Noah, there appeared the suggestion, both incorrect and impolitic, that the Catholics of Maryland were united in opposition to the "Jew bill." This called forth an immediate reply from Dr. Joshua I. Cohen of Baltimore, denying the allegation.[23]

Kennedy reintroduced his bill for equal rights in 1820; again it was defeated. In 1822, however, the bill passed the House of Delegates by a

20. *Speeches on the Jew Bill,* pp. 66-67. "I do not hesitate to assert, that could this question be brought before some tribunal competent to decide, I would undertake to maintain, that the right which this bill professes to give, is already *secured* by our national compact; I would boldly contend, that the State of Maryland has deprived, and still continues to deprive, American citizens of their just political rights. If we cannot find it in the express letter of the instrument, can we hesitate for a moment, in believing, that it has at least virtually abrogated every part of state law or constitutions, whose tendency is to infringe the *rights of conscience.*" Thus, we have the unusual situation of a Jeffersonian violating the sanctity of states' rights and advocating a loose construction of the constitution.

21. *Ibid.,* pp. 75-76.

22. *Ibid.,* pp. 77-82.

23. Cf. Aaron Baroway, "The Cohens of Maryland," in *Maryland Historical Magazine,* XIX (1924), 59.

small majority, and needed only the approval of the next session of the legislature in the form of a confirmatory act to become law. To prevent this, the opponents of the measure united to defeat for re-election as many as possible of those who had voted for the bill. In sixteen cases, advocates of the bill were defeated.[24] The political maneuver was a success; the confirmatory act was not passed, despite a very finely worded Memorial addressed to the delegates by Jacob I. Cohen, Jr.[25]

Among the casualties of this 1823 campaign was Thomas Kennedy himself. In his home county, the sole issue of the campaign was the "Jew Bill." The opposition, headed by Benjamin Galloway and Joseph J. Merrick, called itself the "Christian ticket" and represented Kennedy and his associates as running on the "Jew ticket." Some of the advertising published in local newspapers descended to very low levels of abuse. Galloway and his ticket received the overwhelming support of the electorate.[26]

Despite the loss of their leader, the supporters of the "Jew Bill" made a strong effort to have a confirmatory act passed in the 1824 session of the House of Delegates. It is reported that John Van Lear McMahon, who was not even born at the time when Solomon Etting began the agitation for repeal of the test provision, made a five hour speech on the confirmatory act.[27] The featured speech on this occasion was, however, that of Colonel W. G. D. Worthington, a very prominent member of the legislative body.

Of all those whose speeches on this issue have been preserved, Worthington spoke with least oratorical flourish. He argued his case persuasively, with clarity, with facts and statistics. His speech was devoted to establishing that the religious disqualification was contrary to the spirit of the Maryland constitution and to the letter of the constitution of the United States of America; that it contravened the genius and character of both the federal and the state governments; that it consorted ill

24. Hartogensis, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-98, n.

25. Altfeld, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-31, contains a somewhat garbled version of the Cohen Memorial. Cf. Baroway, "The Cohens of Maryland," in *Maryland Historical Magazine*, XVIII (1923), 366-69 for an accurate transcription of the original, which is in the collections of the Maryland Historical Society.

26. Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 351. Cf. Altfeld, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33 for the text of a campaign advertisement published in the *Washington County Herald* on August 18, 1823.

27. Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 351.

with the spirit of the age; and that it was against the policy of the country.[28]

He asserted that the test clause in the Maryland constitution was the relic of an illiberal age in a document which otherwise was liberal in spirit and scope. This constitution was one of the early milestones in the upward process from dependence to freedom, and should be recognized as such and given its most liberal construction; then the test clause, "this repugnant condition, would be controlled and merged in the clear and unequivocal intention of the whole instrument."[29] The federal constitution came into existence in the freer and more tranquil atmosphere of a later period; in it, there is no room for discriminations. *"No religious test* stands in high relief over the very portals of the temple, and intolerance falls broken and prostrate at the sight!"[30] The early documents of the Continental Congress, such as the Address to the Inhabitants of Quebec, showed the same spirit of religious tolerance at work.[31]

To illustrate his point that the spirit of the age was liberal in these matters, Worthington tells of the successful attack on the North Carolina test law carried through by Jacob Henry:

> A person was, some years or so past, elected in the North Carolina legislature; she has a *strict test*—his seat was attempted to be vacated; it was determined that the state test was repugnant to the constitution of the United States, *and he retained his seat!*—he was a Jew! What does this show, but that an isolated and odious disability like this, is swept away before the age.[32]

From Worthington's speech, we learn of a pamphlet opposing the passage of the confirmatory act which was placed on the desk of each delegate. The author, or authors, of this pamphlet hid behind the pen-name "Orthodox." This drew the fire of the Colonel. So, too did the pamphlet's errors of fact, particularly with reference to religious discrimination in other states of the Union. His reply to the work of "Orthodox" also took notice of the implication that the Jews were not interested in the fate of the bill, because they had not agitated the

28. Cf. *Speeches on the Jew Bill*, p. 102.

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 102-3.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 104.

31. Worthington read several quotations from the early Journals of Congress, as well as the address referred to. He also cited Madison's words in support of the Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom. Cf. *Speeches on the Jew Bill*, pp. 104-6.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 107. Cf. Peter Wiernik, *History of the Jews in America* (New York, 1931), pp. 119, 126 for Henry.

cause, and mentioned a memorial, probably that composed by Jacob I. Cohen, Jr., which has already been mentioned:

> No, sir, the Jews have not made "a great clamour," because that would be the means of injuring both their cause and their standing in our country. But directly contrary to the inference of this writer, they have gravely and decorously, feelingly and ably presented, by my hands, a memorial to this honourable body, to relieve them from this test.[33]

The policy of the Union, Worthington continued, and of the individual states was to encourage the immigration of "moral, enterprising, and affluent citizens." By setting up discriminations of any sort against any such citizens, a state discourages these valuable migrants from settling, leading them to prefer some other state in which they are given equal rights. To support his contention that the Jews were valuable citizens Worthington presented his audience with a series of answers by Solomon Etting to a set of five questions of a statistical nature. Etting's answers indicate that the Jews of Maryland were not many, comprising, in fact, but one-fortieth of the total number of Jews in the country; that their wealth, as estimated by Etting, was one-twentieth of the total wealth of the Jews of the country, and that they were, therefore, a somewhat favored community. Etting also listed in his reply such notable Jewish figures of Maryland history as Solomon Bush, B. I. Cohen, and Reuben Etting, and such national figures as Mordecai Manuel Noah, Consul to Tunis, and Commodore Uriah P. Levy.[34]

33. *Speeches on the Jew Bill,* pp. 107-11.

34. *Ibid.,* pp. 112-15. The full text of the Worthington questionnaire and Etting's replies is worthy of quotation:

"Solomon Etting's Answers to Col. Worthington's Queries.

Quest. 1st. The number of Jews in the state of Maryland?

Answer. Supposed, at least, *one hundred and fifty.*

Quest. 2nd. The wealth of the Jews in the state of Maryland?

Answer. General wealth difficult to ascertain; among a few heads of families, may estimate *half a million of dollars.*

Quest. 3d. The number of Jews in the United States?

Ans. At least estimate, six thousand.

Quest. 4th. The wealth of the Jews in the United States?

Ans. This is equally difficult to ascertain with question 2nd. Among the *heads of families,* in the principal cities, we may fairly estimate the wealth at *ten millions of dollars.*

Quest. 5th. What offices have been held, or are now held, by members of the profession?

Ans. To enumerate these, in detail, would be extremely tedious and difficult: we will mention a few within immediate recollection.

Solomon Bush, colonel in the American revolution, a distinguished officer, and who died after the revolution, of the wounds received, or effects arising out of them.

There were many valuable members, *officers, principally,* in the revolution, from the south chiefly, who were nearly all cut off and destroyed early in the war; they were ever at their post, and always foremost in hazardous enterprises.

Reuben Etting—marshal of Maryland, appointed by Mr. Jefferson, and who continued in office until his removal from the state.

Ditto—captain of a volunteer corps, raised very early in Baltimore, long under his command, and grew so numerous as to require being divided into companies, and thrown into the 5th regiment of Maryland militia.

Solomon Etting—Captain 5th regiment Maryland militia, appointed by governor Paca.

B. I. Cohen—Lieutenant in Columbian Volunteers, attached to the 5th regiment Maryland militia, appointed by Charles Ridgely, of Hampton, Esq.

It may be well here to mention, that all the above offices under the state of Maryland, were understood so to be and were held, without subscribing to the religious test oath.

The strongest case applicable to the subject, is one at present existing, and may thus be related:—Early in the spring of the existing year, 1823, a number of spirited young men formed a volunteer corps of riflemen, known by the name of the 'Marion Corps'; without any previous knowledge on his part, of even the existence of this company, they unanimously determined, and did elect Benj. I. Cohen their captain—a commission was received from Governor Stevens, but not qualified to, of course, in consequence of the existence of the *test* law; the corps were made acquainted with this fact, and a resignation on his part of the command by the captain elect—at a meeting of the corps, *called for the purpose,* it was unanimously determined that *no captain should be elected* until the fate of the bill at present before the legislature, should be decided, and the corps is, at this time, commanded by the first lieutenant. This was the corps to which was presented *the flag,* by Governor Stevens, on behalf of Mr. Cohen, as a testimony of his gratitude for their highly distinguished marks of esteem.

There are very many instances of local appointment in the different states, both in a military and civil capacity; wherever the Israelites are numerous, or large and powerful, those of talent will be found amongst them.

M. M. Noah—Major in Pennsylvania, Consul to *Tunis* for the *American government,* and on his return to the country, appointed by the legislature of New York to the important station of Sheriff of their metropolis.

A. A. Massias—Major in the U. S. army during the late war and retained in the service at the reduction of the army; he is now pay-master for the southern department.

U. P. Levy—Lieutenant in the navy of the United States; has repeatedly distinguished himself in the service—last commander of the U. S. schooner Revenge and lately sailed for London and Paris, as bearer of despatches to the ministers of the government at those places.

There are very many midshipmen, cadets, &c &c."

Worthington carried his argument one step further by his assertion that he was fighting not for the creation of a new right, but for the fulfillment of a pledge of freedom to a group of people "descended from a nation of mighty men, famed for military exploits, and their high literary attainments."[35] The test bore heaviest on the good and conscientious, since the bad and hard-hearted would not scruple to swear falsely. Further, he argued that those who gave as their reason for disapproving of the proposed remedy that it applied only to the Jews were talking idly, since the test, in practice, affected only Jews.

> You have no followers of the koran, nor the zenda vesta, nor the morals of Confucius, nor the shaster of the Bramins here, to complain of this test—so that the only people it *practically affects,* are the followers of Moses.[36]

Although the Confirmatory Act did not pass the House of Delegates, and the victory of 1822 was nullified, the proponents of religious liberty in Maryland were not disheartened, for, in the elections held during 1824, Thomas Kennedy was again returned as delegate of Washington County. Again, the "Jew bill" was brought before the House, not in its original form, but as a compromise measure.[37] Kennedy spoke for it. He was introduced by John S. Tyson, Esquire, who spoke briefly before Kennedy. Tyson was a strong supporter of the bill; how strong is evidenced by his somewhat tactless assertion that the Jews who would be aided by the bill were better Christians than the legislators whom he asked to support it:

> You have been born in the midst of Christianity—you have imbibed it, I had almost said, with your mother's milk; you have from the pulpit, week after week, and in the closet, day by day, received line upon line, and precept upon

35. *Ibid.,* p. 123.

36. *Ibid.,* p. 124. Before leaving the subject of Worthington's speech, we should note that, at one point, he calls attention to the benefactions of a Judah Torah, of New Orleans, who is undoubtedly the famous Judah Touro. The story of Touro's generosity, as narrated by Worthington, follows: "No more than a month or two ago, a Protestant Church was involved in debt, in New Orleans, for about $20,000. It was set up at public sale, the pastor and congregation being unable to pay it, and bought by Mr. Judah Torah, a Jew. What did he do with it?—did he convert it into a warehouse, or set it up to make money on it? No: he gave it back at a moderate rent, to the pastor and congregation" (p. 130). This is a remarkable benefaction, even considering that its author made other large scale donations, during his life, such as the $10,000 he gave to make possible the construction of the Bunker Hill monument (cf. Wiernik, *op. cit.,* pp. 144-45).

37. Cf. Hartogensis, *op. cit.,* p. 98.

precept: yet you wander from the line and disobey the precept. The Jew has none of your advantages, and yet he does no worse than you; nay, he does better! for the faithful Jew practises Christianity without professing it—you profess it without practising it.[38]

"There is not a religious sect in the world," said Tyson, "which has not abused power when it possessed it." It might have been Jefferson warring against "spiritual tyranny." "Cloak religious power as you will, you will always discover with it one inseparable companion—the disposition to abuse it."[39] On the positive side, too, Tyson echoed Jefferson. Maryland, he asserted, in a passage based upon the Declaration of Independence, denied to the Jews "the inalienable rights of human nature."[40]

These comments by Tyson were intended merely to spice his introduction of Kennedy. The introduction itself took the form of a tribute to Kennedy in which that gentleman was identified with both Atlas and Sisyphus, and the "Jew bill" with the Hydra.[41] Kennedy's speech marking the final introduction of the bill reiterated the sentiments he had expressed in earlier years. On the very last day of the session, February 26, 1825, with more than one-third of the delegates absent, the bill was enacted, by a vote of 26 to 25. Almost a year later, on January 5, 1826, the Confirmatory Act was passed 45 to 32 without vocal opposition, no special notice being taken of the culmination of a thirty year battle for the principles of liberalism and enlightenment.[42]

It did not take long for the practical effects of the passage of the Confirmatory Act to be felt. Almost immediately, Solomon Etting and Jacob I. Cohen were elected to the Baltimore City Council; Cohen later

38. *Speeches on the Jew Bill*, p. 147.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 148.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 152.

41. *Ibid.*, pp. 155-56: "The only way to get rid of this bill, is to vote for it—otherwise, it will return upon you again; it is invulnerable and immortal; cut off one head, another will rise in its stead . . . I beg pardon of the gentleman from Washington county for thus introducing him to the house. I could not do otherwise, because his name is identified with the Jew bill. . . . He was an early champion of the cause; Atlas-like he bore it upon his shoulders at a time when it was too heavy for all other men—it fell—he raised it—it fell again—he raised it again—and again. Like Sisyphus, he was compelled, alternately, to roll up the stone, and suffer its recoil. . . . Let him consummate the work—He began it, it is his right to end it. . . ."

42. *Cf.* Hartogensis, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-98. The dates as given in Altfeld, *op. cit.*, p. 204, are confused.

became President of its upper chamber.[43] Thus Etting, whose memorial of 1797 marked the opening of the long struggle, and Cohen, whose memorial to the session of 1823-24 kept the battle alive, were deservedly the first to benefit from the fruits of the victory.

Meantime, Kennedy wrote, in 1826,

> I have seen the first of my wishes as a public servant gratified by seeing the principles of civil and religious liberty established in the United States, and in seeing persecuted Children of Israel placed on an equality with their fellow citizens.[44]

Kennedy was a Scotch Presbyterian; Worthington a Protestant Episcopalian; MacMahon an Irish Presbyterian.[45] These men and other supporters of the bill for the relief of the political disabilities of the Jews of Maryland were able to co-operate in political matters, despite their differences in religious belief and practice, because they were all followers of the libertarian views of Thomas Jefferson. How the old man in Monticello must have welcomed the news that Maryland had joined those other states that subscribed to his belief that men's "opinions in matters of religion . . . shall in nowise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities . . ."!

Five months after the "Jew bill" had finally been written into the statute books of the state of Maryland, Jefferson died. His work however, did not die with him. In his own state of Virginia there arose those who disputed his views.[46] His followers in Maryland however, had made it possible for the Jews of that state to reply to queries about their religion, as Jefferson himself had replied: "Say nothing of my religion. . . . Its evidence before the world is to be sought in my life; if that has been honest and dutiful to society, the religion which has regulated it cannot be a bad one."[47]

43. Hartogensis, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

44. Altfeld, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 101, 136. *Speeches on the Jew Bill*, p. 127.

46. Cf. Maude Howlett Woodfin, "Contemporary Opinion in Virginia of Thomas Jefferson," in Avery Craven, ed., *Essays in Honor of William E. Dodd* (Chicago, 1935).

47. From a letter to John Adams, January 11, 1817. The words quoted above were described by Jefferson as his answer to "one of our fan-coloring biographers." Cf. *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, edited by Paul Leicester Ford (New York, 1899) x, 73.

CRISIS AND CONTINUITY IN HISTORY

ROBERT E. FITCH

Professor of Philosophy and Religion, Occidental College

IT WOULD SEEM to be the most natural thing in the world to view history as drama—a story that has its own logic of continuity, but the meaning of which is best illuminated at moments of crisis and catastrophe. As in the life of the individual, there are the critical times of birth, of initiation into manhood, of marriage, of success or of failure, and then of death, and, perhaps, of entrance into life after death: so, in the larger record of social evolution, there are the groanings and travailings of creation as it brings into being a new civilization; there are the wars, and revolutions, and discoveries, social and technological, which mark advance into maturity; and there is the gentle decline, or catastrophic fall, whereby the body of the old culture passes away, as its spirit makes ready to enter into another incarnation. Drama, moreover, moves toward a fulfillment. It has a goal and a meaning; or it has several goals and several meanings. And these meanings, when they are truly divine, or truly diabolic, are not exhausted in the temporal span of the one play, but somehow move on toward richer and more intimate characterization in later renderings.

Yet for some years now it has been a cardinal tenet of the creed of our culture that history has no heroes, and that history exhibits no significant crises. Only in very recent times have we learned to believe, once more, in the crucial and the catastrophic, and to look, again, with yearning eyes, for the truly begotten Son of Man that shall reveal to us the meaning of this moment. The sources of this spiritual crisis in the modern temper—its conflicting theses and antitheses—are the subject-matter of the inquiry of this paper.

I

HISTORY AS CONTINUOUS CYCLE

Apparently it required a great deal of enlightenment to obliterate the primitive, naïve sense of the drama of life. The Greeks made their contribution toward this, as did the pessimistic philosophies of the Orient and of the Occident, as did also the scientific rationalism of the bourgeoisie. According to any one of these theories, there are no genu-

ine crises in history; there is only continuity, or—what amounts to the same thing—pure discontinuity.

The typically Greek philosophy of history is cyclical. With Anaximander, it may teach that all things come out of the Bound-less, and to the Bound-less they return. The drama of the cosmos is only a mechanical one, of the conflict of opposites—the hot and the cold, the wet and the dry, the light and the dark—which successively encroach upon one another, and are encroached upon; which emerge from the Limit-less, and then are resolved back into It. Over all there presides the principle of "Justice," or of balance, such that the ultimate proportion of things is never disturbed, and the eternal revolving is never transmuted into a directed evolution. A similar "Justice" governs the mingling and the separating of the four elements in Empedocles' cosmology, as they are alternately stirred by *Eros* and by *Eris,* by Love and by Strife. It is Love that blends, that combines, that agglutinates; it is Strife that differentiates, distinguishes, and individualizes. But the record of their conflicts is but the tale of an eternal recurrence, in which history offers no significant turning-points, but only a perpetual turning.

The substance of this view is retained in the more sophisticated philosophies of Stoicism and Neoplatonism. For Stoicism there is a primeval *Logos Spermatikos,* differentiated into specific *logoi spermatikoi,* which provide the structure underlying the apparent changes of history, until the final conflagration restores all things to their original unity of substance. For Neoplatonism, the world process moves forever from the ineffable One down to the unspeakable Many, and back again. To be sure, in the descent, or ascent, there are the distinguishable stages of Reason, Soul, and Matter; but endlessly does the Real pour forth its emanations, and endlessly do they return unto it. Scotus Erigena appropriated this pattern for a cosmic Christian soteriology, taking care only to define, within its limits, the locus of the Persons of the Trinity, the nature of heaven and hell, and the function of the Incarnation. But the total process is an atemporal one, without periodicity, without meaning for history—a self-enclosed cycle, of which the phases are temporally sequential only in an illusory sense, since all phases are simultaneously present in "one continuous One."

Pessimism—Oriental or Occidental—also has its version of the cyclical theory—the mechanical alternation of the *Yang* and the *Yin.* Curiously enough, in Hindu thought meaningful crises are made impossible by

denying any genuine continuities to history. Thus every event, or every individual, or every atom, is, as it were, a miniature crisis by itself, but a crisis void of significance because all other events are equally crucial, and because there is no organic continuity with, nor emergence from, other non-critical events. Beneath the blank *Brahma* of an eternal *Logos,* there stirs down here the perpetual flux of an unending confusion, too distant from its presiding principle to gain therefrom any pattern of purpose or structure of meaning. One cannot step twice into the same river; nay! one cannot step once into the same river, for there is no river, and there is no sameness. Schopenhauer is really preaching an identical doctrine when, in apparent contradiction, he teaches that history is the scene of an eternal sameness—the ceaseless exemplification of the eternal Ideas of the restlessly striving Will. For it is one and the same thing, to say that nothing is the same, and to say that all things are the same. In either case, there is no meaning, nor sense, nor purpose to life; neither continuity, nor crisis; but only the unending flux of a hungry Will which forever feeds upon its own vitals.

However, our own disinclination to credit history with crisis derives from the bourgeois technique which is simply the complement of the Hindu procedure. If Hinduism destroys crisis by denying significant continuity, then the scientific rationalism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries destroyed crisis by reducing history to pure continuity. Voltaire, Gibbon, Robertson, and Hume, were the representatives of this tendency. It has had its re-birth with the modern cultural historians—Harry Elmer Barnes, *et al.,* who make the same claim to "scientific objectivity" and impartiality, who are equally troubled by the unique and the indeterminate in human events, who have the same anti-clerical and anti-political prejudices, and who share the old bourgeois passion for pacifism, cosmopolitanism, humanitarianism, and progress.

For this school, history becomes a mechanical affair of causal sequences, and, when one discerns its underlying laws and principles, one cannot again believe in the reality of crisis. Thus history may afford spectacle, but it never unfolds a drama. *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,* as presented by Gibbon, is a magnificent spectacle, but it is no true drama. In the foreground, to be sure, there are rich pageantries, magnificently caparisoned personages, brilliant occasions, and superb panoramas, but, in the background, there marches relent-

lessly the dull procession of causes primary and secondary, which the discerning mind recognizes as the instruments which manipulate the more colorful puppets on the stage. History as spectacle is a mere façade, the careful design and the skilful illumination of which only accentuate the emptiness that lies behind.

The modern faith in pure continuity was initially a fruit of mathematical and physical science. Leibnitz enunciated the principle in his monadology, when he affirmed that there must be infinitesimal steps and degrees between all differences in the hierarchy of being. But probably it was Newtonian mechanics which lent most prestige to the doctrine. Seen microscopically, the world consisted of a congeries of atoms, making impact upon one another like so many billiard-balls, in an orderly sequence of cause and effect, with "action at a distance" ruled out of the realm of possibility. Seen macroscopically the cosmos was a complicated clock, of which the routine revolutions followed the pattern of universal and immutable law.

The deistic and skeptical attack on miracles simply focalized the effort of scientific rationalism to obliterate spontaneity and indeterminacy from physics, and to eliminate significant crisis from history. The supernatural rationalists—Locke, Tillotson, and Clarke—in defending miracle, were actually the champions of something more than theological orthodoxy. They were the champions of freedom, novelty, and crisis, in the course of the world's evolution. To be sure, as rationalists, they could not appreciate the larger implications of their doctrine; but, as supernaturalists—i.e., as Christians—they were the custodians of a great heritage in the philosophy of history, and instinctively defended an interpretation of life which, indeed, they could not adequately comprehend.

For some two centuries and more, however, scientific rationalism and the principle of continuity held the field. The theory of evolution, at first, appeared to be only another confirmation of the basic axiom. Darwin exploited it and reaffirmed it when he used it as an hypothesis to link one species with another by means of a series of intervening "variations." *Natura non facit saltum*—it was Darwin (not de Vries!) who loved to quote this. Later on, when Weissmann proclaimed the isolation and continuity of the germ plasm, the principle had achieved a fully respectable status in biology.

The impact of this principle upon Christian doctrine is best illus-

trated, in our day, by the writings of Charles Clayton Morrison. Indeed, his success as a religious journalist in the last few decades derives precisely from his being a perfect mirror of bourgeois prejudices, as they have been agitated in the contemporary American mind. One finds in his editorial writings the consistent iteration of the great eighteenth century middle class dogmas of pacifism, humanitarianism, and progress; and an ever-recurring exemplification of the sentimentalism and muddle-mindedness that go with this particular mode of materialistic utopianism. Moreover, his recent tract, *What Is Christianity?*, is none other than a bold imposition upon the drama of the Christian Epic of the smooth and soothing continuity of the bourgeois philosophy of history—rendered, in this instance, as an emphasis upon the continuity of the Christian community, in contra-distinction to an emphasis upon the irregular irruptions of prophets and messiahs, and upon the crises of personal religious experience.

Morrison's Christianity, however, saves him from fulfilling the proper logic of the bourgeois emphasis upon pure continuity; for, in the framework of Newtonian mechanics, this returns to the pagan, cyclical view of history. This was clearly realized by Herbert Spencer, who laid down an eternal cycle of equilibrium, of evolution, and then of dissolution. The story of the universe is no more than that of a top, which at first spins uncertainly out into infinity, and gradually achieves a dynamic equilibrium, then loses its impulse, skids, and falls, and picks itself up to spin once more out into infinity. Thus either pure continuity, or pure discontinuity, leads to cyclicalism; and cyclicalism means the absence of meaning, of drama, of crisis—a perpetual turning, without any turning-point.

In any case, this doctrine, until recently, has been the dogma of the modern mind. Gathered in a complex about the central idea of continuity was a faith in the natural goodness of man, interpreted romantically or rationalistically; a faith in orderly evolution and in the "inevitability of gradualness" (Spencer for the middle classes; Bernstein and the revisionists for Marxism); and a faith in the omnicompetence of education to promote rational progress by the diffusion of experimental habits and attitudes of mind (Dewey). To this faith it was clear that there are no longer any heroes, or great men; there are only groups, classes, economic forces, trends, and tendencies. History is reduced to pure continuity. It has no crises; or, at any rate, it ought not

to have any; and, when a bad, wicked, inconsiderate crisis like the Second World War comes along, one just has to shut his eyes to it, like the respectable Tories and Republicans, and pretend that the damned thing isn't really there.

II

THE RECOVERY OF CRISIS

And yet the prophets of crisis speak their word again, in spite of the unctuous priests of continuity. Else were one's sojourn on this earth altogether too dull a routine of ordered piety and inflexible rectitude! But the prophets of crisis could not come out of the bourgeois sheepcote; or, if they did, they must step full out of it, and away from it, and mount leaping once more to the craggy heights, where they could see that history is not only a valley and a plain, but that it is also a pinnacle and a precipice.

Romanticism was the first movement in the modern world to break with the principle of continuity. It had before it the terrific catastrophe of the French Revolution, in which all the old well-established values seemed to go tumbling down into oblivion. And it had, at last, a real hero in Napoleon Bonaparte, who could seduce the imaginations of men to a mystic rapture of exaltation that was never inspired by the studied and classical poise of a Duke of Marlborough. The musician of this movement, therefore, could write a *Heroic Symphony*; its poets could celebrate the lawless and disordered aspects of nature—the wildness of the west wind, the fierce beauty of Lake Geneva in a night of storm, the dark turbulence of the ocean as it rolled on in endless symbol of the infinite sea of being; and its artists could portray landscapes of a serene and humble splendor unmatched by the chiseled symmetry of the gardens of Versailles, or landscapes and seascapes so ominous with threat of cloud, and tumult, and war, that they seemed a fitter background for the tragedy of a King Lear, than for the courtly amenities of a Queen Anne.

In part as an expression of the romantic mood, communism in the mid-nineteenth century arose as a champion of significant crisis in history. To be sure, the Marxian dogma did not altogether repudiate the principle of continuity, but it interpreted continuity dialectically, as a development in which thesis and antithesis clash into synthesis. Inevitable evolution may be a name for the larger picture, but violent

revolution is an integral part of the process. Class rises against class, and the expropriators are expropriated, as the barricades are hurled up in the city streets, and blood runs in the gutters, and the poor who have become too poor take their vengeance upon the rich who have become too rich. Pure continuity, untroubled by turbulence of strife, is relegated to that remote day when the perfect communist ideal shall have been attained; but meanwhile, there is conflict, and crisis, and contradiction.

In more recent times, dialectical theology has appeared as the herald of a crisis more crucial than any found in the story of "economic man." Like communism, it reaffirms the demonic in history, sharply separates the sheep from the goats, the elect from the damned, and proclaims that conflict and contradiction are of the very essence of human existence. Brunner, for instance, denies that the ills of society are due to any cultural lag, or to any state of arrested development. The gist of the matter is that man contains within himself contradictory principles which make a harmonious development altogether impossible. *Der Mensch in Widerspruch* lives forever in agony of soul, *Zwischen den Zeiten,* endlessly torn between the carnal concerns of the temporal and the spiritual imperatives of the eternal. For such a man, no mere process of growth can surmount the crisis; growth, indeed, only intensifies the contradiction in his nature. For such a man, there is needed a hero, a supernatural Savior, who alone can redeem him utterly from his tragic dilemma.

But, apart from specific movements likes romanticism, communism, and dialectical theology, there was an evolution, or revival, of major traditions in science and in religion which struck a blow at the ordered universe. There were early intimations of the coming break-down of Newtonian mechanics in the writings of Bishop Berkeley, who, in his day, was a bold but solitary critic of the "physicists" and "materialists." When, for instance, he argued for miracle as well as for law, for caprice as well as for causality, for crisis as well as for continuity, he was following out the logic of sensationalistic empiricism with more rigor than did Hume, who had to turn rationalist, for the nonce, in order to attack miracles. Again, when, in rationalizing evil in the world, Berkeley explained that the profusion and waste of nature were evidences of God's superabundant energy and power, he was affirming a fact about the universe—waste and disorder—which could never be admitted in orthodox

mechanics. Berkeley did not believe that *natura nihil facit frustra.* In this point, curiously enough, he was partly sustained by Newton, who argued—as against Leibnitz—that God might need to step in to make periodic repairs in the world machine; and by Voltaire, who even entertained the view that there might be loose ends in the universe, or events that occurred *sans filiation.*

Moreover, Charles Darwin, in spite of his formal adherence to the principle of continuity, was teaching better than he knew when he attacked the "systematists," and declared that what interested him in biology was, not the uniformities, but the "variations." However, it was de Vries, with his theory of mutations, who blasted out of biology the dogma that *natura non facit saltum.* Finally, in our own day, physical theory has exploited the issues of discontinuity and indeterminacy to the point where it is no longer possible to take the older dogma for granted. And so, in due time, with the admission of catastrophes in historical geology, of discontinuities in physics, and of "jumps" in the genetic process, it became scientifically reputable to admit genuine crises into history.

But, while the natural sciences had gradually to win to this point of view, it was already incorporated in the religious tradition of the West. Indeed, it has been part of the genius of the Christian interpretation of history that it has never lost the sense of the drama of life. It is just this sense which makes of the literature of the Bible a greater drama than could ever be compounded out of all the works of the Athenians put together. The God of the two *Testaments* may reveal His dignity and His power in the orderly processes of nature and of history; but He also has his unpredictable moments of inspiration and miracle. The life which man leads under such guidance is only partly locked up by law and circumscribed by convention, for it includes the experience of freshness and freedom, of spontaneity and creativity. Man who was made in the image of a Creator God is himself also a creator—partly restrained by the routine mechanics of his craft, but also stirred by the impulses of imagination and the visions of genius. The story of such a life contains an account of heroes, saints, and prophets, as well as of tyrants, traducers, and demoniacs. And, when crisis makes its impact upon this life, it is expressed, not in terms of moral law, or fore-ordained rational structure, but in terms of the urgencies of the moment; it is the act of God's Word in its immediacy.

It was St. Paul who developed the drama in the life story of the individual. In the opening acts, there is revealed the life of sin under bondage to the flesh and the law. Then comes the focal crisis of conversion, and, like any real crisis, it is a turning from, and a turning toward. There are no insipid once-born souls among the characters of this play. There is no smug bourgeois routine of rational evolution. Intolerable were the comfortable middle way of the middle classes, as also the temperate mean of a pagan aristocracy. The individual who was born in sin must be born again to Christ; and, where there is no such significant crisis, there can be no significant continuity, and hence no meaningful consummation.

The drama that St. Paul wrote for the individual was written by Augustine for the larger outlines of Christian history. The great crises in history are the Creation, the Fall, the Incarnation, and the Day of Judgment. One of these crises—the Incarnation—is a focal crisis, marking the climactic point at which the drama gradually turns toward its denouement. The persistent continuities in history are the continuities of the Two Cities—*Civitas Dei* and *Civitas Terrena*—truly mingled with one another like the wheat and the tares until the coming of the Lord of the Harvest. These continuities are the sources and the bearers of the crises that occur within them, so that, seen in total perspective, crisis and continuity are but different phases of one unified drama.

III

THE NATURE OF CRISIS

Once the fact of crisis is accepted, the discussion centers around the problem of the nature of crisis. There seem to be three distinguishable theories:

1. *Transcendent, or Capricious Crisis.* According to this theory, the moment of crisis is essentially unpredictable, because it has no roots in precedent continuity, but springs from a source alien to the routine of ordinary events, or leaps from heaven at an hour known only to God. Sometimes it may be possible to describe in advance what the crisis will be like when it is actually here, and even to give counsel on conduct appropriate to the occasion, but its actual coming is "as a thief in the night." As Brunner expresses it, "Lightning out of eternity flashes into time, and the place where it strikes is called the Moment."[1] An evil

1. Quoted in R. Birch Hoyle, *The Teaching of Karl Barth* (New York, 1930), p. 142.

and adulterous generation may seek after a sign, but there shall no sign be given it. The only way to be ready for this moment is—like the Wise Virgins—to be ready always—to take heed, to watch, and to pray, for "of that day and that hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father."[2] In general, this has been the scheme of orthodox Christian eschatology.

It should be noted, however, that the theory of capricious crisis is not restricted to a supernaturalistic rendering of history. It also appears as one variant of the eminently respectable doctrine of the business cycle. The cycle, in this case, follows the fourfold pattern of prosperity, crisis, depression, and recovery. One school maintains that the crisis is exogenous, that it is initiated by the incursion of some factor alien to the closed system of economic laws and events. This doctrine is also known as the "bump theory," and the "bumps" may be anything from new inventions to a declaration of war, or a proclamation of peace, or spots on the sun, or the election of a Democratic president. The "bump" theory is a kind of Barthian economics, for, although it cheats the economic process of strict predictability, it does redound to the greater glory of the capitalist system, as Barth's theory of transcendent crisis redounds to the greater glory of God. The difference is simply one of perspective: the classical economist extols the system of free competition by showing that it is essentially subject to law and order when not violated from without; and the Barthian exalts the majesty of the Deity by showing that He is not subject to law and order when He doesn't want to be.

The theory of a transcendent crisis, in its Christian variant, is usually attended by the doctrine of a focal crisis and a final catastrophe. The Day of Judgment, of course, is the final catastrophe. The focal crisis, however, is the Incarnation, and, with its occurrence the drama of history has reached a climactic point. "When God enters, history for the while ceases to be, and there is nothing more to ask; for something wholly different and new begins—a history with its own distinct grounds, possibilities, and presuppositions."[3] Communism, as a truly dramatic philosophy of history, also has its focal crisis—that terrible day when "Comes the Revolution!" and the exploited proletariat rises up to inaugurate the era of a classless society.

2. *Mark* 13:32.
3. Karl Barth, in Hoyle, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

2. *Ordered Crisis.* According to this theory, there is a pattern of events, precedent to crisis, which may be read by those who can discern the "signs of the times." This is not the theory of prophetic eschatology in the Old Testament, which is not pessimistic, and does not stress any foreordained rational structure. But it is the theory of the later Hebrew apocalyptic.

In this respect, communist and Hebrew apocalyptic have some remarkable resemblances. In the one instance, the rich get richer and the poor get poorer; while, in the other instance, the tyrant and the oppressor grow more intolerable in their exactions, as the saints in agony cry out, "Lord, how long?" In both instances—in strict theory—human effort is without avail, because the whole course of events is decided in advance—either predetermined by a rational economic dialectic, or predestined by the omnipotent will of God. The actual moment of crisis, moreover, is a catastrophic one—the violent outbreak of bloody revolution, or the sudden coming of the Messiah in clouds of glory. And the dawn of the new day, in both dramas, is marked by an abundance of material prosperity, or by a rich meed of spiritual blessings, according to the various schools of interpretation.

The communist, the Hebrew and the Christian, then, agree that the moment is foreordained. But the religious interpretation ascribes its coming to the inscrutable will of God, while the materialistic interpretation claims to be able to read in history the inexorable logic which is preparing for the great moment of reckoning. Of course, in the case of Hegel, this same dialectic supports an idealistic rendering of social evolution. Hegel believes in ordered crisis, as much as does Marx. The difference between them is one of emphasis and interpretation. The effect of the Marxian view, as of the Barthian view, is to accentuate the catastrophic character of crisis, to highlight its terror and its sublimity: while the effect of the Hegelian view is to tone down the dramatic force of crisis, and to leave the impression that, since crisis is the product of the orderly operation of ideal law, this world is a pretty decent and respectable sort of place after all.

The theory of the business cycle which belongs under this category says that crises are endogenous in character. That is to say, they are the inevitable outcome of the continuities inherent in the very structure of the economic system itself. Naturally, such a view is not very popular with the conscious apologist for a capitalist order, for, while it may en-

hance his powers of prediction, it does promote the suggestion that an economic order which is intrinsically subject to recurrent catastrophe had better be displaced by a neater scheme of things. On the other hand, the Marxians have favored the endogenous theory, as have radical critics of capitalism, like Keynes, who did not fall under any specific rubric.

3. *Emergent Crisis.* The doctrine of emergent crisis effects a compromise and a conjunction between crisis and continuity. It allows for limited predictability and for limited unpredictability. In this respect, it is coherent with modern scientific theory which, in geology, allows for the slow work of erosion and sedimentation, and also for volcanic eruptions and catastrophic upheavals of continents; which, in physics, allows for the reality of both wave and corpuscle, of continuities and discontinuities; which, in biology, admits the gradual process of evolution by slow variations, and also acknowledges the occurrences of sudden jumps and mutations.

Lloyd Morgan and John Dewey, between them, supply the essentials of this doctrine. In the very important second chapter of *Experience and Nature,* on "Existence as Precarious and as Stable," Dewey affirms that the universe forever exhibits a polarity of order and disorder, of mechanisms and consummations, of law and caprice, of determinism and freedom. In effect, this is a return to the naïve Homeric metaphysics, which allows for *Moira* and *Anangke,* but also for *Ate* and *Tyche.* But it was Lloyd Morgan who dramatized the distinction between two kinds of combinations that take place in nature—mechanical combinations, and emergent combinations. Mechanical combinations are purely additive, and the only change is a quantitative one. Organic combinations, however, are such that the original constituents lose their character in the new combination, and the emergent has qualities and functions which are not at all found in its constituents.

The bearings of this for a philosophy of history should be obvious. History is the scene both of continuity and crisis. Crisis emerges from precedent continuity—either from the convergence of hitherto isolated continuities or the cumulative effect of developments within a single continuity, or as a result of both factors. And yet because it is a crisis, an emergent, it has genuine features of novelty which cannot be altogether predicted before the event. After the event, to be sure, the crisis, though a unique phenomenon, may be reduced to its recurrent compo-

nents; but the crisis cannot be said to be "nothing but" its components, any more than water may be said to be "nothing but" hydrogen and oxygen. Thus the crisis is real and significant; yet there is no appeal to supernatural agencies. All events are quite "natural," but "nature" is a more free and significantly growing process than it used to be. And, in this liberated and more catholic naturalism—as for the ancient Greeks, and the ancient Hebrews—the spiritual and the material are but two aspects of a total and vital reality.

Of Morrison's *What Is Christianity?* it might be remarked, in a more friendly mood, that he attempts to reinstate for the Christian Epic the continuity which, in the ampler Catholic tradition, has always been unequivocally affirmed. It is quite true that Protestantism and denominationalism have mutilated and truncated the Epic by obliterating the continuity, and by throwing emphasis upon the crises of isolated personal religious experience, or of biblical revelation. Consequently, in seeking to restore continuity to the Christian cosmic drama, Morrison is using a principle of the bourgeois philosophy of history to recover a half of the Christian philosophy of history which, paradoxically enough, was destroyed by the bourgeois, Protestant rendering of religion. To this extent, for Protestants, he has made a very significant contribution to an interpretation of the Christian drama according to the theory of emergent evolution. But, at the same time—as in so much of his editorializing—the bourgeois in him is so much stronger than the Christian that he has almost annihilated the crisis half of his theology in his effort to restore the continuity half.

IV

These technical considerations help to shed light on the popular temper of the moment. In spite of circumstances, the bourgeois faith in pure continuity is still with us. To the partisans of this faith, the crisis in which we now find ourselves is strictly exogenous in origin—an arbitrary and irrational irruption into the ordered continuity of the "American way of life." To this extent, the crisis partakes of the character, not of reality, but of illusion. And, when, as a foreign body, it has been cut out like a cancer, so that only a scar remains as a trace of its visitation, we are to return to the regular pattern of prosperity, isolationism, complacency, and reaction.

The doctrinaire communists—found chiefly in the United States and

Great Britain, not in Russia—illustrate today the faith in ordered crisis. They do not at all belittle the terror and sublimity of this crucial moment; but they view it as the inevitable consequence of precedent tendencies, and are serene in their conviction that its only outcome can be the proletarian dictatorship of the civilization of the future.

The fascists, in spite of their naturalistic assumptions, come closest to illustrating the psychology that goes with the belief in transcendent crisis. They were the original Barthians in political science and economics, long before the theologians appropriated fascist ideology for a Christian neo-orthodoxy. For them, this is the moment when lightning strikes out of eternity into time, when the truly begotten Son of Man, in the form of Adolf Hitler, falls like a bolt upon his foes, and shatters the frame of history, to the inaugurating of a new history with its own distinct grounds, possibilities, and presuppositions.

But those who still believe in the experimental procedures of a democracy will view this Second World War as an emergent crisis. It is the fruit of cumulative developments within ancient continuities, and of the convergence of hitherto isolated continuities. Its final outcome can be in part predicted, and in part scarcely imagined. But so far as we share in the process, and to the extent that there are freedom and indecision in the world as well as determinate order, we may hope to use intelligence and art to exploit chance and caprice so that fate and necessity may not rule us with too cruel a rod.

A THEOLOGY OF THE NON-NATURAL: A REVIEW ARTICLE

FREDERICK DE W. BOLMAN, JR.

Adjunct Professor of Religion, Randolph Macon Woman's College

THE APPEARANCE OF THE SECOND and concluding volume of Professor Niebuhr's Gifford Lectures of 1939[1] is an event of signal importance for the present world of theology. The entire work represents the mature thought and historical researches of one who has long been a powerful force to reckon with, not only in America but, more recently, in England as well. For about a decade Reinhold Niebuhr has challenged the foundations of Christian modernism, told of its irrelevance to our age, and prophesied the doom of Christianity, should Christians neglect the sinfulness of man as veriest agent of the modernist hope. Against this decade of more or less unmitigated prophetic doom it is now of interest to see the new note of hope brought forth by Niebuhr. The guiding motif of this volume has this hope: that Christian life can be true to itself only if it acts under the impulse of a new synthesis of a biblical doctrine of grace, Reformation theology, and Renaissance humanist philosophy.

Whether or not the new synthesis called for by Dr. Niebuhr has been accomplished in these volumes, whether his accomplishment will win converts from the two opposing camps of neo-Reformation orthodoxy and humanistic modernism, whether such a synthesis is the need of this, as of all, ages of men—these are questions which a reviewer should attempt to answer, although it is yet too soon to know how history will deal with Dr. Niebuhr, and any answers must be suggested with hesitancy and an acknowledgment that they may hit the real issues only obliquely. It is already safe to say that a variety of schools of thought will claim our author, if not as *agent provocateur* at least as fellow-traveller. Perhaps "naturalists" and "non-naturalists" will now cast a slightly less hostile glance at one another across the pages of Niebuhr. I hasten to add that this may take place for the simple reason that Dr. Niebuhr does not clearly belong to one school any more than to the other; it will take place, if at all, simply because he succeeds,

1. *The Nature and Destiny of Man, a Christian Interpretation*. Vol. II: *Human Destiny*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943. xii + 329 pp. $2.75.

more or less, in combining the assets of both schools and claims to have gotten rid of the areas where friction has in the past been most severe. I recall that Dr. Niebuhr once, in conversation, traced his spiritual autobiography as the passage from Marx through Spengler to Augustine and Paul. The present volumes attempt to be Pauline through and through—not only in interpreting the dogmatic position of Paul, but, more importantly, by exhibiting Paul's intention to form a synthesis of "orthodoxy" and "tradition."

Dr. Niebuhr's position requires a new descriptive title. For this, perhaps the name "A theology of the non-natural" would hit the mark closest. The non-natural is the keystone to his theological structure; it is carefully defended in issue after issue against charges of being either supernatural or unnatural. The preface to the present volume hints at what I mean.

> I have suggested in the first volume[2] that the Christian faith assesses the spiritual stature of man more highly and has a lower estimate of man's virtue than alternative doctrines, both ancient and modern. I seek to establish in this volume that the Biblical-Christian faith has a more dynamic conception of history than classicism and a less optimistic view of historical dynamism than alternate modern views. Current history seems to me to have invalidated contemporary interpretations of history and thus has given more classical Christian interpretations of the meaning of history a new relevance (p. v).

At the beginning of the volume, Dr. Niebuhr generalizes upon his position, midway between naturalism and supernaturalism, in a philosophy of history. Let us juxtapose two statements to clarify our characterization of "the non-natural" which Dr. Niebuhr defends. First, about classical naturalism:

> The fact that classical naturalism must seek to beguile men from the fear of death, not only by reducing history to the dimension of natural sequence, but also by denying the reality of any possible realm of life and meaning beyond history . . . proves that there can be no sense of history at all . . . without a further sense of an eternity transcending history. The "partial simultaneity" of man, by which he comprehends the sequences of time into his consciousness, inevitably carries with it, by way of implication, a sense of a divine "total simultaneity" which comprehends the sequence of time beyond man's own capacity of comprehension. A suprahistorical eternity is implied in history, because the capacity by which man transcends temporal sequence, while yet be-

2. *The Nature and Destiny of Man.* Vol. I: *Human Nature,* reviewed in *Review of Religion,* VI, 86-89.

ing involved in it, implies a capacity of transcendence which is not limited by the sequence (pp. 9-10).

And now for what Dr. Niebuhr considers the antithesis, which he must likewise in part reject:

Classical idealism and mysticism . . . understand the transcendent freedom of the human spirit; but they do not understand it in its organic relation to the temporal process. The natural and temporal process is merely something from which man must be emancipated. The emancipation is the very fulfillment of the meaning of life. There is no yearning for fulfillment in history (p. 11).

The consciousness of a Christ disclosing the principle of the non-natural is meaningless for either extreme. Only the man who says both Yes and No to "nature" and "supernature," who lives as though he were "in principle" saved in Christ, but who acknowledges "in fact" that the potential meaning of individual and collective history is infinitely distant of realization—only such a man can recognize the Christ. History, then, is an interim between an age of innocence, which man views as past, and an age of fulfillment which is symbolically called future. But Christ is both an axiological center of this interim and an earnest of the meaning of fulfillment:

. . . the contradictions of history are not resolved in history; but they are only ultimately resolved on the level of the eternal and the divine. However, the eternal and the divine which destroys evil is not some undifferentiated eternity which effaces both the good and evil of history by destroying history itself. God's mercy must make itself known in history, so that man in history may become fully conscious of his guilt and redemption. The Messiah must give his life "a ransom for many" (p. 46).

Other equally interesting phrases could have been lifted from Dr. Niebuhr's volume to illustrate our point, namely, that the good life depends upon a recognition of the non-natural within the purview of the individual and society. The function and content of this non-natural come to a focus in the person and work of the Christ. In one sense, the remainder of the volume is simply an attempt to elaborate these two statements.

At this point reference should be made to one further claim put forth in the Preface. Why must Dr. Niebuhr interpret history in the name of Christ? If this age cannot swallow "revelation" and its non-

natural instrument, "faith," what hope has he for his argument? Throughout, the answer to these and similar questions is, for Dr. Niebuhr, as simple as it is fundamental. There have been philosophies of history galore; the world has never lacked wisdom. But, in all other attempts to deal with human knowledge of man's nature and destiny, one crucial element has been lacking. We may call this element humility, but the meaning of such a term is scarcely strong enough to counteract a most destructive tendency in human nature. Man stumbles upon or is given "truth"; only a Christian (Pauline) account not only tells how "truth" is to be found but also explains how and why man perverts, to his own ruin, the very good that he knows. While Dr. Niebuhr argues his case upon more special matters, the double character of the Pauline message has the highest appeal for him. Paul alone accounted not only for knowledge but also for guilt; man may know much "in principle," but "in fact" his knowledge extends beyond his ability, for the very reason that he perennially claims so much more for himself in value and ability that he destroys the relevance of the knowledge he may gain. In short, what other philosophies have recognized, described, and accounted for sin? Dr. Niebuhr finds none which fit the terms of his argument. For him only Christianity contains the message of inevitable humiliation consequent to all wisdom, and, this being its message, it gives the only formula for the revitalization of the humble life—"grace." "Sin is the refusal to admit finiteness. This refusal is sinful precisely because spirit has the capacity to recognize its finiteness. But when it refuses to do so its sinful self-glorification must be broken by the power of 'grace' " (p. 218 n.). The revelation of God in Christ is, then, the only possibility of fully recognizing the dangers to which human knowledge and activity are naturally prone.

> To understand that the Christ in us is not a possession but a hope, that perfection is not a reality but an intention; that such peace as we know in this life is never purely the peace of achievement but the serenity of being "completely known and all forgiven"; all this does not destroy moral ardour or responsibility. On the contrary, it is the only way of preventing premature completions of life, or arresting the new and more terrible pride which may find its roots in the soil of humility, and of saving the Christian life from the intolerable pretension of saints who have forgotten that they are sinners (pp. 125-26).

It is the Christian account of sin which not only explains the ruin of

knowledge but also creates the tensions of the moral life. Thus the revelation of the meaning of love again shows the relation between the "in principle" and the "in fact" of human existence, where the former term refers to what I have called the non-natural in Dr. Niebuhr's theology. Again this is best recognized in his own words:

> The *agape*, the sacrificial love, which is for Christian faith revealed upon the Cross, has its primary justification in an "essential reality" which transcends the realities of history, namely, the character of God. It does not expect an immediate or historical validation but looks towards some ultimate consummation of life and history. On the other hand, the Christian doctrine of Creation does not set the eternal and divine into absolute contradiction to the temporal and the historical. There are, therefore, validations of *agape* in actual history, in so far as concern for the other actually elicits a reciprocal response (p. 96).

This brings Dr. Niebuhr's discussion to the conflict between grace and pride in ancient, medieval, and modern times. A "presumptuous claim of finality" characterizes those men and movements which fail to grasp the ultimate paradox of Christianity, that the Christian is

> "both sinner and righteous"; that history fulfills and negates the Kingdom of God; that grace is continuous with, and in contradiction to, nature; that Christ is what we ought to be and also what we cannot be; that the power of God is in us and that the power of God is against us in judgment and mercy; that all these affirmations which are but varied forms of the one central paradox of the relation of the Gospel to history must be applied to the experiences of life from top to bottom (p. 204).

The paradox is, for Dr. Niebuhr, a favored manner of speaking; it alone can symbolize what must be accepted ultimately upon faith, namely, that God is not man, the non-natural is not the natural, yet God is related to man, the non-natural is of avail in the natural life. It is worth noting, however that his favorite antinomy now receives an important qualification in terms of the plea for a synthesis of biblical, Reformation, and Renaissance insights.

> A new synthesis is . . . called for. It must be a synthesis which incorporates the twofold aspects of grace of Biblical religion, and adds the light which modern history, and the Renaissance and Reformation interpretations of history, have thrown upon the paradox of grace. Briefly this means that, on the one hand, life in history must be recognized as filled with indeterminate possibilities. There is no individual or interior spiritual situation, no cultural or scientific task, and no social or political problem in which men do not face new

possibilities of the good and the obligation to realize them. It means, on the other hand, that every effort and pretension to complete life, whether in collective or individual terms, that every desire to stand beyond the contradictions of history, or to eliminate the final corruptions of history must be disavowed (p. 207).

Now with that statement Dr. Niebuhr is going to find himself among incompatible friends! Modernists, humanists, naturalists of one hue or another will favor the statement upon various grounds, readily admitting as part of their methods that no man can "stand beyond the contradictions of history." And the neo-Reformation orthodox, fundamentalists and religious authoritarians, will assent to the position upon equally various grounds, being sure that *their* methods quite necessarily involve "new possibilities of the good and the obligation to realize them." War will break out only when the two general methods of acquiring knowledge of the good and the precise implications of the meaning of goodness are made clear; then we will, perhaps, be back where we started some centuries ago. It would seem that the best that Dr. Niebuhr can achieve is an armed truce, wherein the relativists are given their due only upon the basis of a non-natural absolutism. The difficulty arises in that ethical relativism has been argued more or less successfully upon too many other grounds to allow Dr. Niebuhr's position to be as unqualifiedly necessary as he considers it. Again we must fall back upon his central justification for the available truth of Christianity: "Christianity can validate its truth about life and history only when it is possible, from the standpoint of that truth, to comprehend the rise of the false truths which use Christianity itself as their vehicle" (p. 129). Or again: "The truth, as it is contained in the Christian revelation, includes the recognition that it is neither possible for man to know the truth fully nor to avoid the error of pretending that he does" (p. 217).

Dr. Niebuhr's importance continues to be a prophetic one in which he stands in no particular school of thought, regardless of the carefully arranged olive branches he may pass around. All reconciliations must be based upon a high degree of religious humility, the setting of grace over against pride, the recognition that "nature" and "grace" are partially discontinuous. Such reconciliations are genuine possibilities:

it is possible in moments of prayerful transcendence over the sphere of interested thought and action to be conscious of the corruption; and it is also possi-

ble to carry this insight into our interested thoughts and actions so that it creates some sense of pity and forgiveness for those who contend against our truth and oppose our action (p. 217).

Dr. Niebuhr pursues the discontinuity between "nature" and "grace" in the realm of social justice. Here, again, "grace" is related to "sinful nature" partly as fulfillment and partly as negation.

The positive relation of principles of justice to the ideal of brotherhood makes an indeterminate approximation of love in the realm of justice possible. The negative relation means that all historic conceptions of justice will embody some elements which contradict the law of love. The interests of a class, the viewpoint of a nation, the prejudices of an age, and the illusions of a culture are consciously and unconsciously insinuated into the norms by which men regulate their common life. They are intended to give one group an advantage over another. Or if that is not their intention, it is at least the unvarying consequence (p. 256).

The sinful elements of conflict and dominion inhere necessarily in every level of communal organization. Only the discontinuous principle of grace—the complete recognition of the non-natural—can, according to Dr. Niebuhr, prevent man from making these tensions and dominions normative and at the same time make clear to him his responsible position in an historical order largely made up of tensions and dominions. In this sense, Dr. Niebuhr never conceives that the non-natural standing in judgment upon the natural negates human responsibility. The very notion of responsibility can be formulated only in terms of what is not and cannot be, yet which stands to actuality as principle of being and being known. It would seem to be some such principle of the non-natural which he uses to replace Barth's principle of the impossible possibility.

Thus far we have seen how Dr. Niebuhr uses "the non-natural" or "grace," which is partly continuous and partly discontinuous with "sinful nature," as a postulate for the understanding of historical process, human knowledge and responsibility. His main contention would be that his use of this principle, as revealed in the Gospels and letters of Paul, is both economical and necessary for the full understanding of what every man—or many men—only partially understand and agree upon without it.

One further point should be noted before passing to the final theme of the volume, "The End of History." What is it, after all, which drives

man to the faith which is required to bridge the gap between the "partial" understanding and the "full" understanding of the meaning of human destiny? Besides escaping eternal damnation—which bothers no one in these days of livelier temporal damnation—why must I be a Christian? What will happen to me if I call upon Occam's razor or label Dr. Niebuhr's biblicism merely useful but not necessary fiction? Dr. Niebuhr's theology is certainly natural theology, in the sense that it rests upon considerably more evidence than a wager concerning my indefinite future. To be exact, faith is no wager at all to Dr. Niebuhr; its fruits are the positive, if partial, harmonies of personal and social life.

> The assertion of Christian faith is that the knowledge of God through the crucified Christ is both "wisdom" and "power," both "grace" and "truth"; which is to say that not only are life and history now fully known by having found their true end and meaning beyond themselves, but they are also completed and fulfilled. Christ as "power" and as "grace" can be mediated to the individual only if the truth of the Atonement is appropriated inwardly. In that case the alternate moods of despair and false hope are overcome, and the individual is actually freed to live a life of serenity and creativity (pp. 57-58).

But my life of serenity and creativity must wait upon "the crisis of conversion," whereat I am confronted by the power and holiness of God and become genuinely conscious of the real source and centre of all life.

> In Christian faith Christ mediates the confrontation of the self by God; for it is in Christ that the vague sense of the divine, which human life never loses, is crystallized into a revelation of a divine mercy and judgment. In that revelation fear of judgment and hope of mercy are so mingled that despair induces repentence and repentence hope (p. 109).

Like Luther I may know when I am or when I am not saved; my self-centeredness may be broken only by the consequent discovery of my genuine self. This genuine self

> lives in and for others, in the general orientation of loyalty to, and love of God; who alone can do justice to the freedom of the self over all partial interests and values. This new self is that real self; for the self is infinitely self-transcendent; and any premature centering of itself around its own interests, individually or collectively, destroys and corrupts its freedom (p. 110).

While the language here could easily lead one into following psychologically self-destructive motivations in the name of Christ, it may be

closer to Dr. Niebuhr's personal experience to interpret him as meaning that any creative release from anxiety and destructive fear may be interpreted theologically and, when this is done, men have a community not only in the present, but also with the past. This is the more possible since he consistently interprets Christ as revealing the *principle* of the non-natural and never "giving any particular or partial force, value or vitality of history a sanctity or triumph which its finite and imperfect character does not deserve" (p. 112). The real difficulty here, however—and this is the real difficulty with Dr. Niebuhr's whole position—is that such complete relativism could ultimately destroy his trans-historical absolutism and thus open the gates to a pluralistic view of history such as he is most anxious to overcome.

To return now to the sequence of the volume, the concluding chapter on the end of history has this central idea, consonant with his general view, namely, that history is an interim between revelation and fulfillment, wisdom and power, knowledge and realization. All double statements of the Kingdom of God as present and future, of the first and second advent of a Christ, of this life and the resurrection, of present pluralities and ultimate unity, point symbolically towards the conceivable end wherein a goal is achieved. Only such theological symbols are held to comply with the just demands that the end as *telos* not be prematurely eclipsed by the end as *finis*. But of what use are these symbols? Fulfillment is, for Dr. Niebuhr, always a useful category. To the Christian it again delineates the difference between "sinful nature" and non-natural "grace"; it keeps man awake to the partial character of his life and the "might be's" of history which establish the tensions under which alone man can be fully man. Responsibility is again definable only in terms of the non-natural; fulfillment is not a guarantee of success but the promised measure of all human activities, individual and social, a measure without which life has, in principle and in fact, only a cyclical return upon itself and ever increasing threats to its own existence. We can do no better than to conclude that historical existence is insecure, that it "ends" with the Antichrist as the accumulation of human problems, that only by recognizing a more ultimate end of history in Christ can we guard against presumptuous theories of security.

It is obvious that man does not have the power to extricate himself from flux and finiteness, as idealists and mystics of the ancient and the modern world believed. It is equally obvious that history does not solve the basic problems

of human existence but reveals them on progressively new levels. The belief that man could solve his problem either by an escape from history or by the historical process itself is a mistake which is partly prompted by the most universal of all "ideological" taints: the pride, not of particular men and cultures, but of man as man. For this reason it is possible to make a truer analysis of human destiny upon the basis of a religious faith which has disavowed human pride in principle, though it must not be assumed that any particular Christian analysis will not exhibit in fact what it has disavowed in principle. . . . Thus wisdom about our destiny is dependent upon a humble recognition of the limits of our knowledge and our power. Our most reliable understanding is the fruit of "grace" in which faith completes our ignorance without pretending to possess its certainties as knowledge; and in which contrition mitigates our pride without destroying our hope (pp. 320, 321).

It is incumbent upon this reviewer to attempt, in conclusion, some comment upon the questions about this work posed at the outset of these remarks. Dr. Niebuhr writes brilliantly and with a histrionic fluidity which, by its directness of intent and persistence of main theme, will win him many new converts. This theology of the non-natural, as I have presumed to call it, manifests, perhaps, one dominant characteristic of the Western world in the throes of its second total war. This characteristic will be called by its critics, who see the weakening of moral fibre as a symptom of the decay of a culture into a civilization, a "failure of nerve." With more kindness to ourselves, and, perhaps, a truer estimate of the stage of our development through which we are now passing, we may call it, rather, a guard against naïve and thereby ruinous optimism. Dr. Niebuhr understands many of the destructive forces of the self and society involved in complacency and escapist, or misplaced, optimism. His work is dedicated, in a sense, to the evangelization of Western man, that Western man not destroy his spiritual capacities for happiness by destroying his spiritual knowledge, the knowledge of his limitations and resources. While many will claim that Dr. Niebuhr merely uses the non-natural as a metaphor for the unknown limitations of human knowledge and ability, and many more will charge him with an ambiguous supernaturalism, neither side will quite hit the mark. This is not to say that his use of the non-natural does not cover a wide variety of human limitations in an often sweeping manner. Nor can he be freed completely from charges of ontological ambiguities; this student and reader still has no precise idea of what "God" means to Dr. Niebuhr, although the function of God in

human consciousness is clearly limned in these volumes. What critics on both these scores may fail to appreciate, however, is a certain acumen which Dr. Niebuhr possesses for describing for us our unqualified hopes, our destructive fears, and confusing decisions in relation to far-reaching human enterprises. His main concern is to lay bare his insights into human motivations as such motivations imply more than the subject matter with which sociology and psychology appropriately deal; he attempts to relate what any knowledge of man and his destiny implies. The measure of his success will, it seems to me, be strictly limited to the release offered to human creativity towards integrated selves and integrated communities. This may rob his point of view of what he cherishes most, namely, its coherence with a knowledge of the historically revealed source of being and truth. Yet, as we saw earlier, he does, in effect, ground his argument for the non-natural upon its power within human experience. Religious truths are not truths unless they arise within the manifold of human experience and bear the fruit of their claims within the continuities of those experiences.

As for the need of Dr. Niebuhr's synthesis in this age, one can only guess. Any reference to a synthesis of dominant cultural trends in the past should be treated as a metaphor, lest the problems inherent in understanding those trends involve our interest to the exclusion of our creative drives. Stated most generally, one of the major difficulties of the book is that Dr. Niebuhr has often shown the ambiguous historical issue of the unbounded aspects of Renaissance hope, while he has only seldom dealt with the destructive aspects of the Christian Reformation. He treats the outcome of certain movements of the Renaissance with the quick brush strokes of the social historian; the Reformation is viewed from the safer vantage of the theological problems solved or left unsolved. Since he is a theologian, this seems fitting. Yet for effective liberation of Western man, who seems to vacillate between unbounded hope and unqualified despair, such treatment is highly prejudicial.

But, despite any inconsistency of method, Dr. Niebuhr has that quality necessary to the prophet, a quality best, if generally, described by consistency of aim or intention. Man is destroying himself, spiritually as well as physically. Not only is this not necessary in the larger context of human existence; man has, at critical moments in the past, understood the possibilities of his freedom to create a meaningful personal and social history. Experiences from a cultural past, reinter-

preted and reapplied, may be more than suggestive. In some as yet unexplained way, the persistence of these experiences may make them normative.

While I feel that Dr. Niebuhr's prophetic message is, in general, wholly salutary for this extravagant generation of men, I should, in conclusion, like to raise three major objections to his view of human nature. With qualifications and references omitted for reasons of brevity, I shall state these in three propositions, in the hope that Dr. Niebuhr will answer them for many of us, his admirers, in the near future.

1. Dr. Niebuhr's view of "nature" as distinguished from "human nature" is not the nature known to scientific experience today, but rather unavoidably reminds one of eighteenth century views which considered the world outside the self in mechanical, cyclical, non-teleological terms. That is to say, he sees "nature" and "human nature" as discontinuous, because he finds that "nature" has no memory, no enjoyments or decisions, no anticipations, in short, no "history."

2. Moreover, he apparently views human knowledge in largely observational terms. While I do not want to state this dogmatically, it would seem that for him man is partially outside of nature, viewing her (or "it" or "them") as passive spectator. That is to say, knowing nature is, in the Greek sense, to pass from the viewing of the goings-on of nature or *physis* to contemplation or *theoria*. Thus, and thus only, can man "transcend" nature, as though nature and the knowledge of nature were utterly distinct and discontinuous, or, again, as though knowledge itself had no "history."

3. Man, for Dr. Niebuhr, is a unique member of nature, determined by her yet free of her. For man has what nature has not; he is a purposive creature with controlled memories, enjoyments and decisions, and anticipations. He alone makes and has "history." Therefore—in a quite Kantian sense—man is a two-story creature who is part of nature yet who "transcends" nature (and "history"!). Hence his unique or spiritual qualities and insights are non-natural. Thus his responsibilities (deriving from consciousness of sin) and integrations (deriving from consciousness of grace) issue from a non-natural source. Dr. Niebuhr finds Christianity symbolizing this duality under varying circumstances and experiences.

Now, if I am generally correct and fair in stating Dr. Niebuhr's views in the foregoing, what happens to proposition 3 if propositions

1 and 2 turn out to be untenable? Supposing nature is less limited than Dr. Niebuhr finds her to be, that the distinctions between her and man with respect to memory, enjoyment and decision, and anticipation are ones of continuous degree rather than of absolutely discontinuous quality. Supposing that knowledge of nature is functional, creative of relevant truths by operations which take place by the joint activities of "things" and "man" (or men). Supposing the late Professor Frederick J. E. Woodbridge is just to the varieties of human experience when he writes,

> man is a part of nature, carried on by her forces to work the works of intelligence. In him she bursts forth into sustained consciousness of her own evolution, producing in him knowledge of her processes, estimation of her goods, and suspicions of her ultimate significance. . . . He is . . . no mere commentator on the world or spectator of it; he is one of its integrations, so to speak, a supreme instance where nature has measurably evaluated herself. His comments are nature's self-estimate.[3]

Or, again, supposing it really means something to say,

> The exhibition of the principles which govern the understanding in attempting to gain a comprehensive view of nature would be a theory of knowledge. It would also be a theory of nature, because those principles would exhibit characters of nature by which the understanding is governed and without which the attempt to understand would not itself be understood.[4]

If these suppositions are discovered to be the applicable and useful realities of experience, then statement number 3 is undermined. While I cannot say that Dr. Niebuhr is irrevocably wrong in his view of human nature and destiny, it does not seem to me that he has sufficiently taken into account the post-Kantian trend of the philosophies of nature and human nature. (Where he does, he often makes their errors and aberrations methodologically *necessary*—but that is another story.) The problem is, does he not define nature and knowledge too restrictively, more restrictively than men today will accept? This appearing to be the case, does not his recourse to the non-natural appear strained, as though because he does not find some things in nature but only in man, therefore these have reference to something which is not nature? In one sense he has shown us the relevance of Christian ter-

3. *Nature and Mind* (New York, 1937), p. 93.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 277.

minology; in another sense his restricted view of nature and knowledge makes his Christian terminology immediately otiose and irrelevant. I agree with his conclusion that man is sinner in need of grace, perennially claiming a status which he does not actually possess, needing to be dispossessed of his extravagant claims; I disagree that the recognition of human sin depends upon the definition of nature and grace which he declares necessary and sufficient.

These are questions worth examining. I write them not with a view to discarding the relevance of what Dr. Niebuhr says, but in the hope that he will tell us all more precisely the meaning of being human and having a destiny, being a creature of sin and virtue, subject to nature and history—and grace.

COMMUNICATIONS

HUMAN NATURE AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION

JOHN A. HUTCHISON

Fellow of the National Council on Religion in Higher Education

THE 1943 WEEK OF WORK of the National Council on Religion in Higher Education was held at Haverford College, September 2 to 7. The Philosophy Group's subject for discussion was "Human Nature and Social Reconstruction." Dr. Ralph Linton's paper discussed the subject from an anthropologist's viewpoint: scientific techniques of controlled experiment were held inadequate for dealing with the complex configurations of human nature; rather, anthropologists gain information about man's nature by studying individuals and groups in different cultures and then seeking a common denominator. Such a denominator has been found to include the following features: (1) basic needs (physiological and psychological tensions); (2) ability to act (conscious and automatic); (3) ability to learn; (4) predominance of psychological needs in determining the bulk of social behavior. Differences in psychological needs among different social and cultural groups are relatively unimportant, the raw materials of human nature being much the same everywhere. However, habit and custom are powerful forces. Thus, social reconstruction must deal with the various personality types of a society as they exist, as given factors. The most effective method of change is that which offers suitable rewards to desirable social behavior.

Discussion raised problems of social strategy, such as what methods have been devised to change individuals and societies, and also problems concerning the relation of anthropology to philosophy and theology. Is anthropology, as a descriptive science, adequate to comprehend man's nature including his values, or must it be supplemented by philosophy and theology? It is essential to define the *ought* as well as the *is*, and thus to clarify the nature of man as a responsible being. Dr. Tillich held that the doctrine of man as a philosophical consideration of the presuppositions necessarily implied in man's nature was essential, over and beyond scientific observation and description.

Dr. John Child's paper, "A Biosocial Theory of Man," formulated

a functional theory of man and personality based upon scientific methodology and the principle of continuity, which sees man as a distinctive expression of nature. A view of man based on these principles is distinguished from both materialism and mentalism. An idea is, behavioristically and pragmatically, a formulated expectation of how a thing will behave, or a plan projected in imagination for dealing with a problematic situation. With the emergence of man capable of learning from experience and guiding his behavior by reference to consequences, a realm of values emerges within the human community. Man's knowledge of the good does not develop apart from his scientific knowledge of actual changing conditions. The biosocial theory of man is not a doctrine of individualism, for man is born to consciousness of self within a social situation, and in the life of the community he develops his most distinctive needs and loyalties. For social reconstruction, it was argued that one must accept novelty and the possibility of novel principles in morality, that one must avoid the opposition between education and social reconstruction, since both are aspects of the process of growth, and that one must accept the concept of planning as a moral principle of the future development of mankind.

Discussion of the paper considered the adequacy and the limitations of scientific method for the description of man. The paper was criticized as rejecting as meaningless speculations about the whole, only to claim such a role for scientific method. Scientific method has value for the guidance and control of natural processes, but it is no substitute for a religious explanation of the character of the universe. The objection was also raised that instrumentalism makes intellectual and value presuppositions which are not clarified. In this respect, the danger is the dissolution of all criteria or ultimate principles.

Dr. Paul Tillich's paper, "Man and Society in Religious Socialism," set forth the ideas of man and social reconstruction developed within that movement. All attacks against the possibility of a doctrine of man are self-refuting, in that they presuppose a being who is capable of innumerable variations in the course of his history. Man is that being who has history, and a doctrine of man is an attempt to describe the structure of a being who thus has history and knows it. Such a being has the structure of "finite freedom"; man is, in essence, such a structure of finite freedom. The political principles of religious socialism

are an effort to interpret this principle politically. On the one hand, seeing man's finitude it opposes utopianism, but, on the other hand, it recognizes the infinite creativity of man's freedom. Creative freedom is the essential element in human nature, and if it be suppressed by personal or social factors man becomes dehumanized. Man's nature therefore demands, as fundamental human rights, such things as equality before the law, the security of being admitted to creative activity, and the power of historical self-determination. But while these rights of man are unalienable, the political forms that they are to assume may vary with different social and historical conditions, and thus no finality is to be attributed to any one set of such forms. Since man's freedom is finite, it is based upon necessity. One cannot act effectively in history without knowledge of the trends or structural necessities. This union of freedom and necessity gives history its dialectical character. One must act and wait, observing the signs of the time and acting only when the time or *Kairos* is fulfilled. The "favored place" in history is a place where the finite claim to be infinite has been "broken," and, freed of pride, a man or group is receptive to the new.

In discussion, Dr. Tillich's views were criticized as being deterministic, viewing new collectivism as inevitable, and antidemocratic in his willingness to sacrifice present forms of democracy. In reply, Dr. Tillich pointed to the biblical idea of historical trends in the concept of *Kairos*. In the interpretation of such trends, intuitive awareness beyond calculation and observation are needed. Dr. Tillich professed not to be antidemocratic, but to see the inadequacy of some of its present forms and to desire new and more adequate political forms to embody its permanent principles.

Dr. Edgar Brightman discussed "A Personalistic View of Human Nature," describing personalism as a radically empirical form of idealism which uses coherence as a criterion of truth, yet escapes absolutism, and which includes practical consequences yet transcends pragmatism. All existence is experience, and all experience is personal, hence all existence is a self or part of a self. Nature spelled with a capital *N* is the order revealed through the senses; of it the human body is a part, but human personality is not. Personality is what it is experienced to be, namely conscious processes of all kinds and degrees. The whole self or personality is held together by linkage of memory and anticipation. Human nature is the field of potentialities of human experience,

and also the limits of that field. Reason is man's capacity to reach out after the infinite and inexhaustible ideal. Freedom is man's creative contribution to an endlessly creative universe; it involves choice, achievement, and responsibility. Man is potentially a child of God, a realizer of spiritual values, and also a sinner, repudiating values. He is a citizen of two worlds, the world of obstacles and sin, and the world of aspiration toward the divine.

The paper was criticized as supporting the bourgeois ideal of isolated individualism. Such a view was held likely to be socially conservative and reactionary, for personality is a social product and must be recognized as such. Dr. Brightman's conception of the nature of God was criticized as assuming a too complete knowledge of God. Further, God was held by some to be not one personality among others, but cosmic personality.

Dr. Harry Bone's paper on "Some General Implications of Psychotherapeutic Character Analysis," was devoted to a description of the character analysis of Clare (from Horney's *Self Analysis),* and some inferences were drawn from it. Among the inferences were the following: (1) Character analysis proceeds in a manner similar to the relation of fact and hypothesis in natural sciences. Various actions and traits suggest hypotheses, which, in turn, guide further exploration into the character structure. And this, in turn, leads to a further revision of theory. (2) Certain conclusions are implied concerning the nature of psychological causation, determinism, and freedom. All the factors in her environment and character being what they were, Clare's neurosis was determined. She had no real freedom of choice. But freedom of choice and responsibility were progressively achieved as she became aware of the determinisms in which she was caught. Thus freedom is not antithetical to psychic determinism but requires it, and the degree of freedom is proportional to one's awareness of the determinisms operating. (3) From psychotherapeutic character analysis there emerges the conclusion that there are some human traits which are general, transcending cultural relativity. They cannot be described in wholly biological terms, but in general human terms. Included in a list of such traits are love, as a valuation placed upon human life and a desire for its fulfillment in oneself and others, equality as between persons, freedom, and responsibility. Neuroses, or stunted, unfulfilled personalities, cannot be defined in terms of a given culture, but only

in terms of these general human norms. One must carefully distinguish between the "rigid normal" of any culture and genuine healthy-mindedness. While societies may make almost anything of human nature, this is not the whole truth. A violation of the essential humanness of human beings sets up powerful reactions or counter movements.

The discussion treated the distinction between the neurotic, the rigid normal, and the healthy-minded, particularly in relation to the problems of present society and to the requirements of creativity. In what sense is the creative man neurotic? What is the relation of individual neuroses to the present forms of our society? And what is the relation of present society to the norms of essential humanness as stated in the paper?

BOOK REVIEWS

The Building of Eternal Rome. By Edward Kennard Rand. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943. xi + 318 pp. $3.50.

Ever since Winckelmann initiated the sharper differentiation of the Greco-Roman world into its Greek and Roman elements, enthusiastic appreciation of Greek brilliance and originality has *pari passu* reduced the stature of the Romans. When, after the last war, Latin all but disappeared from the curriculum, the Latinists, whose training and convictions dictated a fuller appreciation of the Roman contribution to civilization found their numbers reduced and their authority diminished. Professors dealt with classical antiquity as a whole rather than with Greek and Latin separately, and Rome was looked upon as a manifestation of Hellenism, and by no means the most attractive, along with Alexandria and Antioch. And lastly, when, largely as a result of Ferrero's incisive analogies of Caesarism and Bonapartism, the totalitarian aspects of the Roman polity came to be emphasized, there seemed to be little left in Rome with which a humanist needed to concern himself. The whore of Babylon was stripped of her adornments, which had been acquired by conscienceless exploitation and were impressive because they were expensive rather than tasteful, and the Romans were revealed as philistine, avaricious, vulgar, and unimaginative, with a derivative and self-conscious literature and without so much refinement as would soften the realism of their callous, calculating, and mean-spirited portrait busts.

But it is a prodigious indictment against the civilization of Europe to dismiss a whole era which shaped it and gave it direction at so low an estimate, and it is refreshing, therefore, to have a rehabilitation of the permanent contribution of that era from a scholar who is as thoroughly naturalized in it as it is possible for a man from an alien age and climate to be, and who is at the same time no mere *laudator temporis acti* impatient of his own intellectual climate. The foundations which Professor Rand illuminates rest neither on stones nor on military conquests but are comprised in the spiritual texture which is *aere perennius.* His insistence that ideas are substantial, that "poetry is a solid material for the building of the City," marks a welcome turn from the preoccupation with Roman concrete and drains and cooking utensils and trade routes and bookkeeping and civil service which has

threatened to overwhelm the few remaining students of Roman antiquity and has certainly diverted them from the humanistic aspects of their discipline. In a sense this book is a pendant to Werner Jaeger's *Paideia,* and, if Roman materials for such a study are jejune as compared with Greece, Professor Rand compensates by the warmth of his advocacy and the projection of his own amiable and impressive personality. He is himself, in fact, the most persuasive argument for the view he propounds: if so urbane and literate a man is convinced of the worth of Rome and its abiding influence for good, these things must be so.

The high sense of their own dignity and responsibility seems to have been crystallized for the Romans by foreigners, Polybius and Panaetius. Cicero reflects the national moral earnestness, as do the early writers of the Republic of whom we have knowledge. Livy and Tacitus and Sallust regret its weakening as a result of the security and moral relaxation consequent on the Second Punic War. The implication that Virgil and Horace were chiefly interested in reaffirming traditional Roman values for the guidance of Augustus, and that Augustus was an eager and docile pupil looking (apparently exclusively) to Virgil and Horace for guidance, seems an undue exaltation of the practical efficacy of poetry. The affectionate treatment of Ovid is faintly suggestive of an earnest Christian's allegorical interpretation of Canticles. But Professor Rand is no enemy of gayety and devotes a chapter to Roman laughter. Yet the meagreness of the yield leaves some doubt in the reader's mind; Roman wit seems an inorganic attachment to an efficient and grim structure, like the columns affixed to the Colosseum.

For the Republic and the first century of the Empire, which have traditionally been the central interest of the classicist, the value of Professor Rand's book lies in its new interpretations and new emphases. As he moves through the less familiar centuries his easy and complete mastery of his material constantly opens new insights. Pertinent objection is made to the pejorative epithet "silver" as applied to the Latinity of such writers as Seneca and Tacitus, but the archaizing preciosity of Fronto is deplored. Fronto is numbered with the tutors of princes to whom Professor Rand assigns much credit for the fashioning of Roman ideals, yet Professor Rand rather applauds Marcus Aurelius' turn from his master's rhetoric to the study of philosophy. The sceptic may wonder whether Fronto was not the charac-

teristic issue of a tendency long operative, rather than a regrettable exception. The dark third century offers little to Professor Rand's purpose. He cites the recent rehabilitation of Gallienus against the strictures of the *Scriptores Historiae Augustae,* and shows how the judgments passed on various emperors in that work imply as a standard of perfection those qualities with which the builders of the true Rome had imbued Augustus.

In the fourth century Christianity emerged from its subterranean and peripheral existence and moved more freely in the intellectual life of its environment, taking cognizance, by opposition or assimilation, of pagan literature and pagan philosophy. Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine give the century a Ciceronian coloring. Tertullian still fears Rome. Arnobius mocks the pagan myths and scorns the lying poets, but Cyprian baptizes Roman virtues, and Minucius Felix and Prudentius baptize the pagan poets. Lactantius uses allegorical interpretation to make the pagans precursors of Christianity. He dedicates his *Divinae Institutiones* to Constantine as to another Augustus, and Constantine appoints him tutor to his son Crispus, thus continuing the tradition of making the repositories of Rome's moral wealth tutors to Rome's rulers. It is Augustine who preserved Ennius' magnificent line, in a quotation from Cicero: *moribus antiquis res stat Romana virisque.* The errors of Greek philosophy and the imperfections of Roman history are mercilessly exposed by Augustine, yet, as in Arnobius and Lactantius, there is the implication that the Romans are better than their gods, and the ancient ideals continue to inform a Rome become Christian.

The merging of Greek and Roman strands had become apparent under Hadrian, and the union was consummated when Constantine founded the new Rome at Byzantium. The cleavage into East and West under Justinian was tragic, but the dynasties of the Isaurian Iconoclasts, the Macedonians, and the Comneni were affected by Augustan ideals, though largely forgetful of Latin letters, and transmitted as much of those ideals as was expressed in their fresh art and lively literature to Moscow and Kiev. The minds of rulers were still shaped by the precepts and examples of the ancients: such was the intention of the fifty-three treatises of excerpts of ancient authors prepared for Constantinus VII Porphyrogenitus. The *De Caeremoniis,* a kind of

Prince's Handbook prepared for the same ruler, is also filled with reflections of the strength of ancient Rome.

Returning to Rome and the sixth century, Boethius marks a complete symbiosis of Christianity and Humanism, with a thorough understanding of each and a thorough and thoroughly reconciled devotion to both. After inarticulate centuries the Roman legacy burgeons anew in the brilliant Carolingian renascence, which is Professor Rand's special sphere. His deductions regarding cultural interests on the basis of characteristic manuscript hands make fascinating reading. Charlemagne's own concepts were formed in accordance with the ideals of Rome, transmitted in part through St. Augustine's *City of God,* readings from which, Einhard tells us, constituted a favorite postprandial divertissement of the king. Dante's *De Monarchia* not only draws inspiration from the old Rome but regards it as part of the divine scheme, in its own sphere equally valid with the new. Brutus and Cassius share Judecca with Iscariot, and Virgil is intertwined with Augustine to shadow forth the outlines of the ideal state.

It was the thorough permeation of Europe by the Roman element which made even its vernacular literature possible and gave it a unity in its diversity. It was the common denominator of Rome, manifest in such tangibles as the Latin language and the Latin mass and a common educational curriculum, as well as in less tangible concepts of life and government, which made Europe so homogeneous that a cultured man from any part of it could feel at home in any other part. Disintegration of religion and education is made the cause of current barbarism; Professor Rand goes so far as to attribute the success of certain college football teams to the preservation of ancient values in the Jesuit discipline. "To think that ideals have perished because you have been false to ideals is a most comic form of self conceit."

Like his masters, Plato and Cicero, Professor Rand concludes his reflections on the structure of society with a vision, in which ancient worthies (who have, however read the moderns and especially Santayana) discourse with each other and with the author. The vision is less apocalyptic than Er's or Scipio's and rather suggestive of the *Houseboat on the Styx,* but it presents a serious and withal urbane synthesis of the concepts which the ancients fashioned and apposite suggestions of their abiding worth in shaping our own culture: *ridendo dicere verum quis vetat?* The urbanity, the rich allusiveness, the stead-

fast faith which is based on wide and deep knowledge of men and letters and so not subject to the caprice of ephemeral revolutions that are characteristic of Professor Rand's vision as of his book as a whole, serve to document the loss our age has suffered in its preoccupation with the temporal and constitute an eloquent argument for a return to older disciplines.

Moses Hadas

Columbia University

The Great Learning and the Mean-in-Action. Newly translated from the Chinese, with an Introductory Essay on the History of Chinese Philosophy by E. R. Hughes. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1943. xv + 176 pp. $2.00.

Only a few decades ago every Chinese school boy was expected to learn by heart the two little Confucian treatises known as the *Ta Hsüeh* or *Great Learning,* and the *Chung Yung* or *Doctrine of the Mean.* (Such is the traditional translation of the latter title, which Professor Hughes felicitously renders anew as the *Mean-in-Action.*) Together with the *Analects* of Confucius and the *Works* of Mencius, these formed the famous "Four Books" constituting the basis of Chinese education. Now, of course, the Confucian classics no longer hold their place of undivided authority in the Chinese curriculum. And yet, as Professor Hughes shows in the first pages of his Introductory Essay, the ideas contained in these books are far from having lost their meaning for modern China.

The usual technique, when dealing with ancient and alien texts such as these, is to describe, first, their authorship and immediate historical background; then their influence in later times within their own cultural milieu; and finally, perhaps—if this can safely be demonstrated—the impingement of this influence upon our western world. But Professor Hughes, through something of a tour de force, has succeeded in exactly reversing this technique.

The first chapter of the Introductory Essay describes how Neo-Confucianism (the form of Confucianism in which the *Great Learning* and the *Mean-in-Action* gained their pre-eminent position) became known to Europe through the writings of the Jesuit missionaries of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is a fascinating story, the way

in which this Confucianism influenced such men as Leibnitz and Rousseau, and thus came to enter the general stream of modern western thought.[1] The second chapter describes the rise of the Neo-Confucian school in the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, and sketches the ideological history of China during the thousand and more years preceding. The third chapter deals with "The Society which produced 'the Mean-in-Action' and 'the Great Learning,'" and so is centered around the rich philosophical flowering which took place in China between the fifth and the third centuries B.C. The fourth chapter, finally, tackles the thorny question of the authorship and date of the texts themselves. It reaches the conclusion that the *Mean-in-Action* is a composite work, written in part by the grandson of Confucius, Tzu Ssu (died B.C. 402?), and in part by an unknown Confucian belonging to the totalitarian period of the First Emperor (B.C. 246-210). As for the *Great Learning*, Professor Hughes believes this to be the work of an unknown Confucian living just before Mencius (B.C. 371?-289?).

Following this Introductory Essay, which occupies more than half of the total volume, there comes a translation of the texts themselves. The book is concluded with six brief appendices, among them two of exceptional interest on "Leibniz and Chu Hsi," and "Rousseau and Nature in Family Relations."

Through his unusual treatment, Professor Hughes has succeeded in infusing vividness and significance into what would ordinarily be an esoteric subject to the general western reader. Warmth of human understanding and gracefulness of style combine with sound scholarship to produce a work which, while in no sense a systematic treatise of Chinese philosophy as a whole, is, nevertheless, far broader in scope than its title indicates. Indeed, it is one of the best introductions to the subject for the general reader that this reviewer has yet seen, and as such stands as a worthy companion to Professor Hughes' earlier volume, *Chinese Philosophy in Classical Times*. At the same time it contains much meat for the demanding specialist.

It is a rare book in which no ground for criticism can be found, and

1. The extent of Chinese influence on Leibnitz, Voltaire, and the French Physiocrats is well known, but the fact that Rousseau, though outwardly antagonistic to Chinese civilization, was nevertheless unconsciously influenced, emerges as one of the most interesting suggestions of this book.

the one under review is no exception. Thus, in his Introductory Essay (p. 44), Professor Hughes asserts that during the Sung Dynasty (960-1279) Buddhism was still "as strong as ever." On the contrary, the reviewer suspects that most Buddhist scholars would agree that as early as the persecution of 845, Chinese Buddhism, in its intellectual phases at least, was showing signs of decline. Again (p. 45), the author claims that classical Confucianism produced only one first class metaphysician, the writer of the *Mean-in-Action*. This seems hardly fair to such a man as Tung Chung-shu (B.C. 179?-104?), who, if not exactly "classical" in the sense intended by Professor Hughes, should at least have been mentioned before plunging in the next sentence into the Neo-Confucianism of more than a millenium later. Also, the discussion about Nature and Reason (pp. 54-56) is somewhat obscured by a failure to define with sufficient clarity the meaning of the terms so used.

Turning to chapter 4 of the Introductory Essay (authorship and dating of the texts), the reviewer would agree with Professor Hughes that the *Mean-in-Action* is a composite work, written by two different authors of different date, but, in his opinion, it is dangerous to assert with such definiteness that the earlier author was indeed Tzu Ssu, and that the later one was an unknown Confucian seeking to express in veiled language his opposition to the regimentation of life under the First Emperor. Such a hypothesis *may* be correct, but the evidence is too scanty to be conclusive.

Nor can the reviewer agree with Professor Hughes when he says that the break between the earlier and later sections of the text comes at chapter 26, paragraph 7. The pages of text immediately preceding this "break" are filled with remarks highly mystical and metaphysical in tone, and centered particularly around the term *ch'eng* (real or realness), which unmistakably stamp them as a late production and make it impossible for them to have been written by any Confucian as early as Tzu Ssu.[2]

In these same pages, moreover, there even appears a reference to the famous *wu wei* or "non-action" of the Taoists, a term which was

2. The argument that the word *ch'eng* also occurs once in that portion of the text which is indubitably early (in ch. 16 and not in ch. 12, as Professor Hughes erroneously states on p. 97, note 1) is really beside the point, inasmuch as *ch'eng* in that one passage has none of the mystical overtones given it by the later author.

not borrowed from them by the Confucians before the third century B.C. The argument advanced by Professor Hughes (Appendix 4) that this term may actually have been *invented* by Tzu Ssu, and only then taken over from him by the Taoists, seems to the reviewer wholly untenable. In general, Professor Hughes does not appear to give adequate recognition to the considerable degree of Taoist influence apparent in much of the later portion of the *Mean-in-Action*.

As regards the *Great Learning*, the attempt (pp. 102-103) to date the work between B.C. 350 and 340 is unconvincing. Taking the passage, "Profit is not to be taken as (real) profit; righteousness is to be taken as real profit," Professor Hughes interprets this as an attack against the Legalist, Shang Yang (died B.C. 338). But this argument collapses in face of the fact that Mencius, who lived after this proposed dating, makes a similar attack upon profit, and yet does so with Mo Tzu, rather than the Legalists, in mind. Fung Yu-lan (*A History of Chinese Philosophy*, tr. by Bodde, pp. 364-369) has brought forth certain similarities between the *Great Learning* and Hsün Tzu (ca. B.C. 298-ca. 238), and even if the *Great Learning* does not belong to Hsün Tzu's actual school, it probably falls somewhere within his general period.

The translations of the *Great Learning* and the *Mean-in-Action* given in this volume are easily the best yet to appear in English. In some places Professor Hughes has wisely retained the standard renderings of Legge, when change would bring no useful end; but elsewhere, through new interpretations, he has effectively brought out many points unrecognized by Legge. The resulting translations are not only philosophically far more perceptive, but also much more idiomatic in their English. Furthermore, they are greatly clarified by the generously interspersed comments of the translator. Naturally, when new translations of such difficult and often ambiguous texts as these are offered, reason for disagreement between translator and critic can arise on various points. Limitations of space prevent any discussion of these here, but it is the hope of the reviewer, war-time duties permitting, to go into them in detail at some future date in the pages of the *Journal of the American Oriental Society*.

In conclusion, it may be said that this book would have been benefited by greater care in the romanization of Chinese terms and names. The following are some of the inaccuracies that have been noticed:

Shih-hsiang . . . . Yin-hsiang, instead of *Ssu-hsiang . . . . Ying-hsiang* (p. x); Tung Huan instead of Tun Huang (p. 46); Chang Tun-Sung instead of Chang Tung-sun (p. 52); T'ian P'ien instead of T'ien P'ien (p. 80); *ch'ih* instead of *chih* (p. 90); *yu* instead of *ju* (?) and *pü* instead of *nü* (p. 93); *wei* instead of *wai* (p. 94); *Sang Ching* instead of *San Ching* (p. 105); Chiu instead of Ch'iu (p. 111); *Tung Yi* instead of *T'ung Yi* (p. 118); Chih State instead of Ch'i State (p. 136); Ssu-ma Tan instead of Ssu-ma T'an (p. 144); K'ung Yin-ta instead of K'ung Ying-ta (p. 147); Tai Mountain instead of T'ai Mountain (p. 171); *hsüeh ch'i chieh* instead of *hsüeh ch'i che* (p. 172); and Chu State instead of Ch'u State (p. 175).

These are minor blemishes in a book which is an outstanding contribution to our understanding of early Chinese thought.

Derk Bodde

University of Pennsylvania

Hinduism and Buddhism. By Ananda K. Coomaraswamy. New York: Philosophical Library, 1943. 86 pp. $1.75.

The aim of the author in writing this book was two-fold: first, to give a faithful account of Hinduism; second, by a similar treatment of Buddhism, to show that the sixth-century reformation initiated by Śākyamuni was, in actuality, a return to the ancient doctrines of Brahmanism, which, at that time, had been forgotten or misinterpreted. The book is written from the point of view of the *philosophia perennis,* which finds in every great religious tradition "those universal truths to which no people or age can make exclusive claim." The advantage of this point of view, once attained, for the study of Indian religion is that it enables and at once illuminates an immediate understanding of the whole doctrine such as can hardly be reached by the historical method through the mediate steps of correlation and assimilation. The danger, on the other hand, is that the inevitable modifications imposed by local limitations of space and time upon the universal truths of the *philosophia perennis* may be overlooked, or minimized, or disregarded. Of this danger Dr. Coomaraswamy has been aware in the past, and he has not been trapped by it here.

It is necessary, however, to measure this book not only for its value as a work of religion by a religious teacher profoundly convinced of

the truth he is expounding, but also as a contribution by a distinguished Orientalist to our knowledge, in the West, of Indian thought. For a century now, Indian studies have been a part, however small, of our academic tradition. Aside from the great dictionaries and translations (without which even this work would hardly have been possible), it is doubtful whether a more useful single book dealing with either Hinduism or Buddhism has been produced in that entire period than this small volume by Dr. Coomaraswamy. That it is a controversial book is natural, both because of the subject with which it deals and the point of view from which it is written. This does not diminish its worth. It may even be said to enhance its value, for the present time is well suited to a thorough discussion of the merits and defects of these two great systems of Eastern metaphysics. This discussion can hardly be held without argument; but the result of such an argument may well be to give a new impetus and (which is the more important) a new direction to Sanskrit and Pali studies in this country.

The prime value of this volume—and one, indeed, which makes it practically unique in both East and West—is that in it Indian theological terms are used with a proper understanding not only of their Indian meaning but also of their Occidental equivalents. (The need for a complete glossary of these terms is very great.) It is a rare delight to see *svaprakāśatvam* translated by "self-manifestation," *kṛtyā* by "potentiality," *sattva* by "essence," and to be reminded that *agre* (ἐν ἀρχῇ) means not only "in the beginning" but also "in the first cause." It is that sort of writing which brings the Sanskrit words to life and reminds us that it is theology with which we are dealing. Equally sharp will be the reader's pleasure in the short treatment of some much-debated fundamental questions of all religion: transmigration, the theory of the self, the nature of a *dēva,* the doctrine of mediate causes. There is, also, an excellent and needed emphasis upon the "life of incessant recollectedness" which is Buddhism. And, for those who have not yet pondered Śaṅkara's comment on Brahma Sutra 1. 1. 5 (*neśvarād anyaḥ saṁsārī*: "there is no transmigrator other than the Lord"), or who might otherwise pass unheeding over this summation of all Indian theology, there is a long and valuable footnote on page 36.

As has been said, there are points of controversy; there are, too, matters on which one would like further clarification. But this a small

book and, for its size, an admirably documented book, nearly every statement being supported by quotation. To take issue with any one part, moreover, is (as the reviewer has discovered by reflection over several such matters) to imply, in some degree, dissent from the central thesis. Among other things, one would be near the point in saying that this is a skilfully written work.

Two of these controversial matters are important enough, however, to deserve special comment. The ethics of Hinduism and the doctrine of *karma* in both Buddhism and Hinduism are, moreover, topics of the kind which can least well be defined and agreed upon by the method of selective quotation. It may be well, therefore, to examine Dr. Coomaraswamy's treatment of these two related topics in at least one detail here. The kind of social order which Dr. Coomaraswamy proposes as the logical temporal aim of Hinduism is a "functional hierarchy of the realm" in which the code of professional ethics is high enough to ensure honest and careful workmanship, and in which, the sacramental life being complete, the sacerdotal caste guides with wisdom the ruling power of the king. This we may assume to be the ideal, and, for the present purpose, we may assume the ideal at some time to have existed. The question is, however, whether this very system was not the sort of temporal organization which the Buddha left behind him, and which the Sannyasi leaves behind him, and which, indeed, the Hindu concept of *karma* may, in a sense, be said to repudiate. It is no doubt true, as Dr. Coomaraswamy says, that the *karma mārga,* "the Way of Works" of the Gītā, teaches that the fulfillment of one's own vocation "without self-referent motives" is the way of perfection. But here the caveat should be issued that the Platonic τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν which is quoted (p. 24) in support of "the Way of Works" is not to follow one's vocation κατὰ φύσιν (as is stated) but rather κατὰ νόμου. The Gītā is at times a baffling text, and it may be that the perfect performance of our tasks in a spirit of sanctification is the whole doctrine there expounded; yet the earliest documents show that a more radical idea of renunciation, based on consciousness of guilt, was known at an earlier time.[1] Moreover, the complete liberation

1. Cf. RV vii, 86, 5 and 6: *ava drugdhāni pitryā sṛjā no 'va yā vayaṃ cakṛmā tanūbhiḥ . . . na sa svo dakṣo varuṇa dhrutiḥ sā surā manyur vibhīdako acittiḥ . . .* : "Free us from our fathers' sins and from those we have ourselves committed . . . it is not my own will, O Lord; it is seduction, drink, or anger, dice, unthoughtfulness."

from desire which is the goal of Upanishadic (and of Buddhist) teaching can have little necessary relation to a temporal order of this kind, for, as Dr. Coomaraswamy would no doubt agree, any desire, however innocuous, is the root of activity, and any action, however trivial, is a link in the never-ending chain of causality. One might ask, therefore, whether the doctrine of the Upanishads is not at variance with this idea of a "functional hierarchy." The one is the language of humility; the other has at least a different sound.

These matters have been selected for mention in order to urge the need for a fuller treatment of Indian ethics. To the same end one might quote the words of that great German and great Christian, Dr. Albert Schweitzer, who touched nothing without sympathy and yet was moved to write with grave concern of what he thought to be the absence, in Indian religion, of any doctrine comparable to that of Christian love. The crux appears to be that while the metaphysical doctrines of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity may be, transcendentally, the same, the end of life which they all logically recommend may be reached by different ways: by the indifferentism or impartiality of Hinduism, by the quietism of the Buddha, or by the more positive way set forth in the new commandment of Christianity. A sound comparative study of these three practical ways of life is needed. This study should be undertaken in a spirit not of recrimination but of reconciliation. It should be carried out by one learned in all three traditions. Where so much has been offered in such small compass in this book, it were churlish to ask why more has not been given here. It will be, however, but proper tribute to the author to suggest that he could scarcely perform a more valuable task than to give us such a study of Indian and Christian ethics to serve as a continuation or complement—or completion, even—of his present *Hinduism and Buddhism.*

MURRAY FOWLER

United States Naval Reserve

Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research. Vol. XII. New York, 1942. XXV + 140 + מה pp. $2.50.

Once again this annual volume provides a welcome and varied assortment of good things. Professor Salo W. Baron, discussing "The Jewish Factor in Medieval Civilization," pleads for closer rapproche-

ment between the studies of medieval historians on the one hand and of students of Hebrew literature on the other, and indicates many fields in which a unity of approach might yield fruitful results. "Many a general medievalist," he observes, "even if entirely devoid of bias, has conscientiously abstained from dealing with the Jewish factor because he did not consider himself competent to utilize the extensive Hebrew sources, only a small part of which are available in translation. Jewish historians, on the other hand, had spent so many years in acquiring the necessary training in Hebrew letters, in rabbinics, philosophy etc., that they were unable to penetrate more deeply into the life of the contemporary non-Jewish environment." The author gives several examples of the way in which Jews mixed culturally with gentiles during the Middle Ages, and points out especially that the Jewish quarters were usually located in the center of large cities. The Jewish contribution in the transmission of learning (especially of medical knowledge) is duly noted, but the author wisely indicates that such contribution should not be measured, as is too often the case, by the mere fact that a Jew helped to translate one or other Arabic work into Latin. The real point, he asserts, is "to estimate the relative importance of the work for medieval science and of the translator's peculiarities which may have influenced or colored a particular scientific doctrine." In other words, the criterion is not effort but effect. In speaking of the various fields in which the Jewish factor is manifest Professor Baron mentions the transmission of tales and legends, but his suggestion that "one ought to avoid concentration on the literary masterpieces . . . . and descend to the broad expanses of the popular literature of every age" (p. 26, n. 41) tends to underestimate the recent work of many scholars in precisely the latter branch of folklore. His remarks on the assistance rendered by Jews to Christian exegetes of the Bible (p. 28) might, perhaps, have contained reference to Beryl Smalley's admirable booklet, *Hebrew Scholarship among Christians in 13th Century England* (London, 1939). Of especial interest is Professor Baron's "unorthodox" conclusion that "medieval Jewry, much as it suffered from disabilities, still belonged to the privileged minority of every country in so far as it was tolerated at all" (p. 35). The elaboration and defense of this thesis constitutes not the least arresting portion of this stimulating essay.

A Hebrew article (summarized in English) by the late Jacob Lauter-

bach contends that Exodus 12:6 ("and ye shall keep it until the fourteenth day of the same month: and the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the evening") was anciently construed by some to mean that the paschal lamb could be slaughtered at any time between the tenth of the month (the day when it was selected) and the fourteenth, provided that this was done in the evening. Jesus, says this writer, seems to have eaten of it on Nisan 13. In connection with this article the astronomical calculations in Grace Amadon's recent study, "Ancient Jewish Calendation" (*Journal of Biblical Literature,* LXI [1942], 227-79) should be noted.

Moshe Perlmann publishes a description of a disputation between Sayyid Muḥammad Mahdi Ṭabāṭabā'ī and the Jews of Dhu-l-Kifl in 1796, the material being derived from a manuscript in the British Museum. The arguments used are scarcely novel, though not without interest. The contention, for instance, that the Jews must have tampered with the Scriptural text, because the Samaritan sect has a different recension, agrees remarkably with the line of reasoning adopted by Samaritan writers themselves (e.g., the *Dalil* of Pinehas ben Isaac, or the *Kafi* of Joseph of 'Askar), as does also the argument regarding the relative importance of positive and negative commandments.

Eugen Täubler's essay on "The First Mention of Israel" deals with the celebrated stele of Merneptah, and seeks to identify the Yenoam there mentioned not with Janoah near Tyre, but with another city of the same name (modern Janun) south of Beth Shean. Unfortunately, despite the author's heroic efforts, the philology of this equation is highly questionable. (Incidentally, it was made many years ago by T. K. Cheyne in *The Academy,* July 6, 1896, though that scholar sought to find the Janoah intended in the city near Tyre.) On the entire subject of the Merneptah stele readers may now consult the article by W. F. Albright in *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research,* No. 74, pp. 21-23. It should be added in fairness to Dr. Täubler, however, that his paper is an abstract of a longer discussion, though, on the other hand, it may be stated that the argument is made unusually difficult to follow through the laxity of the editor in not revising its markedly poor English style.

Other contributions to this volume include an exhaustive paper by Joshua Starr on "Jewish Life in Crete," and the publication by Ber-

nard Weinryb of a series of Hebrew documents relating to the communal history of Polish Jewry. These articles, however, while obviously of great value, scarcely fall within the purview of this journal.

THEODOR H. GASTER

New York City

Marriage Laws in the Bible and the Talmud (Harvard Semitic Series, Vol. XII). By LOUIS M. EPSTEIN. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1942. x 362 pp. $3.50.

This work is an attempt to present "a comprehensive survey of Jewish law on the subject of marriage as it has developed historically from the beginning of our records to the present day" (p. VII). In accordance with this scant self-characterization of the author's methodological approach to his subject, the contents of the book are divided into six chapters under the headings *Polygamy, Concubinage, Levirate, Intermarriage, Incest,* and *Other Marriage Prohibitions.*

The approach to the subject-matter is a chronological one, as far as the historical treatment of the various headings is concerned, and at the same time an anthropological one as to the biblical marriage laws. Thus the history of the chapter titles mentioned above is traced from pre-biblical times through Bible and Talmud, and through the post-talmudical period of the Geonim to Maimonides, the *Rishonim* and *Aharonim,* down to eighteenth and nineteenth century decisions and expert opinions, and simultaneously compared, in its pre-biblical and biblical sector, with other Oriental codes like the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, and the Assyrian, Hittite, and Syrian-Roman codes. In the execution of the first approach, the author's extensive reading in talmudical and rabbinical writings is revealed. No use is made of the results of modern bible research, although it would have supported the author's anthropological approach. It is equally evidence of the historical development of the biblical marriage laws that they are largely missing from the Covenant Code *(Exod.* 20:22-23:33), and that those of the Deuteronomic Code in *Deut.* 22-13-29, are traceable to a lost code, the main divisions of which evidently corresponded with those of the Code of Hammurabi (cf. R. H. Pfeiffer, *AJSL.* 36 [1920] 310 ff.). The use of Aramaic and Greek papyri would have illuminated the fluctuation of the historical development. *Hosea* 2:4, for instance, ex-

claims about B.C. 800, "Plead with your mother, plead; For she is not my wife, neither am I her husband." This formula of divorce appears ca. B.C. 440 in the Papyrus G of Assuan in the positive formulation as a marriage promise (cf. Cowley, *Aramaic Papyri of the fifth century B.C.*, [Oxford, 1923], no. 15), etc. To round out the picture of the subject under consideration, a treatment of the divorce regulations in a special chapter would have been helpful, especially in view of the work by Ludwig Blau, *Die jüdische Ehescheidung und der jüdische Scheidebrief*, 2 vols. (Strassburg, 1911-12). It is certainly not the least value of the book that it compels the reviewer to take up a problem resulting from the anthropological part of Dr. Epstein's investigation: the question of foreign influences upon the biblical marriage traditions.

No modern scholar can today any longer believe that the early Hebrews were anything but polytheistic, even though Moses himself should be considered as a monotheist. With regard to the biblical marriage laws, the issue presents itself in an analogous manner: what modern anthropology teaches on the development of the sex life of primitives and of historical peoples leads one to assume that the Hebrews began as polygamists, and in the course of their historical journey achieved the concept of monogamy and the laws against the aberrations from this fundamental. Says Dr. Epstein: "All evidences of monogamy in the Bible . . . present a superimposed morality on a polygamous foundation" (p. 5). But then he contradicts himself by denying the existence of a native Hebrew tradition of polygamy, and by assuming that polygamy infiltrated from foreign sources, Canaanitish or Egyptian (p. 4). Anthropologically speaking, it seems inconceivable that the pre-biblical and early biblical Hebrews, who, according to the author's own statement, were anything but monogamistically inclined, had to imitate the practice of such a human trait as polygamy from other peoples, or to take concubinage from the Babylonians (p. 35).

There is no denying the well-known fact resulting from a comparative study of the biblical marriage laws with those of Oriental peoples, that there are instances of close similarities that suggest influence or even interdependence. But such similarities of legal regulations do not necessarily imply the adoption of the usage itself, which may have been of genuine native origin. Once the practice of polygamy and con-

cubinage required specific regulations, being in contrast to the concept of monogamy, the written laws of a dominant culture may have served as a model or pattern for the Hebrew marriage laws. A close circle of peoples, although different in origin, but depending on a similar geographical background, and on the similar development and changes of epochs, is always connected with a rather homogeneous totality of needs and social expressions. The entelechy of a geographical cultural sphere like that of the prebiblical and biblical Middle East, implies this unity of problem. The sociological analysis of the formative factors indicates that participation of various peoples in a similar set of social experiences is decisive. It leads to a similar outlook of life and to similar social institutions. The slower or less dynamic the cultural development of one particular people is, the easier it may become influenced by established foreign laws and regulations, which are then utilized for and adapted to usages that have grown genuinely in their own sphere.

There has long existed the need for a treatment of the historical development of the Jewish marriage laws. Dr. Epstein's well-printed book deserves special attention, because it is the first comprehensive treatment of the subject offered in English. The work will be a valuable guide to scholars and lay readers alike.

LUITPOLD WALLACH

The Dropsie College

Messiahs. Their Role in Civilization. By WILSON D. WALLIS. Washington, D. C.; American Council on Public Affairs, 1943. 217 pp. Paper, $2.50; cloth, $3.00.

Messianism, in the view of Professor Wallis, is a recurrent factor in human psychology. It arises whenever man feels strongly the oppression of the present and sees no hope in human efforts. Since belief in the possibility of relief is essential to man's continued struggle, and since the appeal to human aid holds no promise, man turns to the superhuman, the messianic. His vast store of anthropological information enables the author to illustrate this appeal to the superhuman from various times and various cultures, and to posit, if not to prove, the influence of one culture upon another in the diffusion of messianic concepts.

Wallis does not claim that messianism arises in a messiah, but rather that a messiah arises because of messianism. "A proclaimed messiah pre-

supposed a conscious demand for social salvation, accompanied by fairly definite ideas as to how the demand should be met" (p. 4). The messiah has been faithful to his culture; he has arisen in response to its demands not just for any solution of its problems, but for a solution in terms of the values it holds dear. Thus, for example, Wallis sees three distinct types of messianism in Israel, nationalistic, apocalyptic, and universalistic, corresponding to three stages in the development of the culture of Israel.

It is significant for Wallis' concept of messianism that "when human aid fails and the present offers no surcease, man turns to the past for inspiration and envisages a messianic future" (p. 1). For Wallis sees in messianism the expression of a desire to return to the "golden age" of myth and popular belief. The believer in messianic deliverance is a Platonist, not a Darwinian; he views the present as a degraded form of the past, rather than as the result of a slow adjustment to conditions of life on this planet. This aureate age, whatever its general characteristics, is tied in every culture to the theme of the culture hero, for "cultural forces are usually personalized. . . . Individual men receive credit for the great forces of culture drift. . . . Culture epochs are sung in strains of arms and the man, with emphasis upon the man" (p. 3). Wallis sees, therefore, the desire for the advent of the messiah largely in terms of the desire for the return of the culture hero.

Wallis also places much emphasis upon the political aspects of messianic movements. To the extent that oppressive social conditions produce messianism, which in turn operates to produce a messiah in its own image, and to the extent that the solution to social problems lies in the political field, messianism cannot avoid political influence. In modern times, says Wallis, "Hitler has been an outstanding example of the political messiah" (p. 196). His political doctrines are millenary in character, promising salvation to the individual who sinks himself in the movement, and regeneration, lasting a thousand years, for the Germany which the movement produces.

There is presented (on p. 187) a statistical table of frequency of known messiahs in Judaism, Mohammedanism, and Christianity. This table reveals a very high concentration of messiahs in the nineteenth century, and, proportionally, an equally large number for the first four decades of the twentieth century. It is hard to estimate the predictive

value of such a table, since it is necessarily made up from incomplete data. The table, for some reason which is not stated, does not include Negro claimants, and fails, therefore, to represent that group which, in our country, most consistently follows the pattern of oppression, messianism and messiah which Wallis has set up.

On the whole, the book suffers from the breadth of the messianic concept which Wallis is trying to develop. As W. S. Gilbert pointed out, "When everyone is somebody, then no one's anybody." Wallis' inclusion of some of the founders of Russian heretical sects, for example, can hardly be justified under any definition of messianism, because their purpose was theological rather than soteriological. So, too, the impostors who are described are not messiahs, although their poor deluded followers may contribute to a history of human folly. Much of the material which is included in this book lacks point. In this way the idea of messianism is so diluted that it retains scarcely any positive meaning.

The bibliography is good; further documentation would be desirable. The proof-reading leaves much to be desired. This reviewer, however, cannot feel too resentful at the proof errors, for, from one such, he has gained an insight into messianism. Wallis, at the close of the book, talking of the salvation promised by a messiah and the risks undertaken by his followers intends to quote Blake's "Jerusalem," to indicate the rigors of messianism:

> "I will not cease from Mental Fight,
> Nor shall my Sword sleep in my hand
> Till we have built Jerusalem
> In England's green and pleasant land."

Fortunately, by virtue of a misprint in the first line, the sense is completely changed. "I will not cease from Mental Flight" (p. 202). The last impact of the book is, thus, that messianism is a form of escapism. Perhaps Professor Wallis would say it is a "retreat to victory." But like the appeal of Superman to the ten year old is the appeal of the superhuman messiah to those older but still unready to try to solve the problem of human beings in the only terms in which they can be solved, human terms. Any other attempt is an attempt at evasion, not solution.

Joseph L. Blau

Far Rockaway, New York

Christ and the Christian Faith. Some Presuppositions and Implications of the Incarnation. By W. Norman Pittenger. New York: Round Table Press, Inc., 1941. xv + 190 pp. $2.00.

In at least one respect, the subtitle of Professor Pittenger's little book bears a formal methodological resemblance to the great *Critique* of Immanuel Kant. Just as the present work is described as "Some Presuppositions and Implications of the Incarnation," so Kant's work might be called "Some Presuppositions and Implications of Physics." Kant found physics set forth in Newton's *Principia.* Pittenger finds the incarnation set forth in "the traditional estimate" of the Nicene Creed, "God of God, Light of Light, Very God of Very God." Kant and Pittenger both start from a datum which they accept as true. Against one who doubts Newton, Kant has few if any arguments. To one who doubts the Creed, our present author brings little help. For example, the remark that a reader of the Gospels would have to say of Jesus, *"aut deus aut non bonus homo"* is far from enlightening, in view of the author's own later concessions. The dilemma carries weight only if the Gospels (especially John) are accepted as historically authentic at almost every point, and it flies in the face of "Why callest thou me good?" in Matt. 19:17. Nevertheless the book is well worth reading.

Professor Pittenger's treatment is a "popular," but clear and honest statement of his conception of the modern meaning of the historic creed. He holds many propositions which never occurred to the writers of the Creed, without compromising his allegiance to what he takes to be its essentials. He thinks, for instance, that we have "much less certainty about the strictly 'biographical' Jesus than has often been claimed" (p. 3). He grants that the Fourth Gospel is not fully historical (p. 66). "Jesus," our author says, "never claimed for himself full divinity" (p. 11). He agrees with A. S. Pringle-Pattison in regarding William Temple's idea that "the psychology of the God-Man must necessarily be beyond our grasp" as a dangerous half-truth, if it "reduces the attitude of the beholder to one of stupefaction" (p. 22). He plainly asserts that "the psychology of Jesus is purely human" (p. 23). Furthermore, like Patanjalī, he declares that "we cannot use the miracle-stories as proofs of divinity" (p. 27). Even the Virgin Birth is cautiously granted not to be essential (pp. 88, 91). It is incidentally assumed (p. 136) that Paul did not write Ephesians.

Along with these concessions to the modern temper, the traditional assertions are maintained. Jesus is "God in no reduced sense of the term" (p. 34). However, in a moment this assertion seems to be "reduced" when the deity of Jesus is defined as "God acting in and through him" (p. 45), a formula that many Unitarians might accept. Our author even reaches the point where, in a comparison between Gandhi and Jesus, he tacitly admits that in both there is "a union of God and man," which in Gandhi is "sporadic" and "frustrated," but in Jesus is "perfectly integrated" (see p. 76). This seems to be a difference of degree not of kind; of adjective, not of substance. In any event, the view rests on an explicit rejection of the sharp Barthian antithesis between Christ and "all other fact and all other experience" (pp. 105, 120).

Our author's conviction derives in part from the view that Christ's coming is "a decisive moment in world-history" (p. 106). At the same time, he declines to make "salvation" depend on a knowledge of Christ (pp. 114-15). Both history, thus viewed, and philosophy are regarded by Professor Pittenger as relevant to Christian faith (pp. 120-21). On general philosophical grounds, he defines God as "super-personal" (superhuman?) reality, whose character is love. At this point he comes close to certain views of the finiteness of God (such as Rashdall's, Montague's, and the present reviewer's), when he says that "by his subtle, interior, mysterious operation, God is distilling some enduring value from that which seems to us to be total dis-value. . . . . Calvary and Easter illustrate a universal fact" (p. 129).

The doctrine of the Trinity is presented from an empirical standpoint. "Three experiences had come to man from one God" (p. 128). But from this experience, the author feels obliged to go on to accept the "difficult" doctrine of Catholic thought that the persons of the Trinity are "something half-way between nouns and adjectives" (p. 139). In a doctrine for which the substantive is vital, this is rather more than an ordinary difficulty. It bears more resemblance to a violation of the law of identity, and in the end Professor Pittenger flatly disavows the alternative of a "merely adjectival" view in favor of three subsistents. This outcome seems remote from his empirical basis in the "three experiences of one God," and borders on tri-theism, unless subsistent means something other than substance, as is not stated explicitly. It is, however, not to be denied that the final formula

of "three distinguishable but eternal modes of being and activity" might be read modalistically as well as substantially.

Any reader who takes the Christian faith seriously will learn much from this little volume. Yet one is conscious that two conflicting currents of thought permeate the volume (as they permeated the thought of St. Augustine and many another). On the one hand, the letter of the Creeds is posited as a fixed point of departure, no question being raised about the experiences and criteria which led to the formulation of the Creeds. On the other hand, historical experience, historical criticism, and philosophy, are freely appealed to—there being no one authoritative Christian philosophy (p. 121). There are earnest and scholarly attempts to unite the traditional presuppositions with the empirical-rational method. Unfortunately, oil and water will not mix.

EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN

Boston University

The Origin of the Grail Legend. By ARTHUR C. L. BROWN. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1943. viii + 476 pp. $5.00.

Professor Brown's general feeling as to the relationship between Arthurian romance and Celtic tradition is one which the present reviewer shares. There is no adequate explanation of the Round Table cycle, its idiosyncrasies, and its vogue with the courtly circles of France, except that it is based on the blended traditions of Ireland and Wales, transmitted by the year 1100 and after to the French by bilingual Breton conteurs. The quirks of oral transmission and scribal corruption, the rationalizing and Christianizing of this originally mythic matter, have disguised the legends of the Grail but cannot wholly conceal their essential nature. This general view of the Grail problem seems to me quite sound. Brown's translations and summaries of Irish materials are valuable and rest on the best modern scholarship. On three important points bearing on the Grail problem his solutions, though not original, seem sound: the identity of the Fisher King with the Welsh sea-god Bran;[1] the descent of the Grail Bearer, in part, from the Irish goddess

1. This view has been upheld by Heinrich, Martin, Nutt, Rhys, Wechssler, and Nitze, and elaborated by Miss Newstead in her *Bran the Blessed in Arthurian Romance* (New York, 1939).

Eriu;[2] the characteristically Irish internal arrangements of the Fisher King's hall.[3]

Unfortunately, as a comparison with my article, "The Irish Origin of the Grail Legend" (*Speculum,* VIII (1933), 415 ff.), will reveal, there is a wide divergence between Brown and myself on the interpretation of the facts. He excludes from consideration the pertinent material in the Robert de Boron and Vulgate cycles. His explanation of the French word *graal* as a corruption of Irish *criol,* a bag, basket, or box, runs counter to the evidence which establishes the meaning as a wide and rather deep dish,[4] and which shows that the Welsh knew of just such a vessel which provided whatever food one desired—one of the distinctive attributes of the Grail.[5]

Besides many other questionable details in Brown's book, there are two major theses which arouse serious doubts. One of his fundamental ideas is that most of the wars, tourneys, and personal combats of Arthurian romance reflect, though dimly, the Irish legend of the conflicts between the Tuatha De Danann, or "peoples of the goddess Dana," and the Fomori,—races roughly corresponding to the gods and giants of Greek mythology. One weakness in this contention is that the Irish themselves, as Brown frankly admits,[6] confused the two supernatural races. Another weakness is that the names of the Fomori which Brown equates with the names of unfriendly Arthurian figures do not seem to be known to the Welsh (with two dubious exceptions);[7] and yet, to reach the French, these names must have passed through Wales.[8] Furthermore, when we are able to trace an Arthurian story with certainty back to an Irish saga, the hostile figure turns out to be Curoi,[9] who was not a Fomor, or to be Midir,[10] who was one of the Tuatha De. A final proof of the discord between this hypothesis and the facts is that, when

2. *Speculum,* VIII (1933), 421 f.

3. Nitze, in *Studies in Honor of A. M. Elliott* (Baltimore, 1911), I, 19.

4. Nitze, in *Modern Philology,* XIII (1916), 681.

5. *Romanische Forschungen,* XLV (1931), 68-71. *Speculum,* VIII (1933), 430.

6. Pp. 75, 78 f., 223, 260, n. 49.

7. The argument for the identity of Irish Brion and Cai with Welsh Bran and Cei (pp. 288-92, 383-5) does not impress me.

8. *Modern Philology,* XXXIII (1936), 225.

9. *Publications of the Modern Language Association of America,* XLVIII (1933), 1000 ff.

10. T. P. Cross, W. A. Nitze, *Lancelot and Guenevere* (Chicago, 1930), particularly pp. 34-41.

Brown makes up his list of "giants," i. e., Fomori (pp. 166 f.), he includes many whose stature is, according to the texts, not above normal.

Another major thesis is that the Fomori are lords of the dead, that red is a characteristic color of these hostile figures and of their abodes, that many of the hostile red knights of the matter of Britain are Plutos and their towers are abodes of the dead, and that almost any remote region, such as Spain, Norway, Lothian, Galloway, the Orkneys, is to be interpreted likewise. Even Gawain, we are told, was "a good king of the land of the dead." We meet with Death-Horses and Death-Carts. For all this there is little cogent evidence. If Procopius, a Byzantine of the sixth century, reports that west of the wall in Britain the air is so pestilential that anyone who passes beyond falls dead, this hardly proves that Galloway, Lothian, and the Orkneys 600 years later were regarded as the realms of the departed. If Brown shows with excellent evidence that the medieval Irish knew a red-cornered rock off the Kerry coast as the House of Donn, where the dead have their tryst, he has built a very top-heavy edifice of inference upon it. I have elsewhere endeavored to show that this house of Donn, which seems to have no connection with the many faery palaces of Irish legend, is the only abode of the dead (apart from Christian concepts of heaven, hell, and purgatory) identified as such in Old and Middle Irish literature.[11] The Welsh evidence is completely negative; in the descriptions of Annwn there are no dead. MacCulloch's argument on this point still holds good,[12] and is accepted by many scholars. When we come to the Bretons, however, it is clear that, in the twelfth century as in the nineteenth, there was a strong tradition of a lord of Death.[13] It appears in the Breton lai of *Sir Orfeo* and in its modern folktale parallels, where Death personified takes a human bride off through a cavern in a rock to his splendid palace, and a husband or brother, seeking her out, finds himself among corpses or among souls enduring punishment.[14] This Breton eschatology has colored a few Arthurian romances, and in the German poem, *Diu Krone*, the Grail King declares that he

11. *Publications Mod. Lang. Assoc.*, LVI (1941), 891-98.

12. J. A. MacCulloch, *Religion of the Ancient Celts* (Edinburgh, 1911), pp. 370-76. Hastings, *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, II, 689-96.

13. A. Le Braz, *La Légende de la Mort*, ed. 3 (Paris, 1912).

14. W. H. French, C. B. Hale, *Middle English Metrical Romances* (New York, 1930), p. 323. *Revue Celtique*, II (1873-75), 291, 297, 303.

and his people are dead.[15] This evidence is clear, unmistakable, whereas the effort to identify every knight who is clad in red or has anything to do with red as a Celtic Pluto finds no support in the texts and ignores the indications that red was a solar color, not only for pagan Irish sun-worshipers but also for the Arthurian romancers to whom the Irish bequeathed a considerable portion of their mythology.[16]

Useful as a source of reference to primary materials, Brown's work must be regarded as a questionable guide to the interpretation of Celtic myth and Arthurian romance.[17]

ROGER SHERMAN LOOMIS

Columbia University

The Long Road to Methodist Union. By JOHN M. MOORE. With Forewords by EDWIN H. HUGHES and JAMES H. STRAUGHN. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1943. 247 pp. $2.00.

After divisions which had lasted for more than a century, the Methodist Protestant Church (1828) and the Methodist Episcopal Church, South (1844) united with the Methodist Episcopal Church, in 1939, to form a new organization, The Methodist Church. The long duration of the separation, the numbers involved—some ten million communicants—and the bitterness which was the accompaniment and aftermath of these schisms, combined to make the process of unification prolonged and difficult. As the first large-scale merger of an American Protestant group, it may well be studied by other denominations which have a strong family feeling. It would, therefore, seem desirable that a full and unbiased history of the Methodist experience should be available.

Such a record this volume professes to be. Indeed, one might mistake it for the "official" history, since the two Bishops who furnish the fraternal Forewords, shown in a triple handclasp with the author, were joint chairmen of the Commission which drafted the final Plan of Union. The volume, however, has no official imprimatur; its value,

15. *Publications Mod. Lang. Assoc.*, LVI, 898 f.

16. R. S. Loomis, *Celtic Myth and Arthurian Romance* (New York, 1927), pp. 46, 86, 215-17. *Journal of English and Germanic Philology*, XLII (1943), 168 f., 179.

17. In a projected book on Chrétien de Troyes and Celtic tradition I intend to discuss the *Conte del Graal*, its sources, and their meaning, with greater accuracy and clarity than in my *Celtic Myth and Arthurian Romance*.

which is considerable, rests wholly upon the full knowledge and fine spirit of its author, whose personal contribution to the success of the great undertaking, especially in its concluding stages, was of prime importance. He writes from intimate acquaintance with the records, and with many of the men who were active in the several approaches to union, and, fortunately, he was born late enough to have been spared exposure to the most violent outbreaks of partisan feeling which marked some gloomy periods of the road-building process. A son of the Middle Border, educated largely in Northern schools and ordained in a Northern Methodist Conference (although his distinguished ministry has been almost wholly in the "Church, South"), he is probably as nearly free from bias as is possible for one brought up in the atmosphere of either section. Yet, as Bishop Moore himself says in this book, "The history of a people does something to them that enters into the blood of their veins and the fiber of their minds and souls." Such defects as this history has are plainly traceable to this source.

The work has conspicuous merits: diligent and scholarly study of the source material, accurate statement of the successive stages in the slow progress of the movement, and the causes of failure in the earlier approaches; generous and wise use of official documents; liberal and discriminating quotations from significant writings and speeches of the leading spokesmen on both sides; and an illuminating explanation of the Plan eventually adopted. All these features combine to make a history which will amply repay careful study.

Having said this much in sincere appreciation of Bishop Moore's work, the conscientious reviewer is constrained to note certain shortcomings, which should be pointed out to any reader who might otherwise accept the volume as the definitive utterance on the subject. That it cannot be. That must be written by some ecclesiastical historian who is free from prepossessions which "have entered into the blood of his veins and the fiber of his mind and soul." Methodist Protestants have expressed the opinion that the author was so absorbed with the North-South question that he gave inadequate attention to matters relating to the former group. Some indication of this unfortunate deficiency is evident from the fact that Bishop Straughn, in his Foreword, feels obliged to "bridge certain intervals" in the account of Methodist Protestant participation. A glaring omission of this sort is the failure to mention the epoch-making plea of President Thomas H.

Lewis, of the Methodist Protestant Church, to the Methodist Episcopal General Conference in Baltimore (1908), of which it has been truly said that it was "historic as setting on fire the union movement."

Sharing the Northern point of view, this reviewer may seem overcritical, yet he must bear in mind the non-Methodist student who will look to this volume as the complete statement of the essential matters involved. Such a person would be helped to understand the "long road," if the author had given a better picture of the scenery along the route, and a more circumstantial description of the terrain which it traverses. For instance, the South has often contended that the basic cause of the division of 1844 was not slavery, but a disagreement as to the absolute power of the General Conference. It is not clear that the author favors this view, though he quotes documents which express it. But he does not tell us that, when the Southern Church wrote its first Discipline (1846), it gave precisely identical "full power" to its General Conference, even copying the exact language of the Methodist Episcopal Discipline of 1844! Hence, it would appear that the Southern objectors approved the *principle;* what they opposed was the exercise of that power by an adverse majority. Such a majority—already two to one—was increasing with the rapid development of the industrial North, and the coalition of Southern leaders with an influential body of Northern "appeasers" had lost the control which had enabled it to water down the original strong provisions of the Discipline against slavery. This control was now menaced by the irresponsible abolitionist crusaders from New England, the advance guard of the "——— Yankees"! The defeat of William Capers for the episcopacy was a sharp warning that no slaveholder could hope to be elected bishop by such a General Conference. Without a knowledge of facts like these, it is not easy to understand all that lay back of the separation of 1844.

Nor did the end of slavery make unification easy. The New South inherited the slavery problem in a new form as the race problem. Yet an outsider—an Englishman, for example—might read this book without visualizing this almost insurmountable obstacle to union. Southern Methodism, still inextricably entangled with the social and political system of its section,—which considered itself a "white man's country," and denied to the "brother in black" his right to vote, restricted his educational opportunities, and segregated him in hospitals, hotels, restaurants, and trains—realized that, under existing

circumstances, the only unification possible would be one which would guarantee it permanently against interference by a General Conference of which a majority was sure to be composed of delegates from sections unsympathetic with the Southern racial policy. That is why no progress was made toward unification until a Plan of Union by Reorganization was brought forward. As evenutally adopted, this split The Methodist Church into six "Jurisdictions," two of which were, humanly speaking, assured of Southern control; three were presumably Northern, and the sixth, or "Central" Jurisdiction, gathered in the Negro members of the former Methodist Episcopal and Methodist Protestant Churches. Ingenious provisions were enacted to guard against any invasion of Southern "attitudes," to borrow one of Bishop Moore's euphemisms for racial discriminations. The reader who is not familiar with the coverage of such terms as "attitudes," "customs," "social system," and even "civilization," might not always discover what—or who—was "under the woodpile."

The author of such a history treads on delicate ground; he is not always aware of the location of the pitfalls which beset his footsteps. A Northern writer might have erred at other points, for the Northern Methodist were by no means guiltless at more than one stage of the long journey. When the story is completely set forth, it will be by someone who approaches the subject without prejudice, and in the clear, cold light of the whole truth!

James R. Joy

New York City

George Lincoln Burr. His life, by Roland H. Bainton; and selections from his writings, edited by Lois Oliphant Gibbons. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1943. xi + 505 pp. $3.75.

A profound scholar, modest, sincere, courageous, charming, George Lincoln Burr was the leading scholar in our country, perhaps in any country, in the history of the two periods of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance and Reformation. His works published in book or pamphlet form are not many, for he was his own severest critic; and he was more content in building up the remarkable library in those two fields that is to be found at Cornell University. European scholars who visited Cornell, such as Ferdinand Buisson, were astonished to find

there manuscripts, pamphlets, and books dealing with such important topics as the history of religious tolerance that were no longer to be found in their own countries. Then, too, Burr was often engaged in helping other historians with their writings and was lavish with the time he devoted to his students. He was very far from Cardinal Newman's rather malicious definition of a gentleman as a university man who is too indifferent for enthusiasms and too skeptical for prejudices. Very moving was the sentiment about life that rested in the brooding depths of his nature. How he thrilled many a student with his sincere and confident assurance that, with a little more effort, the difficulty about which he was being consulted would be overcome! Alas, he did not have many graduate students. Cornell, remote from any great city, did not attract many students of medieval and renaissance history; few knew how rich its library is in those two fields. And so this book is all the more needed and helpful, in that it will make known to a greater number of readers something of the life and writings of this true scholar.

The biography is well written by Professor Roland Bainton, of Yale. It deals with the scholar's childhood, his early years at Cornell, his searches for books and manuscripts in Europe for the Andrew Dickson White Library, and his work as a teacher at Cornell. Burr's teaching gift was all his own, arousing the curiosity of those who were eager to learn still more, making even those over whose heads his lectures went feel sure they were sitting in the presence of greatness, and inspiring those who were able to profit by them. He was far and away the best teacher of history it was my fortune ever to find. Ah, it was well for Cornell and its liberal-minded president that he was there in the early years, when the university was being attacked, both openly and surreptitiously, by bigoted ecclesiastics and theologians, for he was a learned and wise counselor; and, later on, he helped greatly in giving to the world President White's notable book entitled *The Warfare of Science and Theology*. Much else is told of Burr's life—of his work as a historical expert in helping to settle the international dispute regarding the boundary of Venezuela, to which it surely was a mistake for him to devote so much of his time when other work, far more important in the long run, was clamoring for his attention; of his editings of original historical sources; and of his reviews of books by great writers of history. It is good to have this story of the life of George

Lincoln Burr. Those who knew and loved him will hold it dear and treat it dear; and many another to whom he is only a name will welcome the chance to learn something about him.

The second part of the book, more than two-thirds of it, includes twenty-five selections from his scattered essays and book reviews, collected and edited by Lois Oliphant Gibbons, one of his former students. They illustrate the wide interests, the keen analysis, the unusual power of sympathetic understanding, the remarkable gift of interpretation, and the literary charm of the great scholar. Some of them, in the future, can never be neglected by students of their subjects; and they and others will interest and inform many a collegiate youth and teacher, and also, now and then, some intelligent reader outside the walls of any college. Among them are some likely to be used for long years to come. It is possible here to speak of only a few of them. "Savonarola and His Biographers" discusses an unsigned manuscript biography of that Dominican friar, found one foggy morning in an old-book shop in London's Soho Square. "The Year 1000," in its turn and in its own way, after the studies of François Plaine and Pietro Orsi, shows us that the story of a general panic prevailing in Europe at the approach of the year 1000 is altogether unreliable. "History and Its Neighbors" deals with the nature of history and discusses the relation to history of some of its nearest neighbors. "Liberals and Liberty Four Hundred Years Ago" tells the story of many leaders and heretics of the Reformation period little known even to many college teachers of the subject.

Surely this book was needed to make known to students of later generations something of the personality and work of the great scholar and to inform writers and readers of many a courageous thinker who has sacrificed himself for the sake of what he believed to be true.

Edward Maslin Hulme

Stanford University

Freedom Forgotten and Remembered. By Helmut Kuhn. Chapel Hill, N. C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1943. viii + 267 pp. $2.50.

Mr. Kuhn's book shows that spiritual reasons rather than material ones caused the rise of Nazism. The Nazi movement started at univer-

sities, because the German youth and the intelligentsia had lost belief in transcendent goals; it did not meet with any real resistance among the working classes, because their representatives, the Social Democrats who held the key positions in the Weimar Republic, believed in nothing but higher wages and fewer working hours. They were taught that freedom was nothing but a philistine prejudice. The vision of a real purpose to live for was completely lacking. Hitler supplied this gap with a negative content—with hate—which, by a "logic of passion," has been transformed into a positive thing.

All that was possible, because the genuine religious meaning of democratic ideals had changed into a secularized one, and because the democratic principles had been transformed into mere habits which blinded people to the democratic ideas themselves. So it happened that the purely relative or instrumental values of political, economic, social, and biological forces were transformed into absolute claims on man, demanding that he adjust himself to his environment, submerge himself in the state, and yield to the power of the natural drives of the beast in him, etc.

The greatest danger brought about by Nazism is the destruction of selfhood. This results from a voluntary abdication of freedom by the individual, rather than from the dictation of external conditions implied in the industrial revolution. The reason for the voluntary abdication of the individual person and his freedom lies in the fact that the religious origin of democracy and freedom has been forgotten. It can be recalled only through an anthropology which renders visible the spiritual nature of man and a realization of his source in and aiming towards God.

In presenting this view, Mr. Kuhn gives an excellent picture of the spiritual background of the present catastrophe. He is right in emphasizing the new character of the present day reactionary mind, which is not, as it was in Jefferson's time, religious fanaticism and intolerance but, on the contrary, just areligious and anti-Christian. Mr. Kuhn exposes the sophistry implied in the attempts which confuse the temporary restrictions and regimentations laid upon the individual during the war with totalitarianism itself (cf. the excellent passage on p. 92). He is right, also, in his fight against the present political indifferentism among intellectuals and self-styled realists who are actually in fundamental agreement with the Nazi propaganda, through

their refusal to acknowledge the very obvious fact that this war is actually a war for the preservation of human civilization, since the dignity of man as a free thinking, willing, and acting being, and his cultural productivity, are in danger of being extinguished through the re-establishment of a totalitarian slavery. Today this means a kind of slavery that has never existed before, not even in the ages of the darkest and most primitive savagery. And it must be remembered that such a state is not meant as an immediately necessary and solely transitory evil; on the contrary, it is intended as an end in itself, as something good—just as war is praised as heroic in itself.

In disclosing the ideological implications of the present fight against Nazism, Mr. Kuhn has fulfilled a very necessary task. But I cannot agree with his suggestion that the reinforcement of Christian teaching with respect to human nature through elaborating and vitalizing its anthropology *at the expense* of all the theological subject matters which were the concern of the patristic and medieval discussions would help very much to find the way out of the present crisis. For the most astonishing thing to an unprejudiced observer of the present ideological situation is that problems which, a few decades ago, seemed to be nothing but preposterous quarrels over empty words, have taken on again a very genuine relevance and urgency; and it seems to me that the old controversy between paganism and Christianity has to be resumed by focussing the discussion on what has been called the Christian *absurdum* or *paradoxon,* namely the embodiment of the Absolute, Eternal, and Divine in a finite temporal human being, the salvation of the world and the decisive revelation of eternal meaning through a single historic event.

Kierkegaard was right in insisting on the dogma of the Incarnation in his fight against its complete dissolution by Hegel. By the way, Mr. Kuhn does not do justice to Kierkegaard in restricting him to the Either-Or philosophy and by opposing his philosophy to a philosophy of reasonable decision. Kierkegaard opposed it rather to an aesthetic attitude by means of which man detached himself from personal engagement and responsibility.

I shall attempt to explain the reasons which give an immense importance just now to the recollection of the Christian dogma of the Incarnation of the Absolute and Eternal in the finite and temporal--

reasons which ask for a Christian anthropology only in the wider context of a comprehensive theological and philosophical discussion.

This core of Christian teaching, and its theoretical and practical implications, today faces many opposed views—just as in the time of the controversies with Neoplatonism and Gnosticism, Arianism, Donatism, Pelagianism, Nestorianism, Manicheism and so on. Today, just as then, the paradoxical unity of the Divine and human, of the eternal and temporal, of the absolute and finite, of freedom and predestination, of Spirit and flesh—the paradoxical unity of these seemingly incompatible principles is threatened with disintegration into one-sided absolutisms in our modern thinking and practical behavior. And, consequently, modern man externalizes also the inner moral struggle beyond personal responsibility into antagonisms of good and bad principles, represented by objective terms like upperclass and proletariat, Arian and Jew, elite and mass.

If deprived of his absolute meaning as a shrine of the Divine, man loses his immediate relation to God; he receives value entirely from being a function or an impersonal member in a collective body like the state, the nation, or mankind, or from his mere participation in world history; he himself has no absolute substance.

Deprived of his spiritual dignity, man becomes an object of merely aesthetic or biological valuations which make him blind and deaf to the evident reality of inner kindness with its richness and creative warmth, and to the evident postulate of justice. The experience of these evidences is denounced as naiveté, illusion, or fraud; sophisticated analyses derive them from biological decay and psychological weakness as their real source.

Human history, too, is reduced to a natural process which has its driving forces in race and soil, in hunger, or the longing for power. "Realists" call all the idealistic and reasonable goals utopian and want to persuade man that he has to shape his future in accordance with existing facts and interests only. They neglect the patent evidence that real human history as a progressive development would never have come into being if man behaved as they say he does or should do, and that the course of history has been determined most decisively by men who acted in the light of ideas and ideals rather than existing conditions. Even Alexander the Great, Augustus, and Charlemagne were "utopians" in the opinion of their contemporary "realists." And it is foolish

to conclude from the incomplete realization of ideals that they have not been great determining historic factors. Hitler demonstrates what course history would have taken without the influence of Christianity.

The implication of the Christian paradox is that man has to realize absolute and spiritual ends in this finite world, and this means that he has to behave even towards finite things and temporal events as if something absolute and eternal were at stake. Therefore, not only the materialistic attitude is un-Christian, but also a merely spiritualistic one. There are people who like to escape into the peaceful realm of otherworldliness and leave this earthly world to the devil. Such people neglect the duty imposed upon them by the fact that they are born into the present time, and its specific historic situation; they behave as if they were pure spiritual beings, not bound to certain finite conditions. Some authors, such as Hamsun and Massingham, reveal irresponsibly in a romantic back-to-nature impulse and in snobbish glorifications of soil, folk and primitive backwardness; they disdain the present industrialism. I am not quite sure whether Mr. Kuhn does not share this attitude, for he seems to consider the machine-man as a necessary correlate to the technological achievements of the present time.

Contrary to that view, I hold that modern industrialization and material progress are Christian in their origin and as to their aims and means. It is not by chance that only Christian peoples created them. Christian is the view of nature as something which is not divine, and which it is therefore permissible to treat irreverently and violently as industrialism does, and which is nevertheless recognized as good, for it is the creation, manifestation, and gift of the Divine Grace, and it is given to man to be used and enjoyed by him.

Furthermore, it is Christian not to set one's values and enjoyments upon the results of one's own work in the interests of others, or in favor of future generations, which is the prerequisite of the capitalistic transformation of accumulated work into machines. Christian is the outlook towards a better future, contrary to the pagan view which interprets the historic development as decay or as an eternal repetition of the same things in endless circularity.

Christian is the goal of a united mankind where everyone—and not a small minority only—is freed from slavery and want and is recognized as capable of living a spiritual life, rather than being absorbed by the struggle for material existence. On principle, the realization of these

goals is possible in the actual historic situation and is prevented only by the power of un-Christian ideologies which want to persuade us that toil, want, slavery, and elite classes are necessary and even desirable.

Christian, too, is the conviction that man lives and shapes his life and environment as a reasonable being according to plans, instead of yielding to instincts, to automatic happenings and to an environment which grows up unconsciously *(organisch gewachsen)*.

And finally, Christian precepts induce the specific training self-discipline, and asceticism in working, needed for the creation and preservation of modern industrialism.

It is, therefore, eminently a Christian task at the present time to find the right way of maintaining the spiritual personality and goal of man within his industrial environment. But this task cannot be solved within the realm of a Christian anthropology alone, for it covers the entire complex of man's view on God and the world. Moreover, every theological discussion has to be carried out on the firm ground of an unchallenged faith, whereas our faith today has to face the most radical and sincere opponent of Christianity—Friedrich Nietzsche—who is not at all that negligible and nearly ridiculous figure that Mr. Kuhn depicts him. On the contrary, Nietzsche drew his conclusions partly from biological and psychological facts—conclusions which others were too short-sighted or too cowardly to draw. And Nietzsche's influence is the more dangerous in that his biologistic and irrationalistic view meets halfway the widespread weariness and disgust with the mechanization and intellectualization of present day life. There is only one way of overcoming both—the irrationalistic biologism and the mechanistic intellectualism—namely, the re-establishment of a genuine awareness of spiritual realities, and the realization that they can never be reduced to mere biological and psychological factors. But the approach to this vision is blocked by the domination of a type of thinking which has been trained exclusively by the one-sided influence of natural sciences; and it is blocked still further by those vulgarized philosophies which question and devaluate every evident experience and awareness of man, subjecting them to the nonsensical claims of what they call a *criterion*. They place this *criterion* beyond the evident contents themselves, where it belongs and where everyone seeks it and finds it in the common life. They make it, instead, apply to a specific character of consciousness. Thus being caught in subjectivity, they move convulsively in an infinite

regress to find a way out of it to the true reality itself. Finally, they have to give up: Scepticism, relativism, and subjectivism—frankly admitted or confusedly hidden—are the final stages of all inquiries which started "critically" with the analysis of the consciousness, instead of its object or content—and the emphasis laid today upon anthropology ranges among those inquiries.

Therefore, although I agree with Mr. Kuhn's suggestion that a Christian anthropology is necessary for the preservation of the freedom of the individual, I cannot see how such an anthropology could be established in a really convincing way, unless we first resume the discussion of all those ontological, theological, and cosmological problems which modern philosophy has discredited by holding that man, his consciousness and nature, must be the starting point and *organon* of all the efforts to attain definite knowledge. We have to start again right away with the knowledge of God and the world, in order to get the correct knowledge of man which can justify his claims on Freedom, Justice, Truth, and Brotherhood against totalitarianism.

MAXIMILIAN BECK

Yale University

The Maritain Volume of The Thomist. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1943. 374 pp. $3.50.

The publication of this volume of essays in honor of a distinguished Thomist thinker is an encouraging event at a time when the intellectual life of mankind is still in such deadly peril. M. Maritain has attained widespread fame as one of the outstanding of Neo-Scholastic writers, and, although it is regrettable that certain of his *confrères* who are no less able—such men as Father Gabriel Picard, Father Pedro Descoqs, and Father Garrigou-Lagrange—should not be equally well known, it is, nevertheless, a satisfaction to see at least one follower of the Angelic Doctor receive the recognition he deserves.

As regards the majority of these essays we find that their authors assume without question the soundness of all the chief tenets of Thomism and of the claims of the Roman Catholic Church, and proceed without misgiving to indulge in complaisant reflections upon this happy state of affairs. There is nothing unnatural in such procedure, yet a non-Roman Catholic reader may be excused if he give utterance to a feeling

of disappointment that a critical attitude was not more frequently adopted, for it is from delving into the basic principles of a philosophy that the greatest profit is to be had.

There are, fortunately, certain exceptions, and of these the most refreshing is undoubtedly Professor Adler's paper on "The Demonstration of God's Existence," with its frank facing of difficulties and its insistence upon analyzing all the problems involved. This is just the sort of thing that needs to be done, and the somewhat exasperated tone of Father Schwartz's "Reply," in the April number of *The Thomist,* is perhaps an indication that it has been done rather well. Professor Adler has introduced a terminological distinction between a *series* and a *set* of causes—the former being ordered successively and the latter being simultaneously co-operative—which it is to be hoped will find general acceptance. We cannot be sure that every series will have a first term, but we can be sure that the number of causes which constitute any set will be finite. Nonetheless, it is difficult to show that a relation of reciprocal causation may not hold between these causes, or, again, that there is only one necessary being among them. Professor Adler maintains that a successful proof of the existence of God must envisage him, not as *causa fiendi,* but as *causa essendi*; furthermore, he believes that one contingent being cannot be the *causa essendi* of another, although he admits that it is not easy either to demonstrate this latter proposition or to reconcile it with the text of St. Thomas. His detailed discussion of these problems will well repay close study.

None of the other philosophical essays is of the same caliber. Miss Anshen provides a few pages of general eulogy in "Est, Est, Non, Non." Mr. Thompson, in "Providence," attempts to reconcile the doctrine in question with observed facts, and restates the argument from design. Professor O'Meara, in "John Dewey and Modern Thomism," traces the similarities and differences between the pluralism of Dewey and that of Neo-Scholasticism. In "Matter, Beatitude and Liberty," Professor Pegis points out that the Aristotelian doctrine of uncreated matter introduces into the universe, and even into the being of man himself, an element of irrationality and contingency, and that consequently Aristotle's denial of personal immortality renders the realization of genuine felicity impossible. As its title implies, Professor Ives' "Maritain's Philosophy of the Sciences" deals with a topic of contemporary interest. The three

degrees of abstraction are expounded in the usual fashion. Special emphasis is laid upon Maritain's distinction between dianoetical intellection which attains to essences, and perinoetical intellection which is concerned with the regularities of the behavior of objects. The former thus grasps the original qualities of things, the latter their relational qualities. Perhaps we never know all the original qualities of anything, yet are we ever ignorant of all of them? If not, how many of them must we know to know the essence? One would have been grateful for further light upon such questions as these. Professor Gurian's article on "Maritain's Political Philosophy" stresses our philosopher's belief in a plurality of types of civilization, his opposition to any attempt to "revive the Middle Ages," his disapproval of dictatorship, totalitarianism, and "Rousseauistic Democratism," and informs us that he regards democracy with an increasingly favorable eye. Monsignor Phelan, in "Justice and Friendship," contrasts the Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of these virtues with the Thomistic, to the advantage of the latter. Incidentally, it is worth noting that by "friendship" is clearly meant benevolence.

Father Smith's paper entitled *"A Date in the History of Epistemology"* restates Professor Gilson's contention that the existence of an external world is rendered evident by sense perception so that the problem of its reality does not arise. The avowed foe is here the idealist, yet it is easy to discern in the background the figure of Father Picard, who has written so brilliantly on the *Cogito* as the foundation and guarantee of all knowledge. Father Smith's view is endorsed by Professor Chapman who, in "To Be—That Is the Answer," is, nevertheless, concerned to emphasize that it is not in the sensible, but in the "unique metaphysical intuition of existence," that the root of Aquinas' philosophy is to be found. "With St. Thomas," he tells us plainly, "philosophy for the first time in its long history was able to reach deeper than the level of inextinguishable essences to the fathomless undercurrents of existence radiated by them" (p. 144). Are we then to infer that Plato, Aristotle, the Neoplatonists, and the earlier Schoolmen discoursed concerning the non-existent? From so absurd an assumption we can save ourselves by the reflection that, in all probability, it is the doctrine of the "real" distinction between essence and existence that Professor Chapman has in mind. But the view that this doctrine is the basis of Thomism will be challenged by certain Neo-Scholastics—notably by Father Descoqs.

The theologian is sure to be interested in Father Osbourn's "The Theological Ingredients of Peace." This able essay is divided into three sections, of which the first and longest, dealing with the divine likeness in man, contains a careful and illuminating discussion of the Thomistic concept of *image*. The second section treats of God as formal exemplar, the third, of the influence of the divine exemplar on the divine likeness. President Finklestein's important contribution on "The Role of Dogma in Judaism" presents Pharisaism in a new light, inasmuch as it leads us to view the intellectual position of the Pharisees as the consequence of a process of negation of already existing Sadducean doctrines. Father Brennan, in "The Thomistic Concept of Culture," analyzes the various senses in which the term culture is used today, and endeavors to show that, although he did not make a similar use of the *word*, St. Thomas had nevertheless a perfectly adequate understanding of all that it signifies. Mr. Sargent, in "Dante and Thomism," assures us that the poet, although not a philosopher, could yet "play the philosopher," and that, when he did so disport himself, he was not an out-and-out Thomist, but that, nonetheless, the influence of Thomism contributed profoundly to the greatness of the *Divine Comedy*. Professor Middleton, in "Contemplation in America," laments the "anti-metaphysical mentality" of American educators and their consequent lack of sympathy with the comtemplative life.

The remaining essays, President Hutchins' "The Theory of Oligarchy: Edmund Burke," which presents the great orator as the firm partisan of established privilege, Professor McMahon's "The Virtue of Social Justice and International Life," and Professor Nef's "Art in France and England, 1540-1640," take us far from Thomism and the philosophy of Maritain. Mr. Lourié's "*Motet:* De Ordinatione Angelorum," for which Mme. Maritain has chosen the texts, and a bibliography of M. Maritain's writings by Miss Burns constitute an appropriate ending for the volume, even as the brief—all too brief—biographical sketch by Mr. Binsse provides a fitting opening. The variety of interests represented in the various contributions renders the book of greater interest to the general reader than to the special student of philosophy or religion, and this is doubtless what the wisdom of its editors intended.

ROBERT LEET PATTERSON

Washington, D. C.

Patterns and Principles of Spanish Art. By Oskar Hagen. A completely rewritten edition. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1943. xix + 279 pp. 99 illustrations. $4.00.

This book bears the same title as an earlier one issued in 1936, but the text is new and contains new material, new definitions, and new illustrations. The work may be roughly divided into two parts: a first edition, called the "Spanish Imagination," and the remainder of the book, in which the author outlines the period styles of Spanish art, largely limited to the evolution of painting.

Probably the most important contribution is the first section, in which the author analyzes various aspects of Spanish style, that is, the cluster of elements of form which is unchanging and present in every Spanish work of art.

In the beginning, the author discusses the transformation of those foreign artists who came to Spain. German, Dutch, and Flemish architects, sculptors and painters rapidly adjusted their native training to the Spanish tradition, whereas the French and Italians who came to the Peninsula were inadjustable to Spanish idiosyncracies. Also, the Spanish milieu was important, since Spain is a land where Africa and North Europe mingle and is neither purely one nor the other.

As for the elements of Spanish art, the sculptural instinct was strong in Spain and the course of development in sculpture was steadier than that of painting, and in painting the projection and recession of the facial surfaces remind us strongly of sculpture. Spanish art is always realistic and materialistic. This sculptural instinct also influenced Spanish architecture. The mystic strain is also especially noticeable, especially in the Cathedral of Barcelona, where the mysterious gloom is in strong contrast to the clarity of a French cathedral. Another feature of Spanish art is due to the fatalism and pessimism of the Spaniards, expressing itself in what is often weird, sanguinary, unbeautiful and gruesome. Equally characteristic is the *sosiego,* or extreme formality in which art is represented, as well as Spanish individualism. In fact, Spanish individualism may have been partly responsible for the sluggish development of Spanish art. In Spain the great artists were solitary adventurers and did not form schools of pupils and successors. Other features are the conservatism of the Spaniard and his interest in *Caballerosidad,* or the aristocratic vein.

The next chapter is devoted to the Allover Pattern. A profuse inter-

lace of ornaments covering every foot of wall space from the floor to the ceiling is found in all phases of Spanish art from the Moorish period through the flambuoyant Churrigueresque style of the eighteenth century. The tile-designing tradition appears in geometrical patterns, and the incessant repetition of a theme is made palatable by slight variations of its basic pattern, as shown by the altar screens of the Cathedral of Seville, which has an inflexible surface patter. Utmost schematization of the general design is everywhere obvious in Spanish art.

In another chapter, the author discusses the "planarity" of the Spanish style, recognized especially in painting rather than in architecture or sculpture. In its infancy Spanish painting was governed by this desire for planarity. In Gothic painting the figures are seen from in front, side by side like flat paper dolls. Any attempt to replace the original planarity by the perspective effects that came into vogue in other countries would have been, to a Spanish art, an attack upon the decorative essence of the retable. This is seen even in the work of El Greco, after coming to Spain, where his style changed from tactile realism to an ornamental surface stylization. The author also makes some very apt remarks concerning the "impressionism" of Velazquez. Spanish preoccupation with planarity is also evident in both architecture and sculpture.

The author then considers Spanish art chronologically. In his discussion of Catalan painting during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, he completely over-emphasizes the "Byzantine" source of the early style. The earliest source came from the Romanesque art of France, and the earliest frontal is the St. Martin antependium in Vich, not the St. Yolita frontal from Durro, which was done at least a century later, and is almost proto-Gothic in its rustic rendering. The "Italo-Byzantine" style emerged in a group of antependia, mostly dating in the middle of the thirteenth century, of which the Avia frontal is an example, both iconographically and stylistically, but it is strictly "Italo-Byzantine," and not French Gothic. This was followed by an imitation of the Franco-Gothic style, and the Italo-Gothic in the fourteenth, and the Hispano-Flemish style did not appear until the fifteenth century, not in the fourteenth as stated by the author (p. 102).

From the sixteenth century on the author appears to be on surer ground, and his observations concerning the style of the period are sound and revealing. His best discussions are those dealing with the

paintings of the seventeenth century and finally with the work of Goya.

The most useful contribution of this book is found in the first section, called "The Spanish Imagination," and the author's remarks concerning Spanish painting, when he discusses "planarity in Spanish art" are probably the best. If he were to bring out a subsequent edition of this book, it would be of greatest interest if he were to expand his Book One to an entire volume, because in that approach he offers something entirely new to the criticism and understanding of Spanish art.

WALTER W. S. COOK

New York University

Why Exhibit Works of Art?: Collected Essays on the Traditional or "Normal" View of Art. By ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY. London: Luzac & Co., 1943. 148 pp. 6*s*.

This volume brings together a series of eight papers and a book review published by the author over a period of several years.[1] Though

1. These papers and their places of publication are listed on p. 147 as follows:

Chapter I. "Why Exhibit Works of Art?" An address delivered before the American Association of Museums at Columbus, Ohio, and Newport, R. I., in May and October, 1941, and printed in the *Journal of Aesthetics* (Fall Issue, 1941).

Chapter II. "The Christian and Oriental, or True Philosophy of Art." A lecture delivered at the Walter Vincent Smith Art Gallery, and at Boston College, 1939, and printed as a *John Stevens Pamphlet* (Newport, 1939).

Chapter III. "Is Art a Superstition or a Way of Life?" A lecture given at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, April, 1937, and at Harvard University (Summer School), July, 1937. Printed in the *American Review* (Summer Number, 1937), and as a *John Stevens Pamphlet* (Newport, 1937).

Postscript. "Note on a Review by Richard Florsheim." *Art Bulletin, Vol.* XX (1937).

Chapter IV. "What Is the Use of Art, Anyway?" Two broadcasts for the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, January, 1937. Printed in the *American Review* (February, 1937), and with other matter by A. Graham Carey and John Howard Benson as a *John Stevens Pamphlet* (Newport, 1937).

Chapter V. "Beauty and Truth." *Art Bulletin,* XX (1938).

Chapter VI. "The Nature of Mediaeval Art." From *The Arts of the Middle Ages,* Museum of Fine Arts (Boston, 1940).

Chapter VII. "The Traditional Conception of Ideal Portraiture." *Twice a Year,* III-IV (1939), pp. 244-52; *Journal of the Indian Society of Oriental Art,* VII (1939), pp. 74-82.

Chapter VIII. "The Nature of Folklore and Popular Art." *Qtly. Journal of the Mythic Society* (July-October, 1936); *Indian Art and Letters* (1937); and (in French) *Études Traditionelles* (1937).

Chapter IX. "The Beauty of Mathematics. A review"; *Art Bulletin,* Vol. XXIII (1941).

it gives us nothing new from his pen, the publisher has rendered a welcome service in making them available in the present form.

Since the turn of the century, Dr. Coomaraswamy's writings have dealt with a wide variety of subjects, including geology, numismatics, mythology, religion, philosophy, metaphysics, the art and literature of India, iconography, music, the dance, the arts of Islam, the Far East, and Medieval Europe, and the nature of art and artists in general, with special reference to their places in the societies that nourished them. The present papers deal with these latter problems. In his introduction to a bibliography of Coomaraswamy's "more important publications" —a list of 494 titles—in *Ars Islamica,* IX (1942), Dr. Richard Ettinghausen says, "There are, indeed, few scholars who, like him, are able to go straight to original sources and at the same time have the ability and courage to hand on a clear-cut, uncompromising message of what they have seen, heard, and learned. Never has he time for, or interest in, presenting personal ideas or novel theories, so constantly and tirelessly has he devoted his energies to the rediscovery of the truth and the restating of the principles by which cultures rise and fall." It may be added that the original sources to which he has turned are not only literary but material, and that his life has been devoted to the handling of objects, the study of texts, and the close observation of men engaged in their daily tasks. In stating his findings, he does not hesitate to quote, for he says, "I . . . am hardly afraid that anyone will imagine that I am propounding any views that I regard as my own except in the sense that I have made them my own" (p. 23); and his work abounds in passages from the unknown authors of the great monuments of Sanskrit literature, from Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Meister Eckhart, Dante, and others. He is well equipped for the task of correcting profound and widespread misunderstandings.

The main points of criticism, as stated by the author, are "(1) that the current 'appreciation' of ancient or exotic arts in terms of our own very special and historically provincial view of art amounts to a sort of hocus pocus, and (2) that under the conditions of manufacture taken for granted in current artistic doctrine, man is given stones for bread" (p. 86). In stating his views on the first of these premises, he has become, over a period of years, the spokesman for an ever-increasing circle of students who have found the accepted terminology of art historians altogether sterile and inadequate when applied to a large part of what

our museums collect and exhibit in the name of art. Broadly speaking, this includes objects from Egypt, from the Near East and the Far East, from all Europe before the Renaissance (excepting the Classical Period in Greece and Rome), and from all those cultures the world over to which we condescendingly refer as "primitive." Otherwise defined, they are objects which were made in those times and places where it mattered not who made them, so long as they properly fulfilled the functions for which they were made. Against this body of material are set the works of Classical Greece and Rome, and of Renaissance and post-Renaissance Europe (from which the "art" of white America need not be distinguished), works which derive such importance as they may be considered to have from the skill with which they were executed, or, often, from the names of their makers. The former, or orthodox, materials represent the large majority of the works of man, for the latter have originated in comparatively limited areas of the earth's surface during no more than one of the several millenia for which we have records of civilized human communities. They can, then, be called normal works of art, and the thought behind their production (which is, of course, the only reason they exist at all) is a traditional body of thought. With equal propriety, and to preserve in terminology a distinction that exists in actuality, the latter may be called unorthodox or abnormal. Coomaraswamy's thesis might be restated to say that the products of a traditional society, produced by a normal art, cannot be satisfactorily measured, or, indeed, measured at all, with a yardstick hewn from a tree grown in abnormal soil. Yet an investigation of the literature of the history of art will, unfortunately, reveal that this is exactly what has been attempted again and again to the serious confusion of generations of students.

It should be emphasized that he uses the word "traditional" in its strictest sense. Tradition meaning not merely "custom," but "handing on," "the oral delivery of information, opinions, doctrines, practises, rites and customs from father to son or from ancestors to posterity" (Webster); or such a body of knowledge so transmitted. Traditional societies are concerned with first principles, the ultimate causes of being and doing. In his introduction to *Peaks and Lamas* (London 1939), Marco Pallis states the situation in this way: "A truly traditional civilization has its roots fixed in a doctrine of the purely metaphysical order, beyond the limitation even of Personality. This doctrine gives to the whole its principle [*sic*] or sufficient cause. The other constituents of the

Tradition, whether ethical, social, or artistic, down to the most petty activities of daily life, all derive their authority from this doctrine, to be exercised within their prescribed spheres. Ideas of a metaphysical order are the cement which binds every part together." Clearly, a society of this kind is remote in every respect from the Western civilization of today. Five hundred years of humanistic background, the ever-increasing pressure of an industrialized way of living, growing reliance on the infallibility of scientific investigation, and constant emphasis on looking to the future have combined to overshadow such vestiges of traditionalism as might otherwise have lingered with us. It is, in fact, not uncommon among us to deplore traditionalism; but a discussion of the virtues or vices of this attitude leads away from the problem at hand. To make a valid and effective study of these arts we must set aside our personal views, recognize that traditionalism is the prime factor in the production of these objects, and give our full attention to the study of the traditions that underlie the cultures involved. As Coomaraswamy says, "One can in fact only be said to have understood the work, or to have any more than a dilettante knowledge of it, to the extent that he can identify himself with the mentality of the original artist and patron" (p. 75); and, "One might as well attempt the study of Christian or Buddhist art without a knowledge of the corresponding philosophies as attempt the study of a mathematical papyrus without the knowledge of mathematics" (p. 48).

The second of his premises, "that under the conditions of manufacture taken for granted in current artistic doctrine, man is given stones for bread," raises problems having to do with the artist himself rather than with the student of art. The author points out that in a traditional society the artist, the "maker by art," was an ordinary member of his social group whose skill was devoted to the making of things that were needed for use. Today, on the other hand, distinction is made between the workman who makes things for use (or, worse still, merely for profit), and the artist who makes things that are essentially useless, and who is concerned chiefly with his own freedom and his need for self-expression. Coomaraswamy says, "A system of 'manufacture,' or rather of quantity production dominated by money values, presupposes that there shall be two different kinds of makers, privileged 'artists' who may be 'inspired,' and under-privileged labourers, unimaginative by hypothesis, since they are asked only to make what other men have imagined. As Eric Gill put it, 'On the one hand we have the artist concerned solely

to express himself; on the other is the workman deprived of any self to express.' It has often been claimed that the productions of 'fine art' are useless; it would seem to be a mockery to speak of a society as free, where it is only the makers of useless things, and not the makers of utilities, that can be called free, except in the sense that we are all free to work or starve" (pp. 14-15). The difference between the maker for use today and his fellow in a traditional society is further seen as the difference between a man who works in order to keep on earning, and one who earns in order to keep on working—a parallel to the man to lives to keep on eating rather than eats to keep on living.

Coomaraswamy's critics have taken his views to mean that he wants us to return to medieval ways of living. This may be a case of impaired understanding due to annoyance over the critical investigation of matters heretofore regarded as inviolable. To the unbiased reader (if there be such) it must be obvious that he advocates no such thing. He merely points out that there is a marked inferiority in the products of the average working man in our civilization as compared with those of traditional societies, and that this can be accounted for by differences in attitude. As he says, "If I assert that a manufacture by art is humanely superior to an 'industry without art,' it does not follow that I envisage knights in armour" (p. 87). There are obvious exceptions to this unfortunate generality. Many of us have had the experience of knowing a worker, perhaps a shoemaker, a gunsmith, or a cabinet maker, a man with a little shop behind his house, whose work is superior to anything we can find in the department stores. This man's attitude toward the work of his hands is by no means the least of the qualities that enhance his product. He is distinguished by the fact that his work is *all* his own; he needs only to know what is required; he is familiar with his tools and with possible materials; he knows how they shall be used to get the best result; he is not only a workman, but also, and primarily, a thinking human being. Who, with the opportunity of talking to such a man and watching him at his work, has not felt, "here is a better man than I am"? He is an honest man, and good; and his interest is clearly devoted to the welfare of the work to be done. This almost unrecognized man in our midst is the artist of our time; and would be the same when and wherever he happened to live. Today he is the exception, regarded as eccentric; in a traditional society he would be the common man, and, like his fellow workers there, always an artist.

The passages cited in the course of this review do not pretend to give the meat of these papers, nor even to give a digest of the views presented. They do not, for example, show, as the author so ably does, that both of these problems are basically involved in matters of religion, that the traditional arts are all fundamentally religious arts, and that their makers are profoundly religious men. A single quotation in this respect would but detract from the impressive scope of the author's statement. It is enough to say that these papers, and the author's other writings in the same vein, are required reading for all who profess to be artists, students of art history, collectors, or mere "lovers of art." That his words have not fallen on barren ground is evidenced by the fact that in recent years there has been a happy trend away from *kunsthistorische* and *stilgeschichte* methods for the study of traditional arts. More and more students are learning the basic truth that, "A traditional must not be confused with an academic or merely fashionable art; tradition is not a mere stylistic fixation, nor merely a matter of general suffrage. A traditional art has fixed ends (by which he means ends of an essentially religious nature) and ascertained means of operation, has been transmitted by pupillary succession from an immemorial past, and retains its values even when, as at the present day, it has gone quite out of fashion. Hieratic and folk arts are both alike traditional. . . . An academic art, on the other hand, however great its prestige, and however fashionable it may be, can very well be and is usually of an anti-traditional, personal, profane, and sentimental sort" (p. 135). Yet the old views and methods are by no means obsolete, and some of the curators and professors of our leading museums and universities are the prime offenders. It is, however, no longer a vain hope that someday the art historian and the anthropologist will swallow their mutual contempt and look upon one another as equal partners in the great task of reconstructing the history of man's thoughts and his activities on earth. When that day comes, it will, in no small measure, be due to the scholarship and human understanding of Ananda Coomaraswamy, of whom the late Eric Gill said, "I believe that no other living writer has written the truth in matters of art and life and religion and piety with such wisdom and understanding."

JOHN A. POPE

Freer Gallery of Art
Washington, D. C.

CRITICAL COMMENTS

A Reply to Dr. Wallach

I am very grateful to Dr. Luitpold Wallach for calling attention to my little publication *Greek in Jewish Palestine* (*The Review of Religion*, November, 1943, pp. 61 ff.). But, to my regret, I have to raise serious objections to his remarks—to all of them, without exception. I shall analyze them, not in the order in which they were made, but in the order of their importance.

Dr. Wallach asserts (p. 63) that I have sometimes unconsciously adopted "the dialectical rabbinic 'learn' method." He cites four instances of such aberrations on my part:

1. I quote the statement of the Babylonian Talmud, "There were a 1000 young men in my father's house 500 of whom studied the Law, while the other 500 studied Greek wisdom," as firsthand evidence of the existence of an officially recognized academy of Greek wisdom. Dr. Wallach remarks (p. 63): "The hyperbolical meaning of these figures cannot be taken as valid historical evidence, etc.," thus missing the point. The hostile attitude of the Rabbis towards the study of Greek is notorious (see pp. 16, 23 *passim*). For this very reason, a casual admission by the Rabbis themselves that the number of the young men in the Patriarch's house who studied Greek equalled the number of those who studied the Law cannot be discredited. The actual figures are of no importance. It makes no difference whether there were 500, 100, or 50 young men who studied Greek; the significant thing is that the Rabbis believed that there were as many of them as of students of the Law. My reviewer's reference to an article on round numbers in the Aggada is quite superfluous, as references to the literature treating this subject (especially the number 5, in our case 500!) are contained in the book reviewed (p. 31, n. 18).

2. Dr. Wallach states *(ibid.)*: "Another evidence of such a hypothetical way of reasoning may be found on page 88, concerning the alleged social intercourse between the Gentile and the Jew, etc." On page 64 he is more explicit: "Thus Justin Martyr's *Dialogue With Typho* is taken as an actual historical colloquy (p. 87) whereas in reality it is a fictitious conversation." What is one to say to such a statement in the light of the following sentence from page 88 (one of the two referred to by Dr. Wallach) of my book: "It makes no difference whatever whether this dialogue is real or *imaginary*, etc.," and of my whole line of reasoning, according to which my case is stronger if the *Dialogue* is fictitious. For, if it were a historical fact, it might have been an exceptional incident, but as a fiction it is a reflex of typical occurrences.

3. Dr. Wallach further asserts: "An example as to how a rabbinical passage is explained by means of a rabbinical category of valuation, and not by means of comparative method is to be found on page 22: 'Abbahu sent a letter to Simeon b. Abba writing him, etc.'" The quotation is misleading because it omits the most important part of the sentence. The latter reads: "R. Abbahu sent a letter to R. Simeon b. Abba *in which he enclosed gray hairs* and wrote

etc." The italicized words indicate that R. Abbahu here did something unusual, and obviously with a purpose. My interpretation of this act and of the accompanying words is entirely in line with a well-known predilection of R. Abbahu, of which I quote numerous instances (pp. 21-23). There can be no question about R. Abbahu's fondness for isopsephesis, plays on words, etc., in short for what the Talmud itself calls *leshon hokmah*. That is undeniably "a rabbinical category of valuation," but it is the only one by which the working of this Rabbi's mind can be understood.

4. Dr. Wallach maintains: "The same method of interpretation is applied to one of the Antoninus and Rabbi traditions. The result of the investigation is summarized in the statement: 'This, of course, indicates that Antoninus was not converted during his earthly life.' The real state of affairs may be found etc." The fact of the matter is that I never made, and therefore never could summarize, an investigation into the historicity of the Antoninus legends. Dr. Wallach mistakes an interpretation of a passage in the Palestinian Talmud for a statement of my own views. Such an error could never have been committed by anyone who read the whole page (p. 80).

A striking illustration of with how little care the reviewer read the book is his description (p. 62) of its contents. He says: "Adopting Immanuel Loew's example, offered in his Index to Samuel Krauss's *Lehnwörter* (p. 7), loanwords arranged according to subject matter are elucidated in the chapters entitled Pleasures and Fears and Oaths and Vows (pp. 99-143)." If he will take the trouble to turn over the pages of the book, he will convince himself that what he said is purely his own imagination. I have discussed only two loanwords in each of these two long chapters, which comprise almost one quarter of the book. The whole material treated there has certainly nothing to do with Loew's or anybody else's Index.

Dr. Wallach adopts the same method in his comments on various details in the book. He declares (p. 65): "The remark 'We have to presume that the letter *Taw* in itself conveyed the idea of life, death, decay (read: mercy—S.L.), or end (p. 186)' shows that the merely symbolical meaning of the different interpretations has been neglected." Here, also, a sentence has been taken out of a context. I quote the Rabbis, who assert that the *Taw* conveyed all those meanings. The commentaries explain this to mean that the preformative *Taw* can be prefixed to the verbs which mean to live, to die, etc. I reject this interpretation, because the preformative *Taw* can be prefixed to any verb, and I therefore conclude that "We have to presume that the letter *Taw* in itself conveyed the idea of life, etc." The reviewer's remark is entirely unwarranted.

I further refer to an opinion of a Jewish Christian quoted by Origen to show that the Jews could see in the letter *Taw* itself a symbol of life and mercy. To this Dr. Wallach (p. 65) remarks: "Origen's report that a Jew . . . is in need of a reinterpretation. The assumption that this mark is an allusion to the *nigrum Theta* is untenable." In the first place, I never associated the *nigrum Theta* with Origen's report, but quoted the opinion of the Rabbis (pp. 185-86)

who explicitly state that the *Taw* in Ezekiel had the meaning of a "*theta* in a ψῆφος." As to the reviewer's "reinterpretation" of Origen that the *Taw* in Ezekiel meant not the *chi* but the *T*, it is identical with Isidore of Seville's (seventh century!) interpretation of Ezekiel, a reference to which may be found in my book (p. 191, bottom, and n. 46 *ibid.*; cf. also p. 188, n. 20). Dr. Wallach adds further *(ibid.)*: "It has been hitherto overlooked that those who are marked with the *Taw* on their foreheads are mentioned in a parallel (19:11) to the main text of the *Zadokite Work*." The latter quotes it explicitly in the name of Ezekiel, and this "mention" has therefore no more value than a quotation from Ezekiel in any other work.

The reviewer says further (p. 62): "We must modify another conclusion, reiterated again and again (pp. VII, 152, 156, 160, 186), namely, that the comparative investigation of rabbinical passages sheds light upon many texts of classical literature. The overflowing masses of classical source material are *not* in need of elucidation derived from any rabbinical text." Although Dr. Wallach picked out at random only a few instances referred to in my preface (p. VIII), yet they refute his statement. On page 153, a passage of Petronius is quoted which was misunderstood by so eminent a scholar as Friedländer in his first edition of that text, and which only becomes intelligible in the light of a Rabbinic passage, as pointed out by Bacher. (Cf. also p. 186 n. 10 regarding a passage of Martial.) The other two instances alluded to by the reviewer do not refer to the classics, but to passages of later Greek works which were misunderstood by the editors and can easily be explained with the help of Rabbinic literature. Many more instances are referred to in my preface. I shall point to only one of them (p. 42), where it is shown that the Greek text of a law mentioned by Valerius Maximus is preserved only in the Palestinian Talmud.

In continuation of the comment cited above, Dr. Wallach ventures an opinion on the Greek loan-words found in Rabbinic literature. Since he does not support his opinion with proofs, but only makes a general statement, we shall regard it as his personal opinion and shall not deal with it. Another such sweeping assertion is the following (p. 64): "The assumption that Tertullian might have found his idea of interpreting *Taw* in Ezechiel 9:4 'in various books of testimonies current among Christians' (p. 87), has to be dismissed, because there did not exist in early Christian literature 'books' of testimonies but only loose collections of testimonies, etc." In other words, my opinion has to be dismissed because I called the loose collection of testimonies "books"! The same applies to his remark (p. 65) regarding the proverb, "Be a tail to lions, etc." Bacher's opinion referred to by Dr. Wallach is also quoted by me (p. 146) but rejected. The like may be said about his remark (p. 65) regarding "the numerous references" (there are only two: he was misled by my many references to the parallel passages and quotations which represent the saying of one and the same sage) "to be found in rabbinic literature on the attitude of kings towards the law, etc. . . . testify to the influence of a specific Hellenistic literary species, etc." That is merely the reviewer's private opinion.

Finally, we shall deal with the two remaining remarks of Dr. Wallach.

He states (p. 64): "The interpretation of IV Ezra 10:1 *evertimus omnes lumina* evidently errs in the meaning of this phrase, which did not presuppose that the lamps 'be first extinguished' (p. 104), because the formulation possesses a merely symbolical meaning referring to the death of a person, etc." The story in IV Ezra reads as follows: "And it came to pass that when my son entered into his wedding chamber he fell down and died. Then we all turned over the lamps, and all my fellow townsfolk rose up to comfort me; but I remained silent until the night of the next day." (The Latin text is quoted in full, *ibid.*, p. 104.) A true and faithful description of Jewish mourning customs! How the reviewer could see "a figure of speech" in the clear statement *evertimus omnes lumina* ("we all turned over the lights") is beyond the scope of my comprehension. My observation on the extinguishing of the lights is supported by clear evidence from other sources *(ibid.)*.

The reviewer states further (p. 64): "Not only the *Shema* was occasionally read in Greek by certain *Rabbis* [my italics] but even the *Tefilla*. Fragments of such a Greek Tefilla are preserved in a Church regulation of the fourth century, in the *Constitutiones Apostolicae etc.*" I shall be highly indebted to the reviewer if he will be able to show me some proof that *Rabbis* read the *Shema* in Greek. His reference to the "*Constitutiones Apostolicae*" is irrelevant. The scholars to whom he refers never said that the *Greek original* of Jewish prayers was embodied into the above source. The Greek is a translation from Hebrew. As to the fact itself of prayers in Greek offered by the simple Jewish masses, ample evidence is available in the book he reviewed (p. 35 ff.).

I am duly appreciative of the good intentions of Dr. Wallach, who magnanimously volunteered to help me. But, in all truthfulness, it must be added that the achievement falls so far short of the intention that I should not have taken notice of it had it not been published in so reputable a journal as *The Review of Religion.*

SAUL LIEBERMAN

The Jewish Theological Seminary of America

A CORRECTION

Dr. Herbert Steiner has called our attention to a misprint in his tribute to Dr. Zimmer in our November number. On page 19, line 15, the word "amoral" appears by mistake; the passage should read, "It (i.e., India) lay before him, ancient and auroral." Dr. Steiner wishes it understood that he does not consider India to be any more "amoral" than any other country! We can only offer our heartfelt apologies to both Dr. Steiner and Mother India. [The Editors.]

BOOK NOTES

China's Religious Heritage. By Y. C. Yang. Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1943. 196 pp. $1.50.

This is a popular work, intended to reach America's religious public with an appeal for profounder appreciation of the cultural and religious heritage of China. It is uncommonly well done. Its author is Chinese and understands the traditions of his country from within. He is also a Christian of wide experience and culture. Twelve years of service in the Washington and London embassies, as well as in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have given him a wide outlook on world inter-relationships. The presidency of Soochow University, membership on the National Christian Council of China, and attendance at the International Missionary Conference at Madras, give scope to his reflections on inter-cultural values.

The book is frankly interpretative and does not pretend to move within the precise limits of scientific Sinology. Its success lies in the skill with which the author translates religious ideals of one civilization into forms understandable by another. Being Christian, he estimates Confucian, Buddhist, and Taoist aspirations by Christian norms. Since these last, however, belong also to the West, his treatment brings Chinese religious traditions sympathetically into a Western frame of reference without losing their essentially Chinese insight and atmosphere. For example, the fact that the Chinese have always believed in a Supreme Ruler of the Universe, Shang Ti, shows ready and understandable affinity with the Western faith in God.

Dr. Yang's treatment of China's abiding faiths is felicitous in characterization. Confucianism he portrays as pre-eminently the art of living, "man in his social relations." Buddhism he sees as "the path of escape" from the inherent sufferings of life as these are understood in China. Taoism, he calls "the law of nature," a species of Lex Aeterna which when found by man becomes a guide of conduct in its profoundest phases. These all are insights of enduring worth which have penetrated and enriched Chinese civilization. Dr. Yang makes it plain that they should be thoroughly recognized and appreciated by anyone endeavoring to reach the soul of the people.

Yet, latterly, the Christian faith has been added to the three religions of China. This the author calls "the way of life." He sees it as more adequately dynamic and complete, bringing yet greater values and, at the same time, correcting emphases in the others which history has shown to be one-sided.

On the whole, Dr. Yang's expositions of China's religious heritage are just, and his comparisons interesting and suggestive. For beginners he sets the subject matter in a useful perspective, and does not trouble the reader with the perplexities which the strictly historical scholar must face. It is a book which deserves the wide popular reading which it seeks.

Clarence H. Hamilton

Srimad Bhagavatam: The Wisdom of God. Translated by SWAMI PRABHAVANANDA. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1943. xii + 340 pp. $2.50.

In the *Bhagavatam,* we get the full flavor of Hindu religious thought, a distillate of the philosophy of the Upanishads and other devotional literature. The present translation is a labor of love. It does not make pretenses at scholarship, and it does not bring us the whole of the sacred book. What there is, is prose and poetry, summary and excerpt, paraphrase and straight translation by the author, interspersed with translations by Swamis Vivekananda and Saradananda. The comments are few, the glossary is helpful. The typography is intriguing.

The whole is presented for our elevation. By making the book known to the English-speaking public, it contributes, no doubt, to lessening the distance that lies between minds steeped in its doctrines and our pragmatic views. The gap is difficult to bridge, except where connatural thinking has paved the way. But whatever our opinion and religious point of view, we must grant, I think, that a country which regards with utter reverence the moral tone and spirituality of a book like this and counts it among its sacred literature, is worthy of our esteem. We may look askance at Yoga, we may stubbornly refuse to think in terms of *māyā,* we may repudiate the absolute, we may lack the desire to have our self lost completely in service or in meditation on the highest reality —yet the loftiness of the ideals is compelling and makes us marvel at the moral timbre of what we like to think of in the economic and political sphere as an emaciated and perhaps depraved race. King and Brahman alike figure as the repositories and expositors of the divine wisdom. They set the example in striving for the ineffable bliss by casting off the illusion of the many. To see the supreme reality in each and all, in man and beast and stone, that is salvation, that is the shedding of the bonds, that is freedom in the Indian sense.

The twofold path for attaining the end is well brought out in the stories that are as dear to the heart of the Hindu as are the fairy stories to a Western child or the biblical scenes to a devout Christian. Through love and utter abandon you lose your self as effectively as in the sustained realization of the oneness of all. Krishna, the central figure of much of the book, descends into human form to help humanity in the ascent to God. It is well to keep this in mind in order to avoid embarrassing moments when we evangelize in the land of Bharata. The grace of God is likewise a theme that may not have a place in a strictly epistemological doctrine of salvation, yet it also is encountered in the book, especially in the story of Ajamil.

Ancient and shot through with the miraculous though many of the stories are, the fact is undeniable that the spiritual food that is offered in them could well serve ourselves for nourishment, especially in times of crisis, when we are prone to see the different forms of reality and call on different names, yet lose sight of the *one* support of all. If read in this light the little volume should be helpful to many in the West, and thus perform a real service in that it not only acquaints us with a document much less known than the *Bhagavad Gītā,* but

assists us in dealing with burning problems of the day through inspiration and the offering of solutions that have stood the test of time.

KURT F. LEIDECKER

In the Steps of Moses. By LOUIS GOLDING. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1943. vi + 556 pp., 16 illustrations and 2 maps. $2.50.

This work by a well known British author deserves to be brought to the attention of the readers of *The Review of Religion,* because it has been some time since a book attempting to follow the journeys of Israel and its leaders from Egypt to the Promised Land has been readily available. Golding's execution of his task is largely a mixture of reflections on the biblical story and theories or traditions about the sacred places with personal travelogue. The latter element is often so British in its touch that an American reader will be more puzzled than edified. Many of the experiences and conversations recorded are of trifling consequence. The author, it appears, is painfully conscious of his Jewish extraction and attempts to hide it among the bitterly anti-Semitic Arabs. In spite of all this, however, the book will help the reader of the Bible to get something of the atmosphere of the lands and places in which Israel is said to have sojourned. A good bibliography (of which the author did not make as good use as he might have) is appended, and a number of interesting illustrations have been given.

EMIL G. KRAELING

Stars and Sand: Jewish Notes by Non-Jewish Notables. Edited by JOSEPH L. BARON. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1943. 555 pp. $2.50.

Among other hurtful consequences of anti-Semitism is the fear of the victim that the prejudice is shared by everybody. Many inferiority twists are so produced. To show how unfounded such insecurity need be, Dr. Baron compiled and edited, in *Candles in the Night,* a collection of great stories about Jews by non-Jewish authors. This venture in sympathetic interpretation he continues here by including reproductions of works of art by such men as Michelangelo and Remembrandt, tributes (although some utterances by Martin Luther were by no means so laudatory as the words in this volume) by preachers, poets, novelists, playwrights, historians, philosophers past and present, statesmen such as Churchill, Smuts, Stalin, Roosevelt. The record is certainly impressive, even after allowance is made by the special pleading which gives the book its purpose. It is to be hoped that it will succeed in dispelling some moods of discouragement.

HENRY NEUMANN

Son of Man and Kingdom of God. A Critical Study. By HENRY BUTTON SHARMAN. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943. 148 pp. $2.50.

In this study, Henry B. Sharman, lecturer in the department of history, Yenching University, who has written half a dozen books on the New Testament, deals with the two fundamental terms of the preaching of the first Christian community. In Part One, he examines all the synoptic passages in which the phrase, "Son of Man," occurs, and, in Part Two, he considers the phrase, "Kingdom of God," with the same thoroughness.

The author's intention is not to furnish exegeses of the respective sentences by providing the reader with a number of "possible" interpretations, but, instead, to give the well deliberated results of years of unflagging investigation. Many a stumbling-block is removed by the manner in which he compares passages of similar content. He does not think it necessary to draw attention to the fact of how deeply the eschatological trend in contemporary thought had touched these two terms, but the attentive student will easily read this between the lines.

Out of a multitude of interesting results, two may be mentioned. Concerning Matt. 26:2, the author says that our Matthew text is to be accounted for by "the free editorial recasting" of the source—Mark, in which is found the simple notice that the Feast of the Passover was at hand. As to the confrontation of the parable of the talents as found in Matthew and Mark, the question may be raised whether, in Jesus' praise of the good servant, the change from "watchful" (Mark) into "faithful" (Matthew) was not due merely to an arbitrary choice among Matthew's sources, but was an intentional alteration intended to express the point of ethical responsibility which this Evangelist supposed that Jesus was emphasizing.

Whoever wishes to investigate the original wording of the speeches of Jesus will find this book to be a very helpful guide.

CARL E. BETH

Evangelicals, Revolutionists and Idealists: Six English Contributions to American Thought and Action. By FRANCIS JOHN MCCONNELL. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1942. 184 pp. $1.50.

In this series of lectures, delivered at Drew University in March, 1942, Bishop McConnell discusses the contributions of James Oglethorpe, John Wesley, George Whitefield, Thomas Paine, George Berkeley and William Wilberforce to American thought and action. McConnell is most successful in achieving his professed objective in the lecture on Oglethorpe. Oglethorpe, he finds, "is worthy of lasting study for his attempts to lift imperialism into the realms of the higher human values." This high moral purpose is found in his effort to set up a debtors' refuge in Georgia, in his policy of fair dealing with the Indians, which foreshadowed the ideal of the trusteeship of the "lesser" people by the "higher," and in his creation of a home for the persecuted of Europe with tolerance for persons of a wide range of opinions.

McConnell regards Wesley's early Georgian career as a limited success and quite correctly palliates, on the grounds of immaturity, that part of his conduct which is so often condemned. Wesley's later and real contributions to America were his religious movement and his church organization, which fitted the needs of this country so admirably in its period of expansion. Whitefield's contribution, according to McConnell, was his modification of the doctrine of Jonathan Edwards in the direction of humanity, a modification more in attitude and practice than in thought.

The last three lectures can hardly be called discussions of Paine's, Berkeley's, and Wilberforce's contributions to American thought and action. That on Paine passes quickly over his political writings and deals chiefly with the "Age of Reason." McConnell feels that the assault upon this work was basically political in origin, that it was made by opposers of the French Revolution and of the American democrats, and that it proved so effective because Paine's point blank statement of his religious views made him such an easy mark. McConnell adds a few points of his own against Paine, but his whole discussion shows little appreciation of the extent to which recent study vindicates Paine's importance in our nation's historical development and in the growth of our national ideals. Berkeley is treated principally in his relationship to Borden Parker Bowne, a much too particularized discussion of this extensively influential metaphysician. The treatment of Wilberforce is a neat general essay but ignores completely the immense influence of this man on American thought as it can be discovered in contemporary essays, lectures, sermons, editorials, and books.

The special value of this book is that it presents the views of a great, liberal-minded churchman of our day upon these important liberal leaders of the past. It is marked by Bishop McConnell's usual spirit of fairness and mature judgment.

NIELS HENRY SONNE

Religion of Tomorrow. By JOHN ELOF BOODIN. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1943. 189 pp. $2.00.

According to the preface, "the author has derived more help from the poets than from the philosophers in preparing these pages." This may justify the impression that from the pages the poets will get more help than the philosophers will. Incidentally, the poets will find familiar material: in the 189 pages there are more than 50 inset quotations from poetic literature.

The theme, developed with a wealth of detail, seems to be that religion in each age has been bound to the past; it has been content in each new age to continue in its old ways, thus generating abuses. Above all, it has been intellectualistic and abstract (the latter word, or the word "abstraction" occurs more than 60 times in the author's critique). In contrast, the religion of the future, while continuing to use reason (pp. 49, 98, 105) and retaining much from the past (ch. 9), must be much more responsive to the testimony of inner feeling, to the demands of the heart, and to the world's present need of genuine

democracy and internationalism. We must work out comprehensive ideals of love, in co-operation with the Genius of the universe in his experiment of evolution (pp. 170, 184). Individual, historical, and cosmic development all tend toward this high destiny, in a process which we may help to promote. There is a distinctly Christian emphasis, centering round the personality of Jesus as an ideal.

The interpretation is urged with great enthusiasm and with a rhetoric which verges upon rhapsody. It is bound to be inspiring to a type of liberalism which does not probe below the surface for the philosophical foundations.

The book does not pretend to deal thoroughly with philosophical problems; in the preface there is reference to the discussion in the author's book entitled *God*. As examples of the treatment used in the present work, pantheistic idealism is countered by the pointed statement that "we need a selective God" (p. 64). Materialism with its "naked reality of matter in motion" and "world devoid of ideals and meaning" is told, "I prefer to believe with the noble idealists . . . that our ideal yearnings . . . are homing instincts" (p. 27). On the question of immortality, Maeterlinck is preferred to the "superficial agnostic" (p. 112). The charge of subjectivism and the pathetic fallacy is met by declaring that the "wooden materialist is subjective in his deadness and conceit" (p. 132). And the universe in its vastness is confronted by the challenge "Do I seem small? What is the whole world of matter compared with thought?" (p. 188).

The volume is, as the preface says, addressed to the religious community, but in a non-technical work an author should, perhaps, be more than ever careful not to use the term "instinct" so loosely (pp. 27, 55, 173, 175, 181).

It is easy to criticize such a book, but it is also easy to overlook its importance. It could be magnificent, if it rested on more secure foundations. Poets, of course, can raise structures faster and further than philosophers can support them. Do poets ever vaguely answer questions before philosophers and scientists have learned adequately to ask them?

GEORGE P. CONGER

Science, Philosophy and Religion. Edited by L. FINKELSTEIN and others. New York: Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, 1943. xix + 438 pp. $3.00.

Third in the series of symposia, this volume ranks in full stature alongside the others. The series constitutes a cross-section of contemporary thought in a wide range of fields. As usual, the most interesting sections of the volumes, and this is no exception, are the informal but recorded comments which appear at the end of the prepared papers. The volumes belong to the conference held each fall at Columbia University of invited scholars in the fields of philosophy, the sciences and religion "in their relation to the democratic way of life."

It is most appropriate that value-theory occupies a prominent place in this volume. Value, it is now conceded, is a basic problem and certainly for social

theory and action. Professors Brightman, Beck, and Pratt are the outstanding interpreters of this subject in this publication. Dr. Russell throws out the question: supposing man is a physico-chemical system, may not the human personality be thought of in terms of the useful scientific pattern of statistical assemblages? The mechanistic hypothesis, says this author, in this sense allows for man's freedom, responsibility, and determined character. At least, so he says, it is far away better as an approach to such questions than the usual manner of philosophical debate and certainly better than the way theologians have handled the problem. To which suggestion there are sparkling retorts by Professors Beck and Pratt. Moreover, the theologian's supposed angel-in-disguise, the Heisenberg principle, which is supposed to prove man's freedom, is neatly exposed as a ghost. The principle of ignorance thus is falsely conceived by ministers of religion, who use it as the sword of freedom. Professor Ferré comes in with his *agape* here and there in comments. Apart from theological "bull-sessions," this concept seems to this reviewer practically unintelligible. The industrial revolution as a historical concept is discussed with an informed criticism by Dr. John Nef. Mrs. Stokowski gives a brief historical sketch of music in terms of layers of civilization. And there are many more, equally good, papers and comments.

VERGILIUS FERM

Love Against Hate. By KARL MENNINGER, with the collaboration of JEANETTA LYLE MENNINGER. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942. ix + 311 pp. $3.50.

The popularization of systematic psychotherapy tends increasingly to present this field as a meeting ground of science and religion. Psychological insights, we are told, fuse naturally with the most essential religious insights. "As a man thinketh in his heart, so is he" has become the slogan of psychiatrist and priest alike. Let only the irritant of dogmatic obligation be withdrawn, and the lion of science will lie peaceably beside the lamb of religion.

As in most of the lamb-and-lion combinations that are proposed, however, one wonders in the present instance whether the lamb escaped ingestion by the lion. A treatment of the conflict of "love against hate" within the human personality is surely a religious affair, particularly when its author makes a point of welcoming religious pronouncements about it. This is done in the chapter on "Faith," and in numerous other parts of the book. But while love is portrayed as the signal means of redirecting aggressive energies, thus saving man and perhaps society (this is the thesis), it is a singularly individualized kind of love. As a by no means slavish follower of Freud, Dr. Menninger remains faithful to the crude evolutionism and cruder social psychology of the master. The primacy of *collective* relationships in human life is ignored, and although the powerful lever, love, is carefully demonstrated, the reader is left with a sense of missing the Archimedean fulcrum.

There seems to be a clear relationship between the scrutiny of love in in-

dividual terms and the author's total disregard of any transcendent morality as a legitimate function of religion. Each man must thus work out his own salvation by conquering his dread of his inner aggressions, and by utilizing their energy in directions that are not anti-social, suicidal, or homicidal in intent. The double negative is a valuable clew. Transcendent and universal *positive* aims are left out of the picture. Dr. Menninger knows that a competitive social order is incompatible with his own recommendations; he asserts quite explicitly that war is incongruous to any adequate scheme of salvation (while rationalizing the present war in a self-contradictory manner); he is entirely aware that the ends share the quality of the means. His wide experience with the fruits of human frustrations compel such recognitions. Nevertheless, the problem of a psychologically and religiously demanded social ethic is consistently dodged, and to him religion, although valuable, remains an expedient born of adjustive inadequacy.

HOWARD DAVIS SPOERL

The Goodspeed Parallel New Testament. Edited by EDGAR J. GOODSPEED. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943. viii + 600 pp. $2.00.

This very useful book contains Professor Goodspeed's own "American Translation" of the New Testament and the King James Version side by side, with valuable brief historical introductions to each book, and copious footnotes for the biblical scholar. The experience of reading the two versions together—the King James so rich and sonorous, and the American so fresh and contemporary—is a pure joy, as well as a genuine illumination of the understanding.

The Holy Bible (Self-Pronouncing). With illustration by FRITZ KREDEL. New York: The Modern Library, 1943. 1131 pp. $1.50.

This attractive new edition of the King James Bible should prove to be popular, especially with young people. The self-pronouncing feature is greatly to be commended, as it removes one of the main stumbling blocks to reading the Bible aloud. The illustrations are, on the whole, well drawn and effective. The print is admirably clear and legible.

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Plane Chant as a Basic Study. By GIOVANNI CAMPAJANI. *Liturgical Arts,* XII (1943), 12-13.

CORRECTIONS

Two articles were listed in the November number as *Journal of Religion* instead of *Journal of Liberal Religion.* The correct references are as follows:

Method and the Future of Theology. By MERLE WILLIAM BOYER. *Journal of Liberal Religion,* IV (1943), 195-205.

The Nexus of Humility. By ROWLAND GRAY-SMITH. *Journal of Liberal Religion,* IV (1943), 212-17.